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Summary of Thesis 
Intergroup apologies, from nations, governments, public bodies and 
businesses, have become commonplace in the modern era for both past and 
present wrongdoings. Despite the increase in these apologies, current research 
suggests that intergroup apologies are not effective in promoting forgiveness or 
progressing the reconciliation process. One prominent inconsistency is that 
interpersonal apologies are generally fruitful in producing forgiveness. In this thesis 
I attempt to answer why intergroup apologies are ineffective and whether it is 
possible to improve their efficacy. 
 In Chapter 2 I highlight some of the paradoxes that surround intergroup 
apologies – such as the fact that desiring such an apology does not increase the 
likelihood of forgiveness when that apology is delivered. In Chapter 3 I focus on the 
role of content in intergroup apology. There I show that specific strategies (such as 
future orientated promises and emotion expressions) should be kept separate to 
avoid one type of content undermining the other. The results reported in Chapter 4 
provide a basis for optimism about the prospects for intergroup reconciliation, 
showing that the expression of guilt and/or shame can be an effective way of 
repairing an intergroup relationship, whereas the expression of pride has the 
opposite effect. The research reported in Chapter 5 shows that intergroup 
apologies can be effective when they are embedded within a broader reconciliation 
process. 
 The majority of the studies reported in this thesis show that there are 
important differences in how interpersonal and intergroup apologies are received. 
Intergroup apologies are far less likely to promote forgiveness – confirming doubts 
about their effectiveness. However, I conclude that there is also cause for 
optimism. The research reported here shows that when intergroup apologies are 
delivered in the right way, as part of a broad and extended reconciliation process, 
they can be effective in achieving forgiveness. 
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
I sit on a man's back, choking him and making him carry me, and 
yet assure myself and others that I am very sorry for him and wish 
to ease his lot by all possible means - except by getting off his 
back. 
Leo Tolstoy, 1887 
 
The above quote from Tolstoy highlights one large pitfall of apologies – If 
people did feel truly sorry for their actions, would they have committed them in the 
first place? This offers an insight into the minds of victims who choose not to accept 
apologies or forgive a transgressor, but of course this does not stop a transgressor 
offering an apology.  
Prior to World War Two, public intergroup apologies were almost unheard 
of. They were often seen as a sign of weak leadership and a potential stick with 
which to beat the apologiser, because he or she was implicitly or explicitly 
accepting responsibility for some adverse outcome.  Since World War Two, the 
frequency with which intergroup apologies are offered has soared. Apologies are 
now being offered from nations, government, public bodies and businesses for both 
past and present failings, to the point where one commentator has described the 
present era as “The Age of Apology” (Brooks, 1999). Two questions that arise from 
this observation are “Why are there so many intergroup apologies?” and “Are these 
apologies effective?”.  In an attempt to answer the first of these questions, Barkan 
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(2000) suggested that we are living in an era in which people are more attentive to 
their moral responsibilities, and that this attentiveness makes us want to repair 
historical wrongs. Relatedly, it seems reasonable to assume that people want past 
wrongdoings to be both forgiven and forgotten, and that the quickest way to 
achieve this is to start with an apology, triggering an ‘apology-forgiveness’ cycle. 
The second question concerning the effectiveness of intergroup apologies is more 
complicated to answer, but one way to address this question is to start with the 
motivations for issuing the apology. If the motivation is to communicate regret that 
is genuinely felt about past wrongdoing, in the hope that future relations with the 
victim group can be improved, then the effectiveness can be mostly evaluated by 
the transgressors in terms of the extent to which they experience some alleviation 
of their negative feelings, as well as any potential positive impacts on the 
relationship between the groups. However, if the motivation for issuing an 
intergroup apology is simply to be forgiven and to move on, judging effectiveness 
becomes more complex. I will devote the remainder of this opening chapter to 
discussing the effectiveness of intergroup apologies, using real world examples to 
illustrate key issues, as well as describing findings from research that has examined 
intergroup apologies and their effectiveness. 
Case Study 1. Nick Clegg and the Liberal Democrats, September 2012. 
 In the run up to the 2010 General Election, the Liberal Democrats were seen 
by many as offering a genuine alternative to the two main political parties in the 
UK. Much of this was due to the performances of their then party leader, Nick 
Clegg, in the television debates that preceded the election. In the course of this 
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build up, Clegg, like many other Liberal Democrat MPs, signed a pledge to the 
National Union of Students not to raise the cap on university tuition fees; if the cap 
were raised, fees would rise from around £3,000 a year to £9,000 a year. After the 
general election finished with no single party holding a majority, Clegg opted to 
take his party into government via a formal coalition with the Conservative Party. 
After less than six months of the new coalition government, the cap on tuition fees 
was raised to £9,000 a year, the legislation passing through parliament with the 
help of several Liberal Democrat MPs. This led to an outcry and an upsurge in 
negativity towards Clegg and the Liberal Democrats, with terms such as “liars”, 
“hypocrites”, and even “Pinocchio” hitting newspaper headlines to describe this 
apparent betrayal of the pledge made to the country’s university students. 
In an attempt to atone for this sequence of events, Clegg himself decided to 
issue a public video apologising on behalf of both himself and his party for not 
sticking to the pledge that he and his MPs previously signed. Despite newspaper 
articles claiming that the apology drew both “scorn and applause” (Wintour & 
Mulholland, 2012), even a superficial examination of opinion poll data and ‘below-
the-line’ comments on newspaper websites suggests that ‘scorn’ is a better 
description of how Clegg’s apology was received. Below are some of the less 
extreme comments made about the apology (which was also satirised by turning it 
into a music video that went viral): 
“Too damn late. You received votes on the back of this. Shameful.” 
“It’s too late Nick” 
“Where’s your resignation letter, Nick? We’re past apologies.” 
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“Pass me the sick bucket please” 
“The Lib Dem Party is largely a joke, I don’t know why anyone would vote for 
them in the next election” 
“The Lib Dem’s are finished” 
Since this episode, support for the Liberal Democrats in General Elections 
has collapsed – from attracting nearly 6,000,000 votes in the 2010 General Election 
to winning around 2,500,000 votes in the two subsequent General Elections. Many 
still cite the actions of the Lib Dems over tuition fees as a key reason why they 
would not vote for them, thereby highlighting the ineffectiveness of Clegg’s 
apology. 
Case Study 2. The Australian Apology to the Stolen Generations 
 As a result of Australian Government policies concerning the ‘civilization’ of 
the indigenous Australian people, between the early 1900s and 1970 thousands of 
children were forcibly removed from their families. The children were removed and 
placed in girls’ and boys’ homes, foster families, and other kinds of institutions. 
These children were taught to reject their indigenous culture and expected to 
conform to “Australian values”, thereby supposedly helping them to assimilate into 
Australian culture. The lives of many of these children were blighted by abuse, and 
in many cases, they were not accepted as equals. Furthermore, a large number of 
those taken away from their families were never able to locate their parents. Those 
who were affected by these actions were subsequently named ‘The Stolen 
Generations’. 
  Chapter 1 
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 An official inquiry into the policies that led to this child removal was 
launched by the Australian Government in 1995. This report was tabled in 
parliament on the 26th May 1997, and from the following year onwards, this date 
was known in Australia as ‘National Sorry Day’. In 2007, the then Prime Minister of 
Australia offered a formal apology in parliament, becoming the first Australian 
Prime Minister to publicly apologise to the Stolen Generations on behalf of the 
Australian government. The apology itself was reported to have been widely 
applauded by both indigenous Australians and non-indigenous Australians 
(McKenny, 2008). 
 Despite the apology being widely welcomed and applauded, it was not 
without controversy. One disputed issue concerned the fact that a promise of 
compensation to the Stolen Generations was missing from the apology. 
Compensation was something that was apparently demanded alongside an 
apology, but this came to nothing.  
 More than a decade later, it seems that genuine success in the wake of the 
apology was limited. The apology generated hope and optimism that inequality 
would be addressed, but this hope has not been fulfilled. A recent report shows 
that Australia is still failing on four out of seven measures that aimed to improve 
the lives of the indigenous people (Mao, 2018).  
Case Study 3. The Canadian Apology for the Indian Residential Schools. 
 Much as with the assimilation attempts made by Australia in relation to the 
Stolen Generations, in Canada from the late 19th century to the late 20th century a 
system of schools was created and funded by the Canadian Government for the 
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purpose of removing First Nations children from their indigenous culture and 
replacing it with the dominant Canadian culture. Children were rounded up and 
taken to these boarding schools. It is estimated that around one-third of all 
indigenous children were placed in one of these schools across Canada. As well as 
being forcibly removed from their families, these children experienced a lot of 
abuse at these schools.  
 Apologies for this school system began to be made in the 1980s and 1990s, 
with the apologies coming from leaders of the United Church of Canada, the 
Anglican Church of Canada, and the Presbyterian Church in Canada. In 1998, 
financial compensation was offered during a government “statement of 
reconciliation” to those people who were physically or sexually abused while 
attending residential schools, although a formal government apology would not 
come for another decade. It was 2008 when the then Canadian Prime Minister 
offered a formal apology, for both the creation of the residential schools and the 
abuses that occurred within them. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 
Canada was also established in 2008, providing an opportunity for school survivors 
to share their experiences. This commission led to 94 “Calls to Action”, in the hope 
of promoting reconciliation. 
 The formal apology made by the Prime Minister was, by and large, well 
received by the indigenous population. It was regarded as a significant symbolic 
gesture and raised hopes and increased optimism that things would change (Eshet, 
2015). However, once again, this appears to be an instance where such hope and 
optimism was not fully converted into positive developments. Of the 94 “Calls to 
  Chapter 1 
7 
 
Action”, by 2018 10 were marked as “completed”, 15 were “in progress”, 25 had 
“proposed projects”, while the remaining 44 had not been acted upon (Carreiro, 
2018). Research has also shown that a key reason for poor well-being in the 
indigenous population of Canada can still be traced to this historical trauma 
(Bombay, Matheson, & Anisman, 2013). 
Summary 
These three case studies point to the apparent ineffectiveness of large-
scale, public, intergroup apologies; or at the very least, they highlight their 
ineffectiveness in comparison to expectations about what would follow from the 
apologies. However, these are just three cases, and case studies by their very 
nature have idiosyncrasies that may not be generalisable to the entire class of 
intergroup apologies. Furthermore, analysis of case studies typically (as here) 
depends on what is available in the public domain, in the form of newspaper 
reports and online commentary.  I therefore now turn to more systematic research 
on intergroup apologies, to examine the state of the evidence concerning their 
effectiveness. 
Research on Intergroup Apologies 
 Despite the large increase in the incidence of intergroup apologies, current 
research is inconclusive with respect to how useful they really can be. It is widely 
assumed that official intergroup apologies are a vital factor in attaining intergroup 
reconciliation (Lazare, 2004; Tavuchis, 1991) and indeed there are studies showing 
the positive effects that apologies can have. For example, Leonard, Mackie, and 
Smith (2011) showed that offering an apology would increase forgiveness, 
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compared to a no apology control condition. This was done by showing 
participants, who were university students, a bogus article that was ostensibly 
written by university professors in a local newspaper. This article had professors 
claiming that the students were “spoiled, immature, and unintelligent,” amongst 
other things, and had a lack of responsibility towards their education. Participants 
were then given information leading them to think that the professors had either 
apologised or had chosen not to apologise. In the apology condition there was a 
greater desire to forgive the lecturers, largely mediated by a reduced desire for 
retribution. Although the findings of Leonard et al. suggest that intergroup 
apologies can be effective, the study has some limitations. First, the extent to which 
it is really an intergroup study is unclear, because the students and professors were 
all members of the same university. Second, in the control condition participants 
were told that the professors had chosen not to apologise, which is subtly but 
possibly importantly different from simply not apologising.  
 Another study that offers some optimism regarding the effectiveness of 
intergroup apologies is the one reported by Brown, Wohl, and Exline (2008). These 
researchers conducted a study examining a ‘friendly-fire’ incident between 
American and Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan and whether the offering of an 
apology would be more likely to lead to forgiveness than not offering one. The 
results showed that an apology was likely to inspire forgiveness, but again, the 
context needs to be borne in mind. As the term ‘friendly fire’ suggests, this incident 
was an accident that happened between two groups who were allies and were 
therefore already in a positive intergroup relationship. The fundamentally good 
relationship between these groups was not jeopardised by the incident. It also 
  Chapter 1 
9 
 
needs to be remembered that the event was accidental, meaning that the context 
is one in which there was no intent. So again, although this study yielded evidence 
that an intergroup apology elicits forgiveness, the context of the intergroup 
transgression is not one in which there was real hostility or rivalry between the two 
groups, as there often is when intergroup apologies are called for or made. 
 A more common finding from research on intergroup apologies is that such 
apologies can improve the victim group’s perceptions of the transgressor group. For 
example, Berndsen, Hornsey, and Wohl (2015) found that victim group members 
perceived transgressors as more remorseful following an intergroup apology, while 
more generally Blatz, Day, and Schryer (2014) showed that victim group members 
evaluate perpetrators more favourably after such apologies. Although such findings 
again provide some reason to be optimistic about the effectiveness of intergroup 
apologies, they do not show any increase in forgiveness, which those interested in 
intergroup reconciliation would generally regard as their key aim. 
 Thus, although there is evidence that intergroup apologies leave victim 
group members more satisfied, and with more positive perceptions of the 
transgressors, such effects typically do not translate into forgiveness and 
reconciliation (Hornsey, Wohl, & Philpot, 2014). This is also consistent with the 
impression given by the three intergroup apology case studies summarised at the 
beginning of this chapter. Research examining the how the Canadian government 
apology was received and how participants responded to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission for the Indian Residential Schools suggests that victims 
were generally pessimistic about whether the apology would actually change 
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anything. Consistent with this is research undertaken by Chapman (2007), looking 
at the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa. Chapman 
found that victims and their family members were generally disinclined to forgive 
transgressors. 
Also consistent with doubts about the effectiveness of intergroup apologies 
in generating forgiveness and reconciliation is research by Philpot and Hornsey 
(2008). These authors conducted multiple studies in a variety of contexts, each of 
which appeared to highlight the ineffectiveness of intergroup apologies; in none of 
these studies was there a significant difference in forgiveness when the 
transgressing group offered an apology, compared to when it did not. These studies 
cast doubt on the positive conclusions drawn from some of the research on this 
topic. The general conclusion suggested by this body of work is that although 
intergroup apologies are initially welcomed, and allow victims to perceive 
transgressors as remorseful, they do not promote forgiveness and reconciliation. 
Interpersonal Apologies 
 Although the evidence that intergroup apologies promote forgiveness 
seems variable at best, and negative at worst, research on interpersonal apologies 
paints a much clearer and more positive picture (e.g., Exline & Baumeister, 2000). 
From a young age, most children are taught that an apology should always follow a 
wrongdoing, and that a sincerely offered apology generally results in forgiveness 
(Darby & Schlenker, 1989). Indeed, the research evidence shows that apologies 
offered by one individual to another generally do lead to forgiveness. For example, 
McCullough, Worthington, and Rachal (1997) found that there was a decrease in 
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the motivation for revenge once an apology had been given. This finding was 
supported by Beyens, Yu, Han, Zhang and Zhou (2015), who showed that offender 
apologies reduce aggressive reactions and implicit negative attitudes. Likewise, De 
Cremer (2010) showed that when an interpersonal apology is offered following 
exploitation or an unfair offer, it is an effective strategy for promoting trust. It is 
also described as a necessity in certain cases, where it is a stronger strategy than 
offering financial compensation. These findings are more consistent and offer a 
much more positive outlook on the effectiveness of interpersonal apologies, 
especially when compared to the research evidence on intergroup apologies.  
Intergroup vs. Interpersonal Differences 
 The abovementioned research highlights a substantial difference in the way 
that intergroup apologies and interpersonal apologies are received. The former 
seems to be ineffective in promoting forgiveness or reconciliation, whereas the 
latter seem to be an effective way of achieving these ends. Research comparing 
interpersonal and intergroup interactions generally shows that intergroup scenarios 
tend to be more competitive than in interpersonal scenarios (Insko, Schopler, 
Gaertner, Wildschut, Kozar, Pinter, Finkel, Brazil, Cecil, & Montoya, 2001; Wildschut 
& Insko, 2007). I now turn to a consideration of the factors that may be responsible 
for this difference.   
Identity  
 One factor that needs to be taken into account when considering why there 
is a difference between intergroup and interpersonal settings is that of personal 
versus social identity. Every individual has a personal identity, comprising his or her 
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attributes, beliefs, and other personal qualities. There are also some attributes and 
qualities that are shared with others, such as family members, work colleagues, 
fellow sports team supporters, fellow citizens of a town or country, and so on. 
These shared attributes make up a person’s social identity. It is well established 
that although the degree to which individuals characteristically construe 
themselves in terms of personal and social attributes varies from one culture to 
another, with those who come from collectivistic cultures being more inclined to 
define themselves in terms of shared attributes (e.g., Triandis, McCusker & Hui, 
1990), it is also the case that social identity plays an important role in social 
behaviour in all cultural settings, especially when one group interacts with another.  
Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) was developed in an attempt to 
account for the role played by social identity in group and intergroup settings. It 
proposes that individuals’ sense of who they are is derived at least to some extent 
from the groups of which they belong. This is especially the case when people 
perceive themselves to be part of a group. This collective then becomes the in-
group, as distinct from other individuals who belong to one or more out-groups. A 
key prediction that can be derived from SIT is that in intergroup settings, when one 
member of an in-group is harmed by one or more members of an out-group, this 
will be experienced by all in-group members as a threat to themselves, due to their 
shared identity. This means that when one or more members of a group are 
harmed, or targeted, for being a part of that group, all individuals who identify with 
that group will also feel harmed or targeted, and share (at least to some extent) the 
associated negative feelings. This is different from a purely interpersonal setting, 
where there is no shared identity with others. Here, harm or the threat of harm, to 
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one person is limited to that individual. Moreover, it is usually clear who the 
perpetrator is, making any conflict between persons a (literally) one-to-one 
interaction, as opposed to a many-to-many interaction. The in-group vs. out-group, 
us vs. them mentality that characterises intergroup relations could help to account 
for the difference in responses to intergroup and interpersonal apologies. This 
concept of identity threat is relevant to many of the studies reported in this thesis, 
because they typically involve instances where participants are not personally 
victimised by another group; instead, they will be exposed to situations in which a 
group (in most cases their in-group) has been treated in a way that threatens the 
wellbeing of the group and thereby threatens their identity.  
One way in which the importance of a shared social identity becomes 
evident is with respect to persuasion and attitude change. Turner (1991) argued 
that when a social identity is salient, the ability to persuade individuals is often 
based on the perceived legitimacy of the information and its relation to in-group 
norms. Persuasion attempts coming from in-group sources are likely to be seen as 
more legitimate and more in keeping with in-group norms and values than are 
persuasion attempts coming from out-group sources. There is no shortage of 
evidence to support this prediction, with Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg and 
Turner (1990), for example, showing that attitude change was greater when the 
source of information belonged to the same in-group as the receiver. To the extent 
that apologies can be seen as attempts to persuade others (typically the victim) – 
for example, that the harm was unintentional or unforeseen or at the very least 
sincerely regretted – this perspective helps us to understand why interpersonal 
apologies are more effective than intergroup ones. If personal identity is salient, 
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there is no reason to regard the person offering the apology as an out-group 
member, and you may therefore be more inclined to accept the apology. If social 
identity is salient and the person offering the apology is an out-group member, you 
may be less inclined to regard the apology as sincere. This perspective also helps to 
explain the results of the few studies that have yielded some evidence that 
intergroup apologies are effective: As noted earlier, in those studies (Brown et al., 
2008; Leonard et al., 2011) there was a degree of shared group identity between 
transgressors and victims, in the sense that there was a fairly salient superordinate 
shared group membership (members of the same university, or allies in an armed 
conflict). In these circumstances, the victim groups would be more likely to listen 
and react positively to someone who was also regarded as a fellow in-group 
member.  
There are other pieces of research on shared social identity that also help to 
explain how it makes decision-making and reactions in an intergroup context differ 
to those in an interpersonal context. Firstly, there are studies showing that a 
collective social identity can and will lead individuals to evaluate situations in a way 
that is biased towards the in-group (e.g., Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Leach, Iyer, 
& Pedersen, 2007). Wildschut, Insko and Gaertner (2002) offer convincing evidence 
regarding this phenomenon. They show the impact that social support can have on 
intergroup competition, concluding that group members, when together, are able 
to provide each other with the support needed in order to pursue an action that 
favours the in-group. Such findings provide a reason why it is more difficult to 
forgive transgressions in an intergroup scenario than in an interpersonal one: in an 
intergroup conflict setting, the actions committed by out-group members are likely 
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to be judged more harshly, and the threat to the in-group is likely to be perceived 
as more severe, and ultimately there may be support for a position of not forgiving 
the out-group. In addition, it has been shown that when social group identities are 
made salient, people tend to behave in a more greedy, competitive manner than if 
individuals were reacting to each other interpersonally (Insko et al., 2001; Insko, 
Kirchner, Pinter, Efaw, & Wildschut, 2005). Together, this research on identity 
highlights how the situations in which social identities are engaged do not create an 
environment that is conducive to intergroup forgiveness. 
The issue of identity has already been highlighted in intergroup apology 
research. In the aforementioned study by Brown et al. (2008), one of the key 
findings was that those who identified more highly with the victim group were less 
forgiving of the transgression than were those who identified less strongly. This 
shows how potentially important the role played by identity is in intergroup 
apologies. It implies that having a high identification with an in-group is likely to 
make one less forgiving, more greedy, more competitive, and more biased towards 
your in-group in evaluating situations of potential or actual intergroup conflict, and 
be less likely to be persuaded by someone regarded as an out-group member who 
seeks to apologise for the out-group’s actions. This helps to explain why the 
research evidence reveals such consistent discrepancies in the effectiveness of 
intergroup and interpersonal apologies.  
Despite the importance of identity in intergroup apologies and 
reconciliation, it is worth pointing out that attempts to reduce the strength of social 
identity that one feels with their group would be likely to be met negatively. With 
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this in mind, it should be recognised that in attempting to make intergroup 
apologies more effective, one must attempt to address the effects that social 
identity can have (e.g., groups being harder to persuade in comparison to 
individuals), rather than the identity itself. Therefore, in the course of this thesis, 
although the role of social identity itself is not directly explored, factors that can 
have an impact on social identity, along with variables that can be influenced by 
social identity, will be. 
Emotion 
 A further factor that needs to be taken into account in explaining the low 
effectiveness of intergroup apologies is the role of emotion in intergroup settings. 
Social appraisal theory (Manstead & Fischer, 2001; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 
2005) proposes that our reactions to events in our lives are not only shaped by our 
own feelings and appraisals, but also by the feelings and appraisals of others. This 
offers an initial insight into how an intergroup scenario is immediately more 
complex than an interpersonal one. In an intergroup scenario, it is not only one’s 
own feelings and evaluations that lead to perceptions, actions and behaviour, but 
also the feelings and evaluations of others. Emotions are experienced and 
expressed in many types of social setting, some interpersonal and some intergroup. 
In both types of setting, how others are seen to react to an emotional event is likely 
to influence an individual’s own appraisal of – and therefore emotional responses 
to – the event, but in the case of intergroup settings group members are more likely 
to be influenced by the reactions of in-group members than those of out-group 
members.  
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Indeed, there is a large body of empirical research showing that people can 
and do experience emotions of behalf of a group to which they belong (Mackie, 
Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie & Smith, 2002). Such findings are consistent with 
Smith’s (1993) intergroup emotion theory (IET). IET proposes that in a situation in 
which individuals define themselves as members of a group, this provides the 
foundation for group-based emotions. The rationale is that emotions are 
experienced when the individual perceives that an event has implications for his or 
her personal wellbeing. In intergroup settings, the wellbeing at stake is that of the 
extended or social self, the self-defined by one’s social identity. Thus, the idea is 
that intergroup emotions are initiated by intergroup appraisals (appraisals that are 
group-based) and are a powerful predictor of perceptions, actions and behaviours. 
It has also been shown that these group-based emotions are independent of 
individual emotions (Kuppens, Yzerbyt, Dandache, Fischer, & van der Schalk, 2013).  
Both social appraisal theory and IET suggest that emotions in intergroup 
contexts are unlikely to work in the same way as they would in an interpersonal 
context. One way in which this is evident is in the regulation of emotions. Gross 
(2002) argues that certain ‘strategies’, like reappraisal, can be used in an attempt to 
upregulate or downregulate emotions to achieve a more desired state. However, 
this is less straightforwardly achieved in an intergroup context. For example, 
Kramer (1994) showed that in negotiations, members of one group often have an 
exaggeratively negative perception of the intentions of the opposing group, which 
makes it more difficult to reappraise their intentions as benign. This finding helps to 
explain why intergroup scenarios are often more competitive than any 
interpersonal counterpart.  
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Because of the aforementioned research, it should not be a surprise to find 
that intergroup emotions play prominent role in conflict and reconciliation (Bar-Tal, 
2007). The collective experience and shared appraisal of past conflicts powerfully 
influences group-based emotions, which in turn have a large sway on what happens 
next, whether it be reconciliation, stagnation, or retaliation. This has been argued 
by Cehajic-Clancy, Goldenberg, Gross, and Halperin (2016), who propose that, as 
with individual emotions, negative group-based emotions need to be 
downregulated if reconciliation is to take place. 
Research that has been undertaken on the effect that group-based 
emotions can have on conflict and reconciliation has revealed the influence that 
emotions have in either ameliorating or exacerbating intergroup conflict (e.g., 
Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; Mackie et al., 2000). Following the 9/11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center in New York, American citizens who reported higher levels 
of anger were much more supportive of military attacks (Cheung-Blunden & 
Blunden, 2008; Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). On the other side of the 
coin, studies examining longstanding conflicts in Bosnia (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 
2008) and in Israel/Palestine (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014) have 
shown the capacity of group-based emotions to promote intergroup reconciliation. 
Although the role of emotion mentioned thus far focuses on the experience 
of intergroup emotions, there is also an important role to be played by the 
expression of such emotions. If, as mentioned earlier, intergroup emotions are 
powerful predictors of perceptions, actions and behaviours, the expression of these 
emotions to a victimised group is likely have considerable implications. Although 
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the literature on the expression of intergroup emotions is less plentiful than that on 
the experience of intergroup emotions, there are studies showing that the 
expression of negative self-conscious emotions, such as guilt or regret, can enhance 
intergroup cooperation (Rychlowska et al., 2019; Shore et al., 2019). The role that 
emotion expression can play in reconciliation has been investigated in the context 
economic games, and this will be a focus of the research reported in Chapter 4.  
Identity is also closely involved in intergroup emotions, with Smith, Seger, 
and Mackie (2007) proposing the that there is a generally positive correlation 
between the two, such that people who identify more strongly with a social group 
experiencing stronger emotions when that group’s wellbeing is affected. It has even 
been shown that discovering that one shares the same emotional responses to an 
event with other individuals strengthens the perception that one shares group 
membership with them, while finding out that one’s emotional reactions are not 
shared with others weakens the sense of shared group membership (Livingstone, 
Spears, Manstead, Bruder, & Shepherd 2011).  
A key finding in the field of intergroup emotion is that when group 
membership is salient, people can experience group-based emotions in relation to 
events even if they are not personally affected by them (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 
1999). This means, for example, that negative emotions can be experienced by 
members of a social group in relation to events in which they are not directly 
involved (see, for example, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears & Manstead, 1998). 
Furthermore, Weisbuch and Ambady (2008) have shown that although individuals 
are inclined to mimic the emotions of fellow in-group members, they are more 
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likely to experience contrasting emotions from those expressed by out-group 
members. 
Prior work on social and group-based aspects of emotion helps to explain 
why it is difficult to achieve reconciliation between social groups. Group members 
are likely to look to fellow group members in responding to any event that affects 
the group’s interests, even events that do not directly involve them, and be 
influenced by how other group members are seen to react. This is especially likely 
to be true of those who identify highly with the group in question, and there is 
reason to believe that shared emotional responses to an event strengthen the 
perception of shared group membership and thereby increase identification.  
Summary 
Between them, the factors of social identity and group-based emotion help 
to account for the differential effectiveness of interpersonal and intergroup 
apologies. In combination, they highlight the difficulties faced by anyone seeking to 
promote intergroup reconciliation. Intergroup settings are characterised by greater 
competition and greed, and in-groups often have exaggeratedly negative 
perceptions of out-groups; group members are less easily persuaded by an out-
group than by their in-group and are more likely to mimic emotions expressed by 
in-group members and contrast away from those expressed by out-group members. 
It is therefore more difficult to regulate intergroup emotions than individual or 
interpersonal emotions. As a result, intergroup apologies are less likely to be 
effective in generating forgiveness than their interpersonal counterparts.  
  Chapter 1 
21 
 
An important factor that links the roles played by identity and emotion in 
intergroup contexts is that of trust.  Voci (2006) suggests that identity, group-based 
emotions, and trust are three intertwined factors. A key issue with group identity in 
intergroup apology settings is that the victims are in effect being asked to trust to a 
greater extent than are the perpetrators. The apology offered can be seen as an 
attempt to persuade the victim group that things will be different in the future. As 
noted by Turner (1991), social influence is often based on perceived legitimacy of 
information, and this also highlights the integral factor played by trust. If one group 
is experiencing heightened threat-based emotions as the result of a transgression 
committed by another group, it is evident that a trust-restoring interaction 
between the groups will be needed to begin to alleviate those emotions. This it 
seems essential that in any effort to promote reconciliation, there will need to be a 
promotion of perceived trust in the apologising group. 
One area of research that explores how trust can be repaired is that of 
economic games and trust games. There have been many studies that highlight 
ways in which trust can be rebuilt, such as denial of intent to be unfair (Van Dijke & 
De Cremer, 2011), offering compensation (De Cremer, 2010), and even appearing 
confused by how the game works (De Cremer, Van Dijk & Pilluta, 2010; Desmet, De 
Cremer & Van Dijk, 2011). However, it should be noted that the majority of 
research in this are focused on rebuilding trust within interpersonal economic 
games and, as with the variety of contexts already introduced within this chapter, 
intergroup economic games, in comparison to their interpersonal counterparts, are 
commonly characterised by greater mistrust, defection and all-around 
competitiveness (Kugler, Kausel & Kocher, 2012). 
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Theoretical Models 
 Having considered two factors that seem to be highly relevant to the issue 
of why intergroup apologies tend to be ineffective, I now turn to a discussion of 
theoretical models of intergroup reconciliation and apology. One of the two models 
I will discuss is a model of intergroup reconciliation, focusing on the needs of the 
two groups that are involved in a conflict. The other is ostensibly a model 
intergroup apology that locates the apology in a broader process that amounts to a 
model of intergroup reconciliation. 
The Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation 
 One model that has been proposed to improve the efficacy of intergroup 
reconciliation attempts is the needs-based model of reconciliation (Nadler & 
Shnabel, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 
2009). This proposes that in order to achieve an effective reconciliation, the 
emotional needs of both victims and transgressors have to be addressed. It is 
argued that while victims are suffering an elementary threat to their identity in 
terms of appearing less powerful, transgressors feel an elementary threat to their 
identity in terms of appearing less moral. 
 Nadler and Shnabel’s model identifies different ways in which each of these 
threats can be addressed. With respect to victims’ need for empowerment, an 
obvious and perhaps instinctive way to accomplish this is through retaliation and 
vengeance. A more constructive route is for the transgressors to acknowledge their 
responsibility for the transgression, potentially in the form of an apology, which in 
turn gives control, and power, back to victims, who then can decide how to 
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progress (Minnow, 1998). It has been suggested that victims perceive matters of 
justice and addressing history to be of upmost importance in reconciliation 
(Rouhana, 2004). A further strategy for improving the probability of reconciliation 
from a victim perspective would include some form of appreciation on the part of 
the transgressors for the accomplishments and abilities of victims, thereby building 
the latter’s self-esteem and leaving them feeling more empowered (Shnabel, 
Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich, 2008). 
 With respect to the transgressors’ needs to improve their moral image, or at 
the very least remove the threat to it, there appear to be two very different 
strategies that can be used, only one of which is likely to promote reconciliation. 
The first option is denial of wrongdoing. Denying the actions or transgressions, or at 
least refuting their potentially severe consequences, would certainly help not only 
in alleviating the threat to the transgressor group’s moral image, but also in easing 
any negative emotions (such as guilt or shame) they might feel about the situation. 
There is some evidence that high identifiers might be more willing to deny 
responsibility. For example, in the study by Doosje et al. (1998), it was found that 
those who were categorised as ‘high-identifiers’ of the perpetrator group were less 
likely to experience high levels of collective guilt.  
An alternative, more constructive option, would be to seek the victims’ 
forgiveness. By offering an apology and making an attempt to repair or compensate 
for harm done, the transgressing group might evoke forgiveness, which would go a 
long way to alleviating the threat to the group’s moral image. A potential problem 
with the offering of an intergroup apology is that some victims may perceive the 
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apology purely as a strategy on the part of the transgressors to reduce this moral 
threat to their identity, rather than as a sincere attempt to achieve reconciliation. It 
is this that has led some commentators to suggest that intergroup apologies are 
simply self-serving (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009). This makes it vitally important 
that the offered apology and reparation meet the victims’ needs for empowerment.  
 Research has been undertaken to test hypotheses derived from this model, 
initially by the model’s authors. Shnabel and Nadler (2008) reported four different 
studies that provided support for the general hypotheses of the model, initially 
demonstrating that transgressions make victims feel powerless and transgressors 
morally inadequate. They used both laboratory-based and role-playing 
methodologies to show this, as well as providing evidence that reconciliation is 
possible if social exchange between transgressors and victims addresses those 
needs. Shnabel et al. (2009), focusing specifically on intergroup scenarios, showed 
that a victim group responds more positively to a message of empowerment (one 
that includes an acknowledgement of responsibility) rather than one of acceptance 
and compassion (one that includes an acknowledgement of the suffering) from the 
transgressing group, whereas the reverse was true for transgressing group. 
 Research testing the model has also been extended to ‘dual-level’ conflicts, 
where “victims” and “transgressors” are not mutually exclusive roles but can be 
applied to both parties concurrently. SimonTov-Nachlieli and Shnabel (2014) 
investigated this using a modified dictator game, in which one party (the allocator) 
chooses how much of an endowed resource to allocate to another party. In their 
first study, the researchers manipulated participants to feel that they were a victim, 
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a transgressor, both (dual), or neither (control). Consistent with the needs-based 
model, it was shown that those in the dual condition showed a heightened need for 
both empowerment and acceptance. It was also shown that those in this dual 
condition were more like victim groups in the way they behaved (they were less 
generous than the other conditions). In a second study, the researchers replicated 
this finding at the intergroup level, using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the 
context for the study. Although the results of this research provide support for the 
needs-based model, they also pinpoint a difficulty, in that many present-day 
intergroup conflicts do have this dual-level character, with neither party to a 
conflict being exclusively ‘victim’ or ‘perpetrator’. Unfortunately, it appears to be 
more challenging to meet groups’ needs under these circumstances. 
 The needs-based model of reconciliation provides us with a way to improve 
the effectiveness of intergroup apologies. In order for a reconciliation attempt to be 
successful, any intergroup apology and offer of reparation must empower the 
victim group. Although this insight is valuable, it is also the case that when the roles 
of “victim” and “transgressor” are less clear-cut, it also becomes less clear how to 
promote effective reconciliation between two groups. Three studies that were 
inspired by the needs-based model will be reported in a later chapter of this thesis. 
The Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies 
 The second model to be discussed is one that seeks to identify the 
components of successful intergroup apologies. This is The Staircase Model of 
Intergroup Apologies (Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011). The purpose of this model 
was to situate the expression of apology in the context of a broader process. This 
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process begins by establishing a foundation that is based upon the acceptance of 
collective guilt by the transgressor group and setting straight the historical record. 
Thus it is acknowledged by the model that an apology in and of itself is unlikely to 
be sufficient to bring about reconciliation; however, if it is embedded in a broader 
set of reparative events and promises of a better future, it can help to increase the 
chances of a positive resolution. As the name of the model implies, it envisages the 
process of intergroup reconciliation as a staircase, with each step involving a 
further reparative action. As will become apparent, only one of these steps involves 
the offering of an intergroup apology. It is argued by the authors of the model that 
it is necessary to address each step before progressing further, because each step 
provides a foundation for the next, cumulatively building trust and creating genuine 
intergroup reconciliation.  
The five steps are as follows: accepting collective guilt, setting straight the 
records of history, discussing reparations, offering an intergroup apology, and post-
apology engagement. Each step creates an incentive for bringing about 
reconciliation. Accepting collective guilt provides a moral foundation and entails the 
transgressor group accepting its responsibility for what has happened. Setting 
straight the records of history enables the two groups to arrive at a shared 
interpretation of events, and also enables victims to be heard, understood and 
validated. Discussing reparations marks the beginnings of repair and establishes a 
shared understanding of what resources are likely to be needed to put matters 
right. Intergroup apology is the key communicative step; it involves the expressions 
of regret and provides a validation for the victims. Post-apology engagement is 
designed to promote genuine reconciliation and harmony between the groups. The 
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idea here is that promises of reparation are not the same as actual reparation; for 
genuine forgiveness to occur, transgressors need to demonstrate through their 
actions that they have changed. 
 An interesting point that is evident from this account of the Staircase Model 
is that intergroup apology is not the first step in the reconciliation process. In many 
cases of intergroup apology, both in research and in real life, the intergroup 
apology is the first act of repair. This may be one of the reasons why intergroup 
apologies are sometimes dismissed as self-serving. The Staircase Model helps to 
eliminate this perception, because other steps have already been undertaken in the 
reconciliation process, meaning that the apology is more likely to appear to be 
genuine, sincere, and trustworthy.  
The initial paper describing the Staircase Model states that the staircase 
metaphor should not be treated as a formal model to be tested, but rather should 
be seen as a framework for understanding why intergroup apologies sometimes do 
but more often do not have the effects that they are intended to have. The model 
has not yet been empirically tested. Three studies that were inspired by the model 
will be reported in a later chapter of this thesis.  
Measuring Forgiveness and Reconciliation in this Thesis 
 The constructs of forgiveness, reconciliation and intergroup relationship 
repair could be measured or investigated in many ways. With respect to 
forgiveness, it is clearly important to ask victims whether they do forgive the person 
or group offering an apology. In this thesis, this is typically done in more than one 
way: first, I pose a simple question “Do you forgive [person/group]?”, with a binary 
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response option of “yes” or “no”. To capture variability of response, this binary 
measure is often supplemented by a multi-item measure of forgiveness.    
 How successful an intergroup apology is, however, may not simply be a 
question of whether it elicits forgiveness: does it also promote reconciliation? To 
address this, I also measure perceptions of the transgressor group and negative 
emotions felt by the victim group. Perceptions of the transgressor group included 
perceived sincerity and remorse. As noted above, many commentators (e.g., Blatz 
et al., 2009) have suggested that intergroup apologies are insincere and self-
serving, so for reconciliation to occur it seems important that the transgressor 
group is seen as sincere and remorseful. However, even when transgressors are 
viewed in this manner, this does not necessarily translate into forgiveness and 
reconciliation (Berndsen et al., 2015). It is therefore important to investigate other 
perceptions. I also assessed trust and believability, on the grounds that both are 
likely to be important in promoting future reconciliation. Turning to the negative 
emotions felt by the victim group, the research reviewed in the present chapter 
shows the power of intergroup emotions in helping or hindering intergroup 
reconciliation.  I therefore assess the strength of negative emotions such as anger 
and disgust in order to explore the extent to which they are reduced by intergroup 
apologies.  
 An obvious way to measure forgiveness and reconciliation is by examining 
intergroup behaviour following an apology. In the studies reported in Chapter 4 of 
this thesis, I assess the behaviour of participants following a transgression in a trust-
based game, examining the extent to which a group that has been exploited prior 
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to receiving an apology changes its behaviour after the apology. This offers a way of 
assessing behavioural responses to apologies, something that is much more difficult 
in the case of the ‘naturally-occurring’ intergroup transgressions that provide the 
basis of many of the other studies in this thesis.  Another key advantage of using 
economic games is that they offer standardised ways of measuring trust, in that 
one player (an individual or group) is typically given a choice between a ‘safe’ 
option with a low payoff and a ‘riskier’ option that carries a higher potential payoff 
but exposes the player to the possibility of being exploited by the other player. Thus 
the more willing the first player is to be vulnerable to exploitation, the more this 
player is assumed to ‘trust’ the other player not to be exploit this vulnerability (for a 
meta-analysis, see Johnson & Mislin, 2011). 
Summary of the Remaining Chapters 
 My first aim in this thesis is to explore the paradox of intergroup apologies, 
investigating what it is that distinguishes them from interpersonal apologies, and 
why these differences lead to such a substantial variation in the effectiveness of 
apologies. My second aim is to examine the circumstances in which intergroup 
apologies can be effective, by manipulating apology content, and/or the context in 
which the apology is embedded.  
 The four studies reported in Chapter 2 investigate phenomena associated 
with apologies and forgiveness and how these differ between interpersonal and 
intergroup scenarios. In Study 1, I examine the influence of ‘apology desire’ on the 
part of victims of an intergroup transgression. Apology desire here refers to the 
extent to which members of the victim group want the transgressor group to 
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apologise. On the face of it, it seems reasonable to expect that those who express a 
stronger desire for an apology will be more likely to accept it when it is offered. In 
Study 2, I explore reactions to apologies and non-apologies made in the context of 
an economic game played between two groups. In Study 3, I investigate how 
effective it is to change the leadership of a transgressing group, and how such a 
change of leadership influences the effectiveness of an apology offered by the 
leader, in terms of perceptions of both the individual leader and the whole 
transgressing group. In Study 4 I examine the effects of implementing a ‘denial of 
responsibility’ strategy, comparing its effectiveness with that of an ‘apology’ 
strategy, and that of a strategy that begins with denial but ends with apology. The 
contexts used in these studies vary, ranging from a transgression made by one 
Canadian university towards members of another Canadian university and an 
economic game played under laboratory conditions, to the role of the local council 
in the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower fire in London and the taxi firm Uber losing 
its licence to operate in London. 
 In Chapter 3, I report three studies in which I explore the role of apology 
content in the context of ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. These studies were 
inspired by the needs-based model of Nadler and Shnabel (2008), described earlier. 
In Study 1, two aspects were manipulated: first, the content of the apology, 
emphasizing one of three factors, namely structural, relational, or identity-related 
reparation; and second, the apology source, varying whether the apology came 
from a large group, a small group, or an individual. In Study 2, I build on the findings 
of Study 1 by focusing on the content of the apology made by a large group. I again 
examined the apology factors that were included in Study 1, but now they were 
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used in combination, and compared with a ‘no apology’ control condition. Another 
factor varied in this study was emotion, specifically remorse, such that a high-
remorse condition was compared to a control condition.  In Study 3, I replicated 
Study 2, but now I divided the emotion manipulation into a guilt condition, a shame 
condition, and a control condition, in order to investigate the role of more specific 
expressions of emotion. 
 In Chapter 4, I report two studies further investigating the role of emotional 
expression in intergroup reconciliation, but now in the context of an economic 
game. The game used in these studies was a modified intergroup version of ‘the 
centipede game’ (Rosenthal, 1981), an economic game that involves reciprocal 
cooperation between two players (in this case, between two groups). In these two 
studies I explored the roles of guilt, shame, and pride within the game. In Study 1, I 
examined what happens when two groups are allowed to play the game naturally, 
without any manipulation, but with the opportunity to express each of the three 
emotions halfway through the game, knowing that these expressions would be 
communicated to the other group. The idea was to examine how these emotion 
expressions related to the group’s own behaviour and the opposing group’s 
behaviour in the second phase of the game. In Study 2, I adopted a more controlled 
approach, allowing two groups to believe they were playing against each other, 
whereas they were in fact playing against a computer program that was scripted to 
behave uncooperatively in the game, but then expressing either pride or shame at 
the halfway stage. The idea was to examine how expressions of emotion made by a 
group that had acted in its own selfish interests in the first phase influenced how 
they were treated by the ‘victim’ group in the second phase. 
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 In Chapter 5, I report three studies in which I sought to test predictions 
derived from the Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies. In Study 1, I manipulated 
the experimental conditions such that in each of five conditions a successive step in 
the Staircase Model was introduced. The context for this study was a (real life) 
border conflict between Cambodia and Thailand. Participants were exposed to one 
of the following conditions, which followed the five steps of the Staircase Model: 
Condition 1, accepting collective guilt; condition 2, added setting straight the 
historical records; condition 3, added discussing reparations; condition 4, added 
intergroup apology; condition 5, added post-apology engagement. There was also a 
control condition. In Study 2 I aimed to replicate Study 1, but this time in relation to 
‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, with participants being recruited from mainland 
Britain. In Study 3, I replicated Study 2, but this time using a Northern Irish sample. 
A further difference from Study 2 is that each condition included an intergroup 
apology, but I varied where in the sequence the intergroup apology was introduced. 
This was intended to serve as a test of the sequential structure of the Staircase 
Model, examining whether the effectiveness of an intergroup apology does indeed 
vary as a function of the prior steps that have (or have not) been taken. 
 Chapter 6 begins with a summary of the findings found in the studies 
reported in the previous chapters and discusses how they relate to the overarching 
aims of the thesis. I then attempt to answer what I regard as the main research 
questions relating to the paradox of intergroup apology: “What makes intergroup 
apologies different to interpersonal apologies?”, “Why are intergroup apologies 
ineffective?” and “Is it possible to improve the efficacy of intergroup apologies?”. I 
will address these questions by integrating my own findings with other research 
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findings in the field. I will then acknowledge the limitations of the research reported 
in the thesis, and how these could be addressed in future research. I will conclude 
by identifying some currently unanswered research questions and by considering 
the implications of research on intergroup apologies for understanding and 
resolving real-life intergroup conflicts.
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Chapter 2 
The Paradox of Intergroup Apology 
“The Age of Apology” (Brooks, 1999) is a term that has been used to 
describe the era in which we live. The rationale for this description is the 
exponential growth in the number of official apologies that are requested or 
offered, and the attention paid to these apologies in the media. “Sorry” is a word 
that was rarely seen in use in relation to group settings before the end of World 
War Two, whereas today we see apologies offered quite frequently by businesses, 
political parties, and even nation states. This upsurge in public apologies is 
presumably based on an assumption that they will lead to forgiveness. However, 
the current state of research knowledge, limited as it is, suggests that intergroup 
apologies are in fact quite ineffective in promoting any form of forgiveness or 
intergroup reconciliation. The aim of the research reported in the present chapter is 
to explore the paradoxical character of intergroup apologies (the fact that they are 
often demanded, sometimes given, but rarely effective), and to review 
inconsistencies between them and their interpersonal counterparts in achieving 
forgiveness.   
Research suggests that interpersonal apologies, from one person to 
another, are generally an effective strategy in repairing damaged relationships. 
McCullough et al. (1998) highlight the fact that an interpersonal apology is one of 
the key factors associated with forgiveness. Likewise, Darby and Schlenker (1998) 
showed how effective apologies are in children. The effectiveness of interpersonal 
apologies has also become salient in the world of law, with Bibas and Bierschbach 
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(2004) calling for apologies to be better integrated into the criminal justice 
procedure. Given the abundant evidence of the effectiveness of interpersonal 
apologies in promoting forgiveness and reconciliation, it is easy to see how it came 
to be assumed that apologies in intergroup settings would be similarly effective. 
However, the research conducted on intergroup apologies does not support 
this assumption. While there are some studies that show that intergroup apologies 
can have positive effects for the group expressing them (Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 
2008; Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2011), the majority of the evidence testifies to 
their ineffectiveness. In a review of the literature, Hornsey, Wohl, and Philpot 
(2014) conclude that intergroup apologies more often than not fail to elicit the 
forgiveness and future reconciliation that they are intended to achieve. This is 
particularly evident in the work reported by Bombay, Matheson, and Anisman 
(2013), who investigated the potential impact of the then upcoming apology from 
the Canadian government for its role in the Indian Residential School system. They 
concluded that participants were generally neutral or pessimistic about whether an 
intergroup apology would actually lead to improved intergroup relations or even 
make a difference to the lives of the Aboriginal people.  
Overview of Studies 
While this difference in the effectiveness of interpersonal and intergroup 
apology leads many to raise the question of “Why are intergroup apologies not 
more effective?” and/or “What can be done to make intergroup apologies more 
effective?”, it should also lead to the question of what other phenomena associated 
with apologies vary between the interpersonal and intergroup scenarios. In apology 
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research the context of the transgression often varies from study to study, and in 
the current age where public apologies are so commonplace, there are multiple 
opportunities to investigate the influence of different factors on intergroup 
apologies and how they impact forgiveness and future reconciliation in real-life 
contexts. 
The four studies reported in this chapter aim to explore the effectiveness of 
intergroup apologies in a range of settings while introducing different 
manipulations that are known or believed to have positive impacts on the 
effectiveness of interpersonal apologies in achieving forgiveness and reconciliation. 
Study 1 investigates the effect of apology desire on intergroup apologies and how 
successful they are. The idea underlying this study is to examine whether those who 
demand an apology for an intergroup offence are more responsive to an apology 
and forgiving of the perpetrator group when it is forthcoming, compared to those 
who do not seek an apology for the same offence. Okimoto, Wenzel, and Hornsey 
(2015) have suggested that the general increase in apologies may be one reason for 
their devaluation and ineffectiveness, raising the possibility that even those who 
demand an apology may remain unsatisfied when it is given. In Study 2, I move 
from exploring whether an apology is desired to an exploration of reactions to 
apologies (or non-apologies) in the context of an intergroup economic game. 
Usually in the intergroup apology literature we find studies comparing an apology 
condition with a no apology condition and then investigating differences in 
appraisals and/or behaviour, the aim being to explore reactions to the apology 
condition and how these differ from those in the no apology condition. The 
assumption is that this helps to understand any gap in the effectiveness of 
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intergroup and interpersonal apologies. In Study 3 I move on to ways in which 
something beyond offering an apology can be done by the perpetrator group to 
make the attainment of forgiveness more likely. I investigate how effective a 
change of leadership in the group perpetrating an intergroup offence can be in 
shaping the effectiveness of any resulting apology. Is an apology offered by a new 
leader more effective than one offered by an old leader who is more closely 
associated with the offence? Changing leaders is often seen as a way to improve 
the image of the group and previous research suggests that there are benefits to 
such change (Ballinger & Schoorman, 2007; Flores, 2012). Finally, in Study 4 I 
examine instances of reactions to situations in which the perpetrator group 
commits an offence but then denies responsibility, thereby not seeking forgiveness. 
I examine whether denial of responsibility for a transgression elicits different 
reactions to those evoked by an apology, which usually entails an implicit or explicit 
admission of responsibility. Denial of responsibility is a strategy that is frequently 
used following a transgression, and again there is previous research showing that it 
can be effective (Gold & Weiner, 2000; van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011). Evidence that 
denying responsibility is more effective than apologising would suggest that the 
admission of responsibility inherent in apology might be one of the reasons for the 
apparent ineffectiveness of intergroup apologies.  
The contexts in which intergroup apologies occurred in these studies 
included a fictitious but plausible transgression between two universities, a 
laboratory experimental economic game played between groups, and two real-
world transgressions, one involving a civic authority’s perceived responsibility for a 
tragic fire in which many citizens died, and another in which a commercial taxi 
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company was judged to be unfit to hold an operating licence due to offences 
committed by some of its drivers. In each context, I manipulated the way in which 
the offending group acted, with regard to the offering or non-offering of an 
apology, or how the apology was delivered. In the case of the two real-world 
scenarios, I varied the actual apologies or statements that were made by the 
perpetrating group. In one study I took the opportunity to vary whether the 
apology was explicitly made on behalf of an individual member (the leader) of the 
perpetrating group, or on behalf of the whole group. This comparison should shed 
light on the differences between interpersonal and intergroup apologies and has 
the potential to shed light on why they are differentially effective. The overarching 
aim of the studies reported in this chapter is that between them they illustrate 
ways in which interpersonal and intergroup apologies differ with respect to their 
capacity to elicit forgiveness, and also demonstrate how factors such as desire for 
an apology, acceptance of apology, changing the source of an apology, and denying 
responsibility for an offence influence the likelihood that an intergroup apology will 
result in forgiveness.   
It should be noted that Study 1 was approved by the Carleton University 
Research and Ethics Board (#: 104675 12-120). Study 2 was approved by the Cardiff 
University Research Ethics Committee (EC.16.10.11.4598G). Studies 3 and 4 were 
also approved by the Cardiff University Research Ethics Committee 
(EC.16.07.12.4556). 
 
 
The Paradox of Intergroup Apology   
36 
 
Study 1 
One major motivation for involving apologies in law and criminal justice is 
described in a paper by Petrucci (2002) as, simply, victims’ desire for an apology. 
This issue of ‘desire’ is an interesting point to raise in connection with intergroup 
apologies, given use of the phrase ‘The Age of Apology’ to account for the sheer 
frequency of intergroup apologies being offered: there many demands made for 
intergroup apologies in the media, whether these demands are directed at 
criminals, businesses, political parties or governments. One paradox frequently 
described in this connection is that the victims of a group transgression will often 
demand an apology, but when it is delivered, they are no more likely to forgive than 
are those who did not demand an apology. This is discussed by Okimoto et al. 
(2015), who suggest that there may be devaluation of apologies as a result of the 
rising trend in public apologies. In Study 1, I aim to explore the nature of apology 
desire and its effectiveness in an intergroup setting in attaining forgiveness.  
The context used to explore this was a fabricated transgression between 
two universities. Students at both the University of Ottawa and Carleton University 
often take classes and courses across the two universities and this provided a 
context for the transgression. Participants, who were all students at Carleton 
University, were presented with a fictitious but plausible article in which the head 
of the University of Ottawa announced a plan to stop this sharing of classes and 
courses, on the grounds that students at Carleton may be academically inferior to 
those at the University of Ottawa. I then manipulated whether that there was or 
was not said to be a collective desire for an apology on the part of Carleton 
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students, with the intention that this would evoke a personal desire for the apology 
on the part of participants. Participants were then shown an apology announcing a 
rescinding of the policy, and their reactions were assessed. 
Although it seems intuitively plausible that the more someone wants an 
apology, from another person or group, the more they should be inclined to forgive 
when they receive that apology, I anticipated that this study would highlight one of 
the major paradoxes of intergroup apologies by showing that apology desire has no 
impact on forgiveness. This prediction was based on the previously mentioned 
differences in the effectiveness of interpersonal and intergroup apologies, and on 
the findings of Okimoto et al. (2015). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred and ninety-three psychology students (46 males & 147 
females; mean age of 19.73) from Carleton University completed this study for 
course credit. The study had a fully between-subjects design consisting of two 
conditions (apology desire present vs absent). Participants were randomly allocated 
to one of these conditions. 
It should be noted that 216 participants started this study. Nineteen 
participants were excluded for failing an attention check placed in the dependent 
variables as an item stating: “This is an attention check, please select ‘Strongly 
Disagree’”. Two participants did not provide consent to use their data at the end of 
the study following the debrief and a further two did not finish the study. 
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Manipulation 
Apology Desire. An article was shown to the participants stating that the 
University of Ottawa was going to implement a policy whereby Carleton University 
students could no longer attend classes at the University of Ottawa due to Carleton 
students being of an ‘academically lower standard’ to those at the University of 
Ottawa. Included in the concluding paragraph of the article was the reaction from 
Carleton University’s Students’ Association, in which participants read either that 
“an apology for the policy and the comments made is essential” or that “an apology 
for the policy and comments made is not going to be enough”. This manipulation 
was also reflected in the title of the article, which was either: “CUSA Demands 
Apology After UOttawa Bars Carleton Students from Taking their Courses” Or ““An 
Apology Is Not Enough” For CUSA After UOttawa Bars Carleton Students from 
Taking their Courses”. Following this, participants were informed that the policy 
had been rescinded and read an apology from the head of the University of Ottawa. 
A copy of the article is shown in Appendix 1. 
Materials 
Manipulation Check. After reading the article, but before reading the 
apology, participants responded to items asking whether collectively Carleton 
University wanted an apology (The students of Carleton want an apology) and 
whether the participant personally wanted an apology (I personally want an 
apology). Both responses were made on a 5-point scale, with endpoints labelled 
Strongly Disagree and Strongly Agree.  
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Forgiveness. To measure forgiveness, participants responded to an adapted 
version of the Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory (Trim-18; 
McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006). This 18-item measure assesses forgiveness and 
consists of subscales measuring avoidance (e.g., [victim] should cut off any 
relationship with the [transgressor]), revenge (e.g., The [transgressor] should get 
what they deserve), and benevolence (e.g., The [victim] should release their anger 
so they can work on restoring the relationship) motivations. The Trim-18 was 
initially designed as an interpersonal forgiveness measure; for the purpose of the 
current research the items were therefore adapted to relate to the University of 
Ottawa. Responses are made on a 5-point scale, with endpoints labelled Strongly 
Disagree and Strongly Agree. The adapted measure can be found in Appendix 2. 
Negative Emotions. Participants answered a four-item questionnaire asking 
how much they felt anger, disgust, hate, and contempt following the apology. 
These were rated on a 5-point scale where 1 equalled “strongly disagree” and 5 
equalled “strongly agree”. The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was .89.  
Procedure 
Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to 
sign an on-screen consent form. Following this, demographic measures were 
completed. The structure of the main questionnaire was as follows: it began with 
the article describing the policy change and the manipulated reaction from Carleton 
University Students’ Association, followed by manipulation checks, the apology 
from the University of Ottawa, negative emotion items, and the Trim-18 (with items 
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within each set presented in random order). After completing these measures, 
participants were thanked, debriefed, and asked for consent to use their data.  
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
Independent samples t-tests showed that there was a significant impact of 
the apology desire manipulation. Those in the ‘apology desired’ condition believed 
that the university wanted an apology (M = 4.19) to a significantly greater extent 
than did those in the ‘apology is not enough’ condition (M = 3.12), t(184.70) = 6.75, 
p < .001, d = .99. As intended, there was also a significant impact of this 
manipulation on participants’ personal desire for an apology, t(190) = 2.67, p = .008, 
d = .39, with those in the ‘apology desired’ condition wanting an apology (M = 4.22) 
to a significantly greater extent than those in the ‘apology is not enough’ condition 
(M = 3.90). 
Forgiveness 
Independent samples t-tests showed that there was no significant impact of 
the manipulation on any of the Trim-18 subscales: avoidance, t(191) = .13, p = .897, 
d = .02; revenge, t(191) = .20, p = .839, d = .03; benevolence, t(176.71) = .47, p = 
.638, d = .07. The means and standard deviations for all dependent variables are 
shown in Table 2.1. 
Regarding perceptions of a collective desire for an apology, there was no 
significant association between this measure and the Trim-18 subscales for 
avoidance, r = .13, p = .083, or benevolence, r = -.08, p = .246. There was, however, 
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a significant positive association between collective desire for an apology and the 
revenge motivation subscale, r = .21, p = .004, showing that the more the 
participant perceived a collective desire for an apology, the more vengeful they felt 
towards the transgressors after reading the apology. 
Regarding the personal desire for an apology, there was no significant 
association between the personal desire for an apology and the Trim-18 subscales 
for avoidance, r = .12, p = .092, or revenge, r = 09, p = .198. There was, however, a 
significant negative association between personal desire for an apology and the 
benevolence motivations subscale, r = -.15, p = .044, reflecting the fact that the 
more participants personally desired an apology, the less benevolent towards the 
transgressors they were after reading the apology.  
Negative Emotions 
An independent samples t-test showed that there was no significant impact 
of the article read on the measure of negative emotions, t(191) = .94, p = .349, d = 
.14.  
There was no significant association between the collective desire for an 
apology and negative emotions, r = .10, p = .167. There was, however, a significant 
positive association between the personal desire for an apology and negative 
emotions, r = .14, p = .049, reflecting the fact that the more participants desired an 
apology, the more they reported negative emotions after reading an apology.  
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Table 2.1 
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the dependent variables 
in the two apology desire conditions (Study 1). 
Condition Apology Desire Apology Not Enough 
Collective Desire for Apology 4.19 
(.94) 
3.12 
(1.24) 
Individual Desire for Apology 4.22 
(.72) 
3.90 
(.91) 
Trim-18   
Avoidance 2.08 
(.97) 
2.06 
(.85) 
Revenge 1.96 
(.90) 
1.93 
(.88) 
Benevolence 3.72 
(.89) 
3.66 
(.73) 
Negative Emotions 2.44 
(1.06) 
2.30 
(1.02) 
 
Study 1 therefore highlights one of the paradoxes of intergroup apology: 
desiring an apology, either collectively or individually, does not have any positive 
impact on how an apology is received. Reading an article highlighting a collective 
desire for an apology did increase both perceived collective desire for an apology 
and personal desire for an apology. However, it had no impact on forgiveness 
motivations or negative emotions felt towards the transgressor after an apology 
was given. Some of the observed correlations also seem counter-intuitive, with 
participants who perceived greater collective desire for an apology feeling more 
vengeful after the apology was given, and those with a stronger personal desire for 
an apology being less benevolent and having more negative feelings towards the 
transgressors after the apology was given. 
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Study 2 
 Given that it appears to be the case that desiring an intergroup apology 
does not result in a greater likelihood of forgiving the perpetrating group, it is worth 
examining reactions to an apology, versus a non-apology. One context in which 
repairing relationships following a transgression has been studied is that of 
economic games, where one player has the opportunity to act selfishly at the other 
player’s expense, or to exploit another player’s trust. Several studies have shown 
certain reparative acts to be useful in interpersonal economic games. For example, 
It has been shown that denying responsibility and intent to be unfair (van Dijke & 
De Cremer, 2011) and offering financial compensation (De Cremer, 2010) are 
strategies that can improve trust, although in both of these studies it was suggested 
that apology would also be a worthwhile strategy. There are also studies using 
economic games in which it was suggested that apology is the best avenue to 
relationship repair (Haesevoets, Folmer, De Cremer, & van Hiel, 2013; Schniter, 
Sheremeta, & Sznycer, 2013). There are, however, plenty of studies highlighting the 
discrepancy between interpersonal and intergroup behaviour in economic games 
(Bornstein, Kugler, & Ziegelmeyer, 2004; Wildschut & Insko, 2007). 
The Centipede Game  
The centipede game (Rosenthal, 1981) is an economic game based upon 
repeated trust. At each decision point, players choose whether to stop the game 
and take the monetary allocations currently on offer, or to pass the decision on to 
their opponent. Every time a decision is transferred to the opponent, the total 
allocation to the two players increases; however, if the opponent chooses to stop 
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the game, the first player finishes with a lower allocation payoff than if he or she 
had stopped the game previously. There is a finite number of steps/nodes, with the 
final one allocating the largest possible pay-out to both players. This game was 
chosen for the present research because of its sequential structure, and because of 
the number of trust-based decisions made within each game. In the multiple round 
version of the game, if a move is made to stop the game early, meaning a low pay-
out for one player, there is an opportunity to restore trust in subsequent rounds. 
Previous research using the Centipede Game has shown that groups stop the game 
significantly earlier than individuals do (Bornstein, Kugler, & Ziegelmeyer, 2004). 
This provides an interesting opportunity to explore the roles of apology within an 
intergroup version of the game.  
In Study 2, the centipede game shown in Figure 2.1 was used. All 
participants who completed this study were students at Cardiff University. For the 
purposes of the current research, the term ‘centipede game’ was replaced by 
‘intergroup cooperation game’ in an effort to enhance cooperation between the 
groups. Each node in the game denotes a decision that has to be made by one of 
the two players (A or B). In this study the players were 3-person groups. The group 
can decide to proceed (Go) or stop. If the game reaches node 5, it is completed. 
Thus a game ends when one of the groups decides to stop, or when the game 
reaches node 5. A group’s designation as “A” or “B” switches with each new game. 
After two rounds of the game, groups were ostensibly given an opportunity to 
communicate with each other, and it was during this communication that an 
intergroup apology (or, in the control condition, no apology) was made. Games 
before and after this intergroup interaction will be referred to as “Phase 1” and 
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“Phase 2”, respectively. The study was run using online software 
(veconlab.econ.virginia.edu).  
Figure 2.1: The way the Centipede/Intergroup Cooperation Game was 
presented to participants in Study 2. 
 The game payout was defined as the number of lottery tickets that the 
groups would receive, with each payoff point translating into one lottery ticket for 
their group. Participants were (correctly) informed that the lottery draw would 
involve all groups participating in the current study. 
 Given that apologies are made after a transgression, it was decided that a 
game would be created in which the opposing group defects or steals from the 
experimental group at every opportunity, keeping constant the extent of the 
transgression. This was achieved by having the opposing group being simulated by 
the programme, although participants were led to believe they were playing against 
a real group. There were two Phase 1 rounds before the intergroup communication 
was delivered, and two Phase 2 rounds after the communication. The decision to 
restrict each phase to two rounds was motivated by the need to minimize the 
possibility that the experimental group would make a defecting move in Phase 1. As 
it was, this group was always selected (apparently at random) to make the very first 
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move (in which it is very rare that a group defects). This was followed by the 
opposing group defecting in the next move, and also defecting at the first 
opportunity in the second round.   
 After these first two rounds, groups entered a live chat room in which they 
appeared to interact with the opposing group. In fact, they were exposed to a pre-
prepared script that offered either an apology for the behaviour or a non-reparative 
statement. The experimental group was able to respond to this statement. 
Following this interaction, the programme controlling the game allowed the next 
two rounds to proceed to the end of the game, to ascertain whether participants in 
the experimental group trusted the out-group to cooperate. Given the effectiveness 
of apologies in interpersonal games, it was thought that this would be a novel way 
of testing whether apologies are equally effective in an intergroup setting. 
Method 
Participants  
Seventy-eight participants (20 male, 58 female; mean age = 19.58) took part 
in this study. They were psychology undergraduates at Cardiff University who were 
recruited via the Experimental Management System (EMS). They participated in 
exchange for course credit. 
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Manipulations and Reaction 
Apology Manipulation. After the first two rounds, participants entered a live 
chatroom with what they assumed to be the opposing group, where they received 
one of two statements. In the apology condition, groups received the statement 
“We’re really sorry about what we did!”, whereas in the control condition groups 
received the message “We were trying to get the best outcome!”. 
Communication Reaction. Reactions to the apology/control message were 
recorded and coded into one of two categories. Groups were categorised on the 
basis of whether or not they responded in a way that suggested that they had 
accepted the opposing group’s statement. Those whose messages mentioned 
“cooperation” or “going to the end” were coded as ‘accepting’, while the remainder 
were coded as ‘not accepting’. Two independent coders were used to determine 
the reliability of the response coding. Cohen’s k was run to determine the 
agreement and established that there was very good agreement, k = .85 (95% CI, 
.64 to 1.00), p < .001. Transcripts of all reactions can be found in Appendix 3. 
Materials 
Game Behaviours. Several game-specific variables were recorded, including 
number of tickets won, average node at which the in-group exited (hereafter: 
average node exit), number of ‘steals’ from the out-group (defined as the total 
number of times the group chose to exit a game),  and the percentage of 
cooperative moves made.  
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Prosocial Behaviour: A composite variable was created using the average z-
score for average node exit, the inverse of number of steals, and the percentage of 
cooperative moves made. 
Procedure  
On signing up to the study, participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire under the impression that their responses would determine their 
group membership. When they arrived in the lab they were left in a waiting room 
until all six participants had arrived. They were then separated into two groups of 
three and led into separate rooms where computers were ready to play the 
“Intergroup Cooperation Game”. Groups read the instructions for the game and 
had one practice game against a computer programme. Group members were then 
asked to ensure that they understood how the game worked before ostensibly 
participating in the first game with the other group. After two games in which the 
programme was scripted in such a way that the other group ended the game at the 
earliest opportunity, there was an interval in which participants participated in a 
‘live chat’ room, where they received either an apology or a control statement that 
ostensibly came from the out-group, after which they had an opportunity to 
respond. Following this interaction, two further rounds of the game were played in 
which the programme controlling the out-group’s behaviour was scripted not to 
defect or to steal. Following this all participants were debriefed.  
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Results and Discussion 
Effect of Apology Manipulation on Reactions 
Reactions to the communication from the other group were classified as 
‘accepting’ (43%) or ‘not-accepting’ (57%). In the apology condition, 64% of 
responses were classified as accepting. The corresponding number in the control 
condition was 28%. A chi-square analysis showed there was an association between 
the apology manipulation and type of reaction, χ²(1) = 3.94, p = .047, with more 
accepting reactions in apology condition and fewer accepting reactions in the 
control condition than would be expected by chance. Thus, this shows that the 
apology condition did lead to more ‘accepting’ reactions than did the control 
condition. However, as we shall see, this did not lead to significantly more prosocial 
behaviours in the game itself.  
Joint Effects of Apology Manipulation and Statement Reaction on Game Variables  
 Mean scores on the game variables are shown in Table 2.2, broken down by 
apology condition and how participants reacted to the statement made by the 
perpetrator group. Apology condition did not have any significant effects on any of 
these variables: tickets, F(1, 22) = .07, p = .799, ηp2 < .01; average node exit, F(1, 22) 
= .58, p = .454, ηp2 = .03; number of steals, F(1, 22) = 2.73, p = .112, ηp2 = .11; or 
percentage of cooperative moves made, F(1, 22) = 1.05, p = .316, ηp2 = .05. 
However, statement reaction did have a significant effect on number of tickets, F(1, 
22) = 7.03, p = .015, ηp2 = .24, and average node exit, F(1, 22) = 4.57, p = .043, ηp2 = 
.17, with those who accepted the statement scoring higher on these variables. 
Statement reaction did not significantly affect number of steals, F(1, 22) = 2.06, p = 
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.165, ηp2 = .09, or percentage of cooperative moves made, F(1, 22) = 3.72, p = .067, 
ηp2 = .15.  
 There were significant interaction effects between apology condition and 
statement reaction on average node exit, F(1, 22) = 5.10, p = .034, ηp2 = .19, number 
of steals, F(1, 22) = 8.73, p = .007, ηp2 = .28, and percentage of cooperative moves, 
F(1, 22) = 5.40, p = .030, ηp2 = .20. In each of these cases the interaction reflected 
the fact that the combination of an apology being given and accepted resulted in 
significantly more prosocial outcomes (i.e., later average node exit, less stealing, 
more cooperative moves) than did any other condition. The only exception was that 
there was no significant interaction effect for number of tickets, F(1, 22) = 1.74, p = 
.201, ηp2 = .07. 
Table 2.2  
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the game variables based 
upon the apology manipulation and the reaction (Study 2). 
Apology  Apology Non-Apology 
Reaction Accepting Non-
Accepting 
Accepting Non- 
Accepting 
Tickets 17.75 
(1.67) 
11.20 
(3.90) 
16.00 
(4.00) 
13.80 
(4.76) 
Node Exit 4.81 
(.37) 
2.90 
(.96) 
3.50 
(1.00) 
3.55 
(1.30) 
Steals .25 
(.46) 
1.60 
(.55) 
1.67 
(.58) 
1.20 
(.92) 
Cooperative Moves .94 
(.12) 
.42 
(.28) 
.53 
(.21) 
.58 
(.37) 
Prosocial Behaviour .87 
(.39) 
-.70 
(.70) 
-.45 
(.70) 
-.21 
(1.05) 
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Joint Effects of Apology Manipulation and Statement Reaction on Prosocial 
Behaviour  
Mean scores for the composite prosocial behaviour variable are also found 
in Table 2.2. Apology condition did not have a significant effects on prosocial 
behaviour, F(1, 22) = 1.43, p = .24, ηp2 = .06. Statement reaction also did not have a 
significant effect, F(1, 22) = 3.73, p = .067, ηp2 = .15. However, there was a 
significant interaction effect F(1, 22) = 6.90, p = .015, ηp2 = .24. As with the 
individual game variables, this interaction effect reflected the fact that the 
combination of an apology being given and accepted resulted in more prosocial 
behaviours. 
A regression analysis was used to test the indirect effect of apology 
condition and statement reaction on prosocial behaviours.  Results confirmed that 
the apology condition significantly predicted statement reaction, b = .39, SE = .19, p 
= .049, but not prosocial behaviour, b = .53, SE = .37, p = .167; statement reaction, 
in turn, significantly predicted prosocial behaviours, b = .89, SE = .35, p = .018. The 
indirect effect was tested using bootstrapping estimation approach with 5000 re-
samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The model for the indirect effect did not quite 
reach significance, F(2,23) = 3.31, p = .054, ηp2 = .15, and the amount of the 
variance in prosocial behaviour accounted for by the predictors was not large (R2adj. 
= .16). The coefficient for the indirect effect was not significant, b = .22, SE = .41, 
95% bias-corrected CI = -.64, .98. 
Thus, the key findings from Study 2 are that the offering of an intergroup 
apology, as opposed to a control statement, did not lead to significantly more 
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prosocial behaviour. However, groups who were offered an apology were more 
likely than those who were not offered an apology to respond to the other group’s 
communication in an accepting way, and an accepting response to the other 
group’s communication was associated with more prosocial game behaviours in the 
second phase of the game. It seems possible that groups that had a non-accepting 
reaction to the apology were more upset by the out-group’s competitive behaviour 
in the first phase, and that this overrode any beneficial impact of the apology on 
cooperation in the second phase. This points to one of the possible reasons why 
intergroup apologies are not as effective as interpersonal apologies. Groups are 
more competitive than individuals (Wildschut & Insko, 2007). In an interpersonal 
scenario, it seems possible that more than 64% of participants would have been 
accepting of the apology. A further possibility is that in an interpersonal scenario, 
even those who were not accepting of the apology would not be so competitive in 
the second phase. The interactive effects of apology and acceptance of the apology 
show that once an apology has been accepted it does have a significant impact on 
variables related to relationship repair and prosocial behaviour (less stealing, more 
cooperative moves). This points to the need for further research on factors that 
increase the likelihood apology acceptance. Such factors will be examined in later 
chapters of this thesis.    
Study 3 
A manoeuvre that sometimes occurs following a serious transgression by a 
group is a change in leadership, or leadership ‘turnover’. In the wake of negative 
events or transgressions in the political or business world, the media tend to run 
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stories about calls for resignation and how a certain person’s position has become 
untenable because he or she was leading the perpetrating group and should 
therefore take responsibility for the consequences of its actions. Motives for calling 
for such a change of leadership include the argument that the affective reaction to 
a leader’s departure has an impact on trust in the new leader and thereby the 
group (Ballinger & Schoorman, 2007). One reason for newfound trust is that the 
incoming leader is seen as representing different interests to the predecessor 
(Bobick & Smith, 2013). Although the majority of this research in this area treats 
leadership turnover as a dependent variable (e.g., Gallego & Pitchik, 2004; 
McGillivray & Smith, 2005), there are a few studies, such as the one by Flores 
(2012), showing that a change of leadership can hasten the termination of conflict. 
Because this is not a well investigated topic in the literature on reparation, it is 
worth examining this phenomenon in both an interpersonal and an intergroup 
setting, to establish whether the effects differ as a function of this difference in 
setting.  
The context I used to investigate this issue was that of the Grenfell Tower 
fire. This occurred on 14th June 2017 at the Grenfell Tower block of public housing 
flats in North Kensington, West London. It is believed to have resulted in at least 80 
deaths. The fire started in a fridge-freezer in one flat and its devastating spread 
throughout the building was hastened by the flammable nature of the building’s 
exterior cladding. The Kensington and Chelsea council responsible for the tower 
block has been criticised for both its neglect of the safety of the building to begin 
with and its response to the fire. Following the departure of the leader of the 
Kensington and Chelsea Council, the newly appointed leader publicly apologised in 
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a newspaper (De Peyer, Evening Standard, 2017). I decided to use this newspaper 
article as the basis for the current study. Its content was manipulated (a) by 
ensuring that it was either obvious that the article was from a ‘new’ leader, or this 
was left ambiguous (control); and (b) by using either “I” or “we” personal pronouns 
in the article, to create the impression that the apology came either from the 
individual leader or from the entire council. I also decided to evaluate how these 
manipulated factors affected perceptions of both the council leader and the 
council. In line with the established differences in effectiveness between 
interpersonal and intergroup apologies, I expected to find a stronger effect of the 
apology on perceptions of the leader in the ‘I’ rather than ‘we’ version. I also 
expected to find a stronger effect of the apology on perceptions of the council 
leader than on the perceptions of the council in the ‘new’ leader version rather 
than the control version. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Two hundred and sixty-one participants (130 males & 131 females; mean 
age of 47.99) completed this study. Participants were recruited via the research 
company Pureprofile (www.pureprofile.com). This enabled me to recruit a sample 
of participants based on their residential location (London). This study had a 
between-subjects design consisting of four conditions resulting from the factorial 
combination of Leader (new vs ambiguous) and Apology Source (interpersonal vs 
intergroup) manipulations. Participants were randomly allocated to one of these 
conditions. 
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It should be noted that 311 participants started this study. Some were 
excluded because they did not provide consent (n = 9), failed an attention check (n 
= 20), or simply did not finish the study (n = 21). The attention check was embedded 
within a paragraph of text instructing “Skip this page and do not answer the 
question underneath this paragraph”. It was included to ensure that participants 
paid careful attention to information provided in the transcripts they were asked to 
read. 
Manipulation 
 The manipulations were deployed using the same basic newspaper article in 
which an apology was given by the leader of the Kensington and Chelsea Council in 
the aftermath of the Grenfell Tower Fire. The different versions of the article are 
shown in Appendix 4.  
 New Leader vs Control. For those in the ‘new leader’ condition, the word 
“leader” at every point in the article was preceded by the word “new”. This 
adjective was absent in the control condition. 
Interpersonal vs. Intergroup Apology. Throughout the article the use of the 
personal pronouns “I” or “We” were used consistently, depending on condition. 
Materials 
 Manipulation Check. To ensure that those in the new leader condition 
perceived that the apology was given by a new leader to a greater extent than 
those in the control condition, at the end of the study participants were asked to 
respond a question about who delivered the apology, using a 1 to 5 response scale, 
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where 1 was “The same leader of the council at the time of the disaster” and 5 was 
“A new leader since the disaster”. 
 Forgiveness. To assess forgiveness, I used two items: “The council leader 
should be forgiven” and “The council should be forgiven”. Both items were 
answered on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 was “strongly disagree” and 5 was 
“strongly agree”. 
 Positive Perceptions. Participants answered a 4-item questionnaire in which 
they were asked how much sincerity, remorse, trust, and believability they 
perceived on the basis of the apology. These items were answered on a scale 1 to 5, 
where 1 was “strongly disagree” and 5 was “strongly agree”. Participants 
completed these items twice, once with respect to the council leader individually 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .87) and another time with respect to the council collectively 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .90).  
 Negative Emotions. The negative emotion items were the same as those 
used in Study 1.  Thus participants completed a 4-item questionnaire in which they 
were asked to rate how much anger, disgust, hate, and contempt they felt following 
the apology. Ratings were made on a 1 to 5 scale where 1 was “strongly disagree” 
and 5 was “strongly agree”. As with the ‘positive perceptions’ questions, these 
items were answered twice, once in relation to the council leader (Cronbach’s alpha 
= .92), and once in relation to the council overall (Cronbach’s alpha = .89). 
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Procedure 
Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to 
sign an on-screen consent form. Demographic measures were then completed. The 
structure of the rest of the questionnaire was as follows: First came a description of 
the Grenfell Tower fire and its aftermath, followed by an attention check, the 
manipulated article containing the apology, the negative emotion items, the 
positive perception items, the forgiveness item and then the manipulation check. 
Items within each set of measures were presented in random order. After 
completing these measures, participants were thanked and debriefed.  
Results  
To establish how the apology being delivered by a ‘new leader’ versus a control 
condition and being interpersonal or intergroup in nature affected forgiveness, 
positive perceptions of the leader and council, and negative emotions felt towards 
the leader and council, a series of 2x2 ANOVAs were conducted, where the factors 
were Leader (new vs control) and Apology Source (interpersonal vs intergroup). All 
means and standard deviations relating to this study are shown in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3 
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the dependent variables 
in the new leader/control and interpersonal/intergroup conditions (Study 3). 
 Condition 
Measure 
New Leader Control 
Interpersonal Intergroup Interpersonal Intergroup 
Forgiveness     
     Council Leader 3.09 
(1.11) 
2.75 
(1.02) 
2.52 
(1.05) 
2.12 
(.91) 
     Council 2.28 
(1.25) 
2.34 
(1.16) 
2.27 
(1.14) 
2.05 
(.96) 
Positive Perceptions     
     Council Leader 3.01 
(.97) 
2.79 
(.69) 
2.75 
(.97) 
2.52 
(.85) 
     Council 2.65 
(.96) 
2.43 
(.84) 
2.62 
(1.01) 
2.40 
(.94) 
Negative Emotions     
     Council Leader 3.12 
(1.09) 
3.31 
(1.04) 
3.17 
(1.00) 
3.33 
(1.16) 
     Council 3.78 
(.94) 
3.31 
(.90) 
3.30 
(.91) 
3.33 
(1.06) 
 
Manipulation Check 
 A 2x2 ANOVA showed that there was a significant effect of the Leader 
manipulation on perceptions of whether the apology being delivered was offered 
by a new leader or the previous leader, F(1, 257) = 26.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .09, with 
those in the new leader condition being more likely to identify the person delivering 
the apology as a new leader rather than the previous one (M = 3.91) than those in 
the control condition (M = 3.19). There was no significant effect of the Apology 
Source factor on perceptions of whether the apology being delivered was offered 
by a new or previous leader, F(1, 257) = .14, p = .712, ηp2 < .01. There was also no 
significant interaction, F(1, 257) = .37, p = .545, ηp2 < .01. 
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Forgiveness 
 For forgiveness of the council leader, there were significant main effects of 
the Leader manipulation, F(1, 257) = 22.49, p < .001, ηp2= .08, and the Apology 
Source manipulation, F(1, 257) = 8.22, p = .004, ηp2 = .03. Those in the new leader 
condition were significantly more forgiving (M = 2.92) than their counterparts in the 
control condition (M = 2.32); and those in the interpersonal condition were 
significantly more forgiving (M = 2.81) than those in the intergroup condition (M = 
2.44). The interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 257) = .05, p = .823, ηp2 < .01. 
 For forgiveness of the council, there were no significant main effects of the 
Leader manipulation, F(1, 257) = 1.22, p = .271, ηp2= .01, or the Apology Source 
manipulation, F(1, 257) = .34, p = .559, ηp2< .01. The interaction effect was not 
significant, F(1, 257) = .95, p = .330, ηp2< .01. 
Positive Perceptions1 
Regarding positive perceptions of the council leader, there were significant 
main effects of the Leader manipulation, F(1, 256) = 6.10, p = .014, ηp2= .02, and the 
Apology Source manipulation, F(1, 256) = 4.33, p = .038, ηp2= .02. Those in the new 
leader condition had significantly more positive perceptions of the council leader 
(M = 2.90) than did those in the control condition (M = 2.63); and those in the 
 
1 The results of exploratory analyses of the individual positive perception 
items (sincerity, remorse, trust and believability) for both the council leader and the 
council are reported in Appendix 5.  
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interpersonal condition had significantly more positive perceptions (M = 2.88) than 
did those in the intergroup condition (M = 2.66). The interaction effect was not 
significant, F(1, 257) = .05, p = .823, ηp2< .01. 
Regarding the positive perceptions of the council, there were no significant 
main effects of the Leader manipulation, F(1, 256) = .06, p = .805, ηp2< .01, or the 
Apology Source manipulation, F(1, 256) = 3.43, p = .065, ηp2= .01. The interaction 
effect was not significant, F(1, 256) < .01, p = .986, ηp2< .01.  
Negative Emotions 
For negative emotions felt towards the council leader, there were no 
significant main effects of the Leader manipulation, F(1, 257) = .07, p = .799, ηp2< 
.01, or the Apology Source manipulation, F(1, 257) = 1.78, p = .183, ηp2= .01. The 
interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 257) = .01, p = .935, ηp2< .01. 
For negative emotions felt towards the council, there were main effects 
closely approaching significance for both the Leader manipulation, F(1, 257) = 3.85, 
p = .051, ηp2= .02, and the Apology Source manipulation, F(1, 257) = 3.63, p = .058, 
ηp2= .01. These marginal main effects were qualified by a significant interaction 
effect, F(1, 257) = 4.38, p = .037, ηp2= .02. Simple effects analyses showed that this 
interaction was driven by an effect within the new leader condition, with those in 
the interpersonal condition having significantly higher scores for negative emotions 
(M = 3.78) than those in the intergroup condition (M = 3.31). The corresponding 
difference within the control leader condition was not significant.  
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Discussion 
The results of Study 3 again highlight the differential effectiveness of 
interpersonal and intergroup apologies. Forgiveness of the council leader and 
positive perceptions of the leader were greater when the apology had an 
interpersonal (“I”) character rather than an intergroup (“we”) character. There 
were similar effects of the Leader manipulation, showing that a new leader who 
apologised was more likely to elicit forgiveness and to be perceived positively than 
was the case in the control condition, where it was unclear whether the apology 
came from a new leader or the previous one. The general reluctance to forgive a 
perpetrating group, rather than an individual, is also reflected in the fact that there 
were no corresponding effects on the measures of forgiveness of the council or 
positive perceptions of the council as a whole. Interestingly, there were no 
significant effects of the manipulations on negative emotions felt towards either 
the leader or the council as a whole, perhaps reflecting the widespread shock and 
anger that people felt in the wake of the disaster. Also interesting is the finding that 
negative emotions felt towards the council as a whole were significantly greater 
when the apology came from a new leader who delivered a personal apology, using 
the first person pronoun. Thus although a new leader who delivers a personal 
apology for a transgression committed by a group appears to be seen in a relatively 
positive light, this positivity appears to be at the expense of emotions felt towards 
the group as a whole, which are more negative than when a new leader offers a 
collective apology. This raises interesting questions about who should deliver 
intergroup apologies in the wake of a disaster for which a group can be held 
responsible, and how such apologies should be delivered.  
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Study 4 
 Another strategy that can be adopted by the perpetrator group following a 
transgression is to deny responsibility for the offence, shifting the blame onto 
others and trying the convey the message that “we [the ingroup] have done 
nothing wrong”.  An important feature of the research on intergroup apologies to 
date is that not all studies find them to be ineffective, especially when comparing 
them to a no apology control (e.g., Leonard, Mackie & Smith, 2011). A point noted 
by Fehr and Gelfand (2010) is that much of the research on intergroup apology has 
a similar design, comparing an apology condition with a no apology control 
condition. Although Fehr and Gelfand used this point as a rationale for studying the 
role of apology content, it can also be used to raise the question of how an 
intergroup apology condition compares to one in which an excuse for the 
transgression is offered.   
Gold and Weiner (2000) have shown that if it can plausibly be argued that 
an interpersonal transgression was caused by something uncontrollable and 
external to the offender, there is less concern that the transgression will be 
repeated and therefore more trust in the relationship. This effect has also been 
shown in economic games (van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011), where participants are 
more generous to a transgressor if the latter can convince them that there was no 
intent to be unfair, by arguing that it was an accident or the result of not 
understanding the rules of the game. Given that trust is integral to intergroup 
relations and relationship repair, it would be useful to examine whether offering an 
excuse is a more effective way of repairing a relationship than making an apology. 
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Of course, there are some instances in which denial of responsibility is based on a 
truthful account of what happened, but there are also cases in which responsibility 
for a negative outcome is initially denied, but later acknowledged. A particular 
instance of this sequence of events was used as the context for the present study. 
 The context was the suspension of Uber’s licence to operate taxis in London, 
in September 2017. This suspension was enacted on the grounds that Uber was 
deemed to be not “fit and proper” by Transport for London (backed by the London 
Mayoral office), naming the company’s approach to reporting serious crimes as one 
of the reasons for this assessment. Immediately after the suspension, Uber released 
a statement in which they claimed to be confused about the basis for the 
suspension and asserted that they had done nothing wrong, noting that they were 
appealing the decision. A few days later another statement was released, this time 
a formal and public apology for their mistake (Crerar, Evening Standard, 2017). The 
headlines and opening lines of these articles formed two of the three conditions for 
my study. In a third condition, participants read both articles, which were presented 
in their chronological order. This was done to examine whether offering of an 
apology as the initial response to a transgression would be more or less effective 
than apologising after an initial attempt to deny responsibility. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Two hundred and twenty-one participants (108 males & 113 females; mean 
age of 47.95) completed this study. Participants were recruited via the research 
company Pureprofile (www.pureprofile.com). This enabled me to recruit a sample 
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of participants to be chosen based on their residential location (I chose cities in 
mainland Britain where Uber was active). The study had a between-subjects design 
consisting of three conditions: denial of responsibility, apology, and denial of 
responsibility followed by apology. Participants were randomly allocated to one of 
these conditions. 
It should be noted that 276 participants started this study. Some were 
excluded because they did not provide consent (n = 4), failed an attention check (n 
= 24), or simply did not finish the study (n = 27). The attention check used was the 
same as in Study 3 and was included to ensure that participants paid careful 
attention to the transcripts they were asked to read. 
Manipulation 
 Denial of Responsibility, Apology, or Both. Participants read the title and the 
first few lines of newspaper articles following the suspension of Uber’s operating 
licence in London. In the Denial of Responsibility condition (hereafter Denial), 
participants only read the initial response from Uber, which essentially stated that 
the company was confused as to why the licence had been suspended. In the 
Apology condition, participants only read the later response from Uber, apologising 
for the company’s wrongdoings. In the Both condition, participants read the two 
articles, one after the other, in the correct chronological order. The articles 
presented were adapted from real newspaper articles but were condensed to 
highlight the message offered by Uber. The texts of the articles used in the three 
conditions are shown in Appendix 6.  
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Materials 
 Forgiveness. To assess intention to forgive Uber for wrongdoing, participants 
were asked to respond to a single item that read “I would be willing to forgive Uber 
for any wrongdoings”. Responses to this item were made on a 1 to 5 scale of, where 
1 was “Strongly Disagree” and 5 was “Strongly Agree”. 
 Positive Perceptions and Negative Emotions. These dependent variables 
were the identical to those used in Study 3, such that positive perceptions were 
measured using 4 items (Cronbach’s alpha = .83) and negative emotions were also 
assessed using 4 items (Cronbach’s alpha = .88). 
 Future Intentions to use Uber. Participants were asked to respond to the 
item “I will definitely still be using Uber in the future”. Responses were again made 
on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 was “Strongly Disagree” and 5 was “Strongly Agree”.  
Procedure 
Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to 
sign an on-screen consent form. Demographic measures were then completed. The 
structure of the main questionnaire was as follows: It began with a description of 
Uber’s operating licence in London being suspended, and then came an attention 
check, the manipulated article(s), the negative emotion items, the positive 
perception items, the future intention item, and the forgiveness item. Items within 
each set of measures were presented in random order. After completing these 
measures, participants were thanked and debriefed.  
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Results  
One-way ANOVAs were used to establish the effects of the conditions on 
the dependent variables. To control for alpha level inflation, Bonferroni-corrected 
post-hoc tests were used to follow up any significant effects. All means and 
standard deviations are reported in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4 
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the dependent variables 
in the three article conditions (Study 4). 
  Condition  
Measure Denial Apology Both 
Forgiveness 3.37 
(1.26) 
3.31 
(1.24) 
2.78 
(1.35) 
Positive Perceptions 3.01 
(.93) 
2.91 
(.90) 
2.45 
(.95) 
Negative Emotions 2.31 
(.92) 
2.32 
(.93) 
2.96 
(1.19) 
Intention for Future 
Use 
3.75 
(1.13) 
3.14 
(1.17) 
2.66 
(1.11) 
 
Forgiveness 
There was a significant effect of Condition on forgiveness of Uber for any 
transgressions, F(2, 218) = 4.67, p = .010, ηp2= .04, with Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
showing that those in the Both condition were significantly less forgiving (M = 2.78) 
than were those in either the Apology condition (M = 3.31; p = .045) or the Denial 
condition (M = 3.37; p = .017).  
Positive Perceptions 
There was a significant effect of Condition on positive perceptions of Uber, 
F(2, 218) = 7.65, p = .001, ηp2= .07, with Bonferroni post-hoc tests showing that this 
those in the Both condition had significantly less positive perceptions (M = 2.45) 
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than those in either the Apology condition (M = 2.91; p = .010) or the Denial 
condition (M = 3.01; p = .001). 
Negative Emotions 
There was a significant effect of Condition on negative emotions felt 
towards Uber, F(2, 218) = 9.90, p < .001, ηp2= .08, with Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
showing that those in the Both condition felt significantly more negative emotion 
(M = 2.96) than those in either the Apology condition (M = 2.32; p = .001) or the 
Denial condition (M = 2.31; p < .001). 
Intentions for Future Use 
There was a significant effect of Condition on intentions to use Uber in the 
future, F(2, 218) = 17.06, p < .001, ηp2= .14, with Bonferroni post-hoc tests showing 
that those in the Both condition were significantly less likely to use Uber in the 
future (M = 2.66) than those in either the Apology condition (M = 3.14; p = .036) or 
the Denial condition (M = 3.75; p < .001). Those in the Denial condition were also 
more likely to use Uber in the future than were those in the Apology condition (p = 
.004). 
Discussion 
The results of Study 4 demonstrate the effectiveness of initially denying 
responsibility, with this response being as effective as initially offering an apology 
when it came to forgiveness of, perceptions of, and negative feelings towards the 
transgressing company. Indeed, denying responsibility was more effective than 
offering an apology with respect to participants’ intentions to make use of the 
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company’s service. However, the most strikingly consistent finding from this study 
is that an apology offered after initially denying responsibility resulted in less 
forgiveness of, less positive perceptions of, and more negative emotions felt 
towards the company, and lower intentions to use the company’s service in the 
future. Thus the combination of an initial denial of responsibility and a subsequent 
apology is clearly the least effective way to respond to an accusation that one’s 
group has committed a transgression. The conflicting messages given by these two 
kinds of statement, in which the accused group initially tries to deny responsibility 
but then acknowledges responsibility by offering an apology, make a poor 
impression, possibly by arousing suspicion and evoking a lack of trust. In the context 
of this thesis, it is noteworthy that one of the conditions in which an apology was 
offered by a group resulted in the least positive responses, confirming that an 
intergroup apology is not always well received. 
General Discussion 
The general objective in conducting these studies was to explore the extent 
of the discrepancy in reactions to interpersonal and intergroup apologies in a range 
of contexts, and to uncover some of the paradoxes of intergroup apologies. I 
investigated the impacts on a range of reconciliation measures of the following 
factors: desire for an apology; divergence in immediate reactions to an apology; a 
change in the leadership of a perpetrating group; and denial of responsibility for the 
transgression. Unlike interpersonal apologies, it was found that the effects of desire 
for apology and change of leadership had little or no influence in promoting 
intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation. Moreover, denial of responsibility was 
  Chapter 2 
69 
 
found to be at least as effective as offering an apology in an intergroup scenario, 
paralleling findings in interpersonal settings, and there was even evidence that an 
apology offered after denying responsibility was the least effective way for a group 
to achieve reconciliation. 
In Study 1 a particular paradox of intergroup apology was highlighted. It was 
shown that the desire for an intergroup apology, whether it be a collective desire or 
a personal desire, does not lead to stronger forgiveness motivations or reduce 
negative emotions after an apology has been delivered. This offers a somewhat 
pessimistic view on the prospects of intergroup apologies achieving reconciliation, 
because it is known that interpersonal reconciliation is enhanced when an apology 
is desired and then offered (Freedman, Burgoon, Ferrell, Pennebaker, & Beer, 
2017). It seems that in the context of intergroup relations, wanting an apology does 
not increase the likelihood that an apology will be accepted. Some counter-intuitive 
relationships were also observed, with those participants who had a high personal 
desire for an apology being less forgiving and having stronger negative emotions 
following the apology, and those participants who perceived a high collective desire 
for an apology having a stronger revenge motivation. One way to explain these 
findings is to argue that an increased desire for an apology brings with it higher 
expectations, and that these higher expectations are not satisfied by the apology on 
its own. This is an issue that should be researched further in an effort to explain 
why in a group context the desire for an apology sometimes generates the reverse 
effect to the one it has in an individual context. 
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The results of Study 2 shed some light on why intergroup apologies are not 
always effective. There was no evidence in this study of a general tendency for 
intergroup apology to result in more prosocial behaviour. However, groups that had 
an “accepting reaction” to the transgressing group were more likely to be prosocial 
in subsequent interactions with the group, and offering an apology was associated 
with greater likelihood of an accepting reaction. By contrast, groups that did not 
‘accept’ the apology were more likely to behave in a competitive manner than were 
those in the control condition. This points to one of the possible pitfalls of 
intergroup apologies, in that that those who are not accepting of an apology may 
end up having more negative impressions of the perpetrating group than would 
have been the case if no apology had been offered. This again highlights a 
discrepancy between intergroup and interpersonal apologies, because previous 
interpersonal research using economic games shows that offering an apology 
following a transgression is an effective way of inducing future cooperation (De 
Cremer, 2010; Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011). In a broader sense, Cohen, Wildschut 
and Insko (2010) show how communication can increase cooperation in 
interpersonal scenarios, and how communication can activate interpersonal norms 
associated with fairness and trust. It seems to be the case that there is something 
about an intergroup scenario that inhibits these norms from being activated. 
 Study 3 highlights further differences between reactions to apologies made 
in the interpersonal and intergroup contexts. The main finding from this study was 
that reading an article of apology issued by a ‘new’ leader, as opposed to the 
previous one, led to an increase in forgiveness and to more positive perceptions of 
the leader. Likewise, an apology that was more interpersonal in nature (using “I” 
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instead of “we”) resulted in higher forgiveness and more positive perceptions of the 
leader. There was no evidence of parallel effects for the council group as a whole. 
The only effect that was found in terms of attitudes towards the group was that if 
the apology from a ‘new’ leader was delivered in an interpersonal way, rather than 
an intergroup one, participants felt significantly stronger negative emotions 
towards the council group as a whole. This may be because a ‘new’ leader making a 
personal apology led participants to regard the council as a whole as more 
blameworthy. The personal apology offered by the new leader may have served to 
highlight the collective failure of the previous regime, both to manage their housing 
safely and to offer a collective apology for this failure. In practical terms, this raises 
questions about who should deliver an intergroup apology under such 
circumstances. Although it may not be very practical for each council member to 
offer a personal apology, the results from Study 3 suggest that this might be the 
‘least worst’ option.  
 The results of Study 4 did yield one finding that is consistent between 
interpersonal and intergroup contexts, namely that denying responsibility for a 
transgression is as effective in achieving reconciliation as making an apology (and 
indeed more effective when it came to intentions to use the company’s service in 
the future). However, this is hardly a ringing endorsement of the effectiveness of 
intergroup apologies. One finding tempering the conclusion that intergroup 
apologies are ineffective is that denying responsibility and then apologising later led 
to more negative reactions than either simply denying responsibility or simply 
apologising. Thus, apologising and accepting responsibility from the outset appears 
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to be a more effective way of promoting reconciliation than initially denying 
responsibility and then apologising. 
These studies have their limitations. In Study 1 the ‘apology is not enough’ 
article resulted in less perception of apology desire than did the ‘apology desire’ 
article, but it did remove the perception of collective or individual desire for an 
apology, because mean scores for both measures were around the midpoint of the 
scale. To properly assess the role of apology desire it would be useful in future 
studies to create contexts in which members of groups that have been victims of a 
transgression can be separated into those who clearly desire an apology and those 
who clearly do not desire one. Achieving this (which would admittedly be difficult in 
practice) would provide greater insight into the role of apology desire and might 
also point to more conclusive explanations for the seemingly counter-intuitive 
correlations observed in this study. A limitation of Study 2 is that it focused on very 
short-term reactions to a transgression and a subsequent apology or non-apology. 
These reactions were assessed after just two rounds of an economic game. 
However, this was done to maintain consistency with the first phase of the game, 
which needed to be restricted to two rounds in order to have control over the 
severity of the outgroup’s transgression. It could be argued that both Study 3 and 
Study 4 would have benefited from the inclusion of a control condition. Although 
much of the current research on intergroup apologies compares an apology 
condition with a no apology condition, in the current studies it would have been 
interesting to compare the manipulated conditions with to a control baseline 
condition in which no information was provided, to establish whether there would 
be significant differences from this baseline. Against these limitations, it is worth 
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highlighting some strengths of these studies. Although Study 1 used a fabricated 
story, it was one that was highly plausible to the participants. Likewise, although 
Study 2 made use of an artificial situation and a fabricated apology, here the 
participant groups were themselves the victims of the outgroup’s transgressive 
behaviour, as opposed to making judgments about transgressions that affected 
other groups. Finally, Studies 3 and 4 used real-life transgressions and the 
manipulations were closely based on the real-life apologies that were offered by 
the perpetrating group. Thus, there are grounds for assuming that the studies were 
high in ecological validity.  
To conclude, the general aim of these studies was to explore the ways in 
which intergroup apologies differ from their interpersonal counterparts, and to 
begin to examine why intergroup apologies often appear to be ineffective in 
bringing about intergroup reconciliation. I have shown that, in contrast to 
interpersonal scenarios, wanting to have an intergroup apology, and receiving an 
intergroup apology delivered by a ‘new’ leader do not increase the likelihood of 
forgiveness, as well as demonstrating the general ineffectiveness of intergroup 
apologies. Overall, the results of these studies are consistent with the assumption 
that intergroup apologies are ineffective, even in this so-called “Age of Apology”, 
when apologies for transgressions committed by one group against another are 
routinely called for and sometimes, at least, given. In the remaining chapters of this 
thesis I will focus on factors that might increase the effectiveness of intergroup 
apologies.
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Chapter 3 
Improving the Effectiveness of Intergroup Apologies:  
The Role of Apology Content and Moral Emotions 
The use of the word “sorry” was rarely seen in exchanges relating to 
intergroup reconciliation before the end of World War Two. By contrast, the 
current era has been dubbed “the age of apology” (Brooks, 1999) due to the 
extraordinary growth in the number of official apologies that are offered or 
requested. Presumably underlying this rise in intergroup apologies is an assumption 
that the offering of an apology should trigger an apology-forgiveness cycle. Indeed, 
there is evidence in interpersonal contexts that apologies are effective in evoking 
forgiveness (McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 
2011). However, the same cannot be said for intergroup apologies (Wohl et al., 
2011). The aim of the present research is to explore factors that would increase the 
effectiveness of intergroup apologies. 
On the face of it, the offering of an intergroup apology should be beneficial. 
Indeed, Leonard, Mackie, and Smith (2011) showed that offering an apology, 
compared to not offering one, did increase forgiveness levels. There are other 
studies showing more specific benefits, such as reductions in the motivation for 
vengeance and increased future support (Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008), as well as 
improvements in victim satisfaction and perceptions of transgressor remorse 
(Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). However, in reviewing the literature in intergroup 
apologies, Hornsey, Wohl, and Philpot (2014) stated that while intergroup apologies 
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can have positive impacts, they generally fail to elicit forgiveness. This is particularly 
evident in research by Bombay, Matheson, and Anisman (2013), who found that 
despite an increase in positive perceptions of the transgressor, individuals were 
generally pessimistic about the idea that intergroup relations genuinely improve as 
a result of apology. 
This raises the question of why intergroup apologies are not effective in 
achieving what they are presumably intended to do, and why it is that they are less 
effective than interpersonal apologies. A plausible explanation for the difference in 
how intergroup and interpersonal apologies are received relates to trust. 
Intergroup situations are characterized by more competition, higher fear, and 
greater mistrust (Halabi, Nadler, & Dovidio, 2012; Insko et al., 1998), all of which 
contribute to the perception that intergroup apologies are not to be trusted. It has 
also been argued that perceptions of sincerity are integral to all apologies (Wenzel 
et al., 2017). Given the distrustful context in which most intergroup apologies are 
made, it is clear why they could be perceived as insincere. This points to an 
apparently straightforward way to improve the efficacy of intergroup apologies: 
Perceptions of their trustworthiness need to be enhanced.  
 Intergroup apologies often involve more than the perpetrator group saying 
“sorry.” They often take the form of a speech, or transcript, in the course of which 
the apology is communicated. Therefore, intergroup apologies are often described 
as ‘scripted performances’ (Hornsey et al., 2014). It is possible that this method of 
communication is one reason for these apologies being regarded as untrustworthy. 
Whereas intergroup apologies are generally given in the form of prepared 
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statements, interpersonal apologies are typically more spontaneous. Past research 
on intergroup apologies has tended to focus on the effects of giving versus not 
giving an apology. Current research is beginning to explore the components of 
apologies, and what it is that makes them effective (Fehr & Gelfand, 2010; Shnabel 
& Nadler, 2015). Given that intergroup apologies often take the form of a script that 
is longer than a simple expression of regret or remorse, it is important to study 
what effects different aspects of apology content can have.  
 Nadler (2012) has argued that genuine intergroup reconciliation can only be 
established when there are changes to structural, relational, and identity-related 
factors. The structural factor refers to the status and power relations between the 
groups, and an apology that addresses this factor aims to promote changes that 
would lead to a greater equality between groups, for example through political, 
legal, or economic means. The relational factor refers to the trust relation between 
the groups, and an apology that addresses this factor would seek to promote trust 
between groups; doing so should lead to a greater harmony between the groups.  
The identity-related factor refers to identity-related threats to victims and 
perpetrators, and an apology that addresses this factor would aim to remove such 
threats, the objective being that the different group identities peacefully co-exist. 
Although realizing these factors would largely depend on actions taken, rather than 
words, they are points that can be addressed in the form of words and it should be 
possible to incorporate them into the content of an apology.  
 The present studies explore whether variations in the content of an apology 
designed to address these factors have an impact on how the apology is received. 
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By systematically examining the effects of structural, relational, and identity-related 
factors within a given apology, the intention is to investigate whether their 
inclusion helps to increase forgiveness or, at the very least, reduces the lack of trust 
that seems to characterize many intergroup conflicts.  
Overview of Studies 
 The present studies explore the effects of varying apology content within 
the context of ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, as seen by people in mainland 
Britain. This conflict was chosen for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there is already a 
wealth of research on this conflict. Cairns and Hewstone (2002) suggested that in 
terms of forgiveness, ‘The Troubles’ must be viewed as an intergroup, rather than 
interpersonal, context, making it well suited to the current research objectives. 
They also called for future work to investigate the role that trust plays in 
forgiveness, citing it as a pathway towards reconciliation. Secondly, ‘The Troubles’ 
have a particular relevance to older members of the British population, from which 
the participants in each of the present studies were recruited. There is also an 
apology transcript that was issued by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in relation to 
their role in the deaths of civilians (The Guardian, 2002). This provided a basis on 
which to vary the content of a real-world apology and to explore the effects on 
perceptions and judgments.  
 The three studies reported below took the form of online experiments. 
Participants in all three studies were recruited via the research company 
Pureprofile (www.pureprofile.com). This enabled the recruitment of participants 
based upon their age (over 35) and geographical location (living in mainland 
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Britain). The minimum age of 35 was chosen because it meant that participants 
would have been at least 18 years of age at the time of ‘The Good Friday 
Agreement’ of 1998, which brought about the end of ‘The Troubles.’ The mainland 
location was chosen because although ‘The Troubles’ are probably associated with 
strongly held attitudes in those living in mainland Britain, they are likely to evoke 
more polarised attitudes in Northern Irish citizens.  
 It should be noted that all studies reported here in this chapter were 
approved by the Cardiff University Research Ethics Committee (EC.15.11.10.4311). 
Study 5 
 Although Nadler and Shnabel (2015) argue that structural, relational, and 
identity-related factors are interdependent and overlapping, as a first step I decided 
to study their independent effects. Previous studies (e.g., Leonard et al., 2011) have 
shown that different types of apology vary in their effectiveness. Thus, the first 
prediction was that emphasizing one factor rather than another in an apology 
would make the apology differentially effective, depending on the context. 
 This prediction was tested by exposing participants to apologies ostensibly 
coming from different sources: a large group (the IRA), a smaller republican group 
(the Irish National Liberation Army; INLA), or an individual (a republican soldier). 
The rationale for varying apology sources comes from research showing that out-
group status and size can have effects on attitudes and perceptions of the group 
(Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002; Liebkind, Nystrom, Honkanummi, & Lange, 2004; 
Schleuter & Scheepers, 2010), as well as giving me an opportunity to explore the 
differences between intergroup and interpersonal apologies. The text of all 
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apologies was identical except for the final paragraph, which was manipulated to 
emphasize either a structural, relational, or identity-related reconciliation process.  
 It was expected that apologies coming from the interpersonal apology 
source would be more effective in promoting forgiveness than the two group 
sources. It was also predicted that the interpersonal apology source would elicit 
more positive perceptions of the transgressor(s), and that this would enhance 
forgiveness. I thought that it would be interesting to explore differences between 
the two groups, and it was anticipated that apologies from the larger group might 
be less effective than equivalent apologies from the smaller group, partly as a 
reflection of the greater threat posed by the larger group, which might make it 
more difficult to change perceptions of the structural, relational, and identity-
related facets of intergroup relations. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Two hundred and sixty participants (127 males & 133 females) completed 
this study. They had a mean age of 51.70 (SD = 10.62, range = 40).  The study had a 
fully between-subjects design comprising nine conditions, with participants 
randomly allocated to one of them. The stimulus material was exactly the same 
except for (a) the ostensible apology source (the IRA, the INLA, or an individual 
combatant), and (b) which feature (structural, relational, or identity related 
reconciliation) was emphasised in the final paragraph of the apology.  
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 The minimum number of participants required was determined by power 
analysis (G*power 3; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). To detect a medium 
effect size for main effects and interactions with 80% confidence with a significance 
level of .05, at least 196 participants would be needed. It should be noted that 339 
participants started this study, meaning that 79 participants were excluded before 
finishing, 22 of whom did not give consent to use their data, while the remaining 57 
failed an attention check. The attention check was located early in the survey, 
before any manipulations, and was used because the effectiveness of the apology 
type manipulation depended on attentive reading of the text.   
Manipulation  
Apology Source. After reading a basic description of ‘The Troubles,’ 
participants were given a brief description of the perpetrator (large group, small 
group, or individual) that was the source of the upcoming apology. This involved a 
basic description of the group and event(s) for which the apology was being issued, 
as well as the number of people believed to have been killed as a result of the 
perpetrator’s actions. 
Apology Type. The apology itself followed the same format and had the same 
main body of text as the original apology that was offered by the IRA (The Guardian, 
2002). The manipulation was implemented in the concluding paragraph. The 
structural conclusion emphasised the desire for equality between the groups 
involved in the conflict and mentioned compensation for victims; the relational 
conclusion emphasised the desire for trust and contact between the two groups; and 
the identity-related conclusion emphasised the desire for identity restoration and 
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the removal of threats to identity. The full transcripts of these apologies can be found 
in Appendix 7. 
Measures 
Forgiveness. This construct was measured in two ways. A single item, “After 
reading this, do you think (the transgressor) should be forgiven?” was responded to 
using ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ response options. This was followed by the Intergroup 
Forgiveness Scale for Northern Ireland (Hewstone et al., 2004). This 10-item scale 
was developed using focus groups (McLernon, Cairns, & Hewstone, 2002) and a 
previous study of intergroup forgiveness in Northern Ireland (Roe, Pegg, Hodges, & 
Trimm, 1999) to shape the item content. It was originally developed to measure 
forgiveness between communities in Northern Ireland, but for the purpose of the 
present study was adapted to measure forgiveness of the transgressor(s) by 
mainland British participants (which can be seen in Appendix 8). Responses to the 
items were made using 5-point scales (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). 
The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .82. 
Positive Perceptions of Perpetrator. Four items were used to assess 
perceptions of the sincerity, remorsefulness, trustworthiness, and believability of 
the perpetrator(s). As with the forgiveness scale, responses were made using a 5-
point scale from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree.’ The Cronbach’s alpha for 
this measure was .89. 
Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their religion, the extent 
of their knowledge of ‘The Troubles’, whether they had any Irish relations, and 
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whether they or their family had been affected by ‘The Troubles,’ either directly or 
indirectly. 
Procedure 
 Participants completed an online survey that took approximately 10 minutes 
to complete. First, participants were given a brief description of the study and 
asked to sign an on-screen consent form. Next, participants provided demographic 
information and were then taken to a page offering a brief description of ‘The 
Troubles’, which also included the attention check. Participants then read one of 
the nine possible apologies, which was followed by the forgiveness and positive 
perceptions measures. Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their time. 
Results 
 None of the demographic variables was significantly associated with any of 
the dependent variables. The effect of condition on the binary forgiveness was 
analysed using chi-square. The effect of the manipulation on the forgiveness scale 
and intergroup perceptions was analysed using a series of 3 (Apology Source: large 
group, small group, individual) x 3 (Apology Type: structural, relational, identity-
related) ANOVAs. The means, standard deviations for all of the dependent 
measures, as well as the percentage of “yes” answers to the binary forgiveness 
questions are shown in Table 3.1. 
Forgiveness 
 For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of ‘yes’ responses was 
56.50%. A chi-square analysis showed a significant association between Apology 
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Source and the proportion of forgiveness, χ²(2) = 36.59, p < .001, but no significant 
association between Apology Type and proportion of forgiveness,  χ²(2) = 1.02, p = 
.601. The significant association with Apology Source was driven by the much 
higher proportion of ‘yes’ responses in the individual condition (82.80%), compared 
to the two group conditions (large group = 43.70%, small group = 43.00%).  
 A logistic regression was performed to ascertain the effects of Apology 
Source, Apology Type, and their interaction on the likelihood of forgiveness. The 
logistic regression model was statistically significant, χ²(8) = 43.17, p < .001. The 
model explained 21% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in binary forgiveness and 
correctly classified 66% of cases. Consistent with the analyses reported above, 
there was a significant effect of Apology Source: the two group sources were less 
likely to result in forgiveness than the interpersonal condition (Large Group: b = -
1.40, SE = .57, p = .014; Small Group: b = -1.78, SE = .59, p = .002). The main effect 
of Apology Type was not significant (p = .557) and the interaction was also non-
significant (p = .652). 
 Turning to the forgiveness scale, there was a significant effect of Apology 
Source, F(2, 251) = 18.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests 
showed that forgiveness was significantly higher in the individual condition (M = 
3.56) compared to the two group conditions (Large Group: M = 3.03, Small Group: 
M = 3.14). There were no significant effects of Apology Type on the forgiveness 
scale, F(2, 251) = .25, p = .779, ηp2 < .01. There also was no significant interaction 
F(4, 251) = .71, p = .584, ηp2 = .01.  
  Chapter 3 
85 
 
Positive Perceptions2 
 There was a significant main effect of Apology Source on positive 
perceptions of the perpetrator(s), F(2, 251) = 26.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc tests showed that the individual condition (M = 3.87) attracted 
significantly higher scores that the two group conditions (Large Group: M = 3.05; 
Small Group: M = 3.27).  There were no significant main effects of Apology Type on 
these perceptions, F(2, 251) = 1.69, p = .187, ηp2 = .01. However, there was a 
significant interaction between Apology Source and Apology Type, F(4, 251) = 2.78, 
p = .028, ηp2 = .04. Simple effects analysis showed that this was driven by effects of 
Apology Type within the large group condition F(2, 251) = 7.03, p = .001, showing 
that ratings of positive perceptions in the structural condition (M = 3.36) were 
significantly higher than in the relational condition (M = 2.63). No significant 
interaction effects were observed in the other intergroup perceptions.  
Mediation Analysis 
 Regression analysis was used to test the hypothesis that the effect of 
Apology Source on forgiveness scale ratings would be mediated by positive 
perceptions of the perpetrator(s). Using the interpersonal condition as the dummy 
variable, it was shown that the two group conditions both resulted in both lower 
forgiveness ratings (Large Group: b = -.53, SE = .09, p < .001; Small Group: b = -.42, 
SE = .09, p < .001) and less positive perceptions (Large Group: b = -.82, SE = .12, p < 
.001; Small Group: b = -60, SE = .12, p < .001). The positive perceptions, in turn, 
 
2 The results of exploratory analyses of the individual positive perception items 
(sincerity, remorse, trust and believability) are reported in Appendix 9. 
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significantly predicted forgiveness ratings, b = .53, SE = .04, p < .001. When 
controlling for the positive perceptions, neither group condition led to significantly 
lower forgiveness ratings (Large Group: b = -.10, SE = .08, p = .184; Small Group: b = 
-.10, SE = .07, p = .164). More than half the variance in forgiveness was accounted 
for by the predictors (R2adj. = .52). The indirect omnibus effect was tested using a 
bootstrapping estimation approach with 5000 re-samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
The coefficient for the indirect effect was significant, b = .08, SE = .02, 95% bias-
corrected CI = .05, .13. 
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Table 3.1 
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) of all dependent variables measured in Study 5, broken down by apology source and 
apology content. 
 Large Group Small Group Individual 
 Structural Relational Identity Structural Relational Identity Structural Relational Identity 
Binary 
Forgiveness 
(% ‘yes’ 
responses) 
51.72% 34.48% 44.83% 44.83% 48.28% 35.71% 85.71% 86.21% 76.67% 
 
Forgiveness 
Scale (1-5) 
 
3.10 
(.80) 
 
2.95 
(.58) 
 
3.03 
(.62) 
 
3.11 
(.65) 
 
3.24 
(.61) 
 
3.07 
(.61) 
 
3.48 
(.63) 
 
3.66 
(.52) 
 
3.55 
(.47) 
 
Positive 
Perceptions 
(1-5) 
 
3.36 
(.85) 
 
2.63 
(.95) 
 
3.16 
(.74) 
 
3.20 
(.80) 
 
3.33 
(.77) 
 
3.29 
(.85) 
 
3.87 
(.66) 
 
3.87 
(.73) 
 
3.88 
(.49) 
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Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to establish whether different types of 
apology could have varying effects across different contexts and sources. As 
expected, there was a substantial difference in the effectiveness of individual and 
intergroup apologies. There was less evidence that the different apology types 
varied in effectiveness, although one feature of the results suggests that the 
apology types were differentially effective.  
Consistent with existing literature, apologies offered by an individual, 
regardless of apology type, were more effective than any intergroup apology, in 
promoting both forgiveness and positive perceptions of transgressors. There were 
no significant differences between the two intergroup conditions. This suggests that 
apologies offered in any intergroup setting face the same difficulty in promoting 
forgiveness and changing perceptions of the perpetrator group. Variations in group 
size and severity of transgression appear to be irrelevant. The results also show that 
the effect of apology source on forgiveness was fully mediated by the positive 
perceptions of the transgressors. This is consistent with previous research showing 
that intergroup apologies are hampered by mistrust, which is the primary reason 
why interpersonal apologies are typically more effective. This suggests that, in 
order to make intergroup apologies as effective as their interpersonal counterparts, 
steps need to be taken to ensure that groups appear sincere, remorseful and 
trustworthy. 
Interestingly, apology type did interact significantly with apology source in 
shaping the positive perceptions of perpetrator(s). In the case of the large group 
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apology, these positive perceptions were significantly higher for the structural 
apology, as opposed to the relational apology. This is interesting because the 
central purpose of the relational dimension of an apology is to promote trust 
between the parties. This suggests that the extent of mistrust in the intergroup 
context is such that an attempt to promote trust did not reduce perceptions of 
untrustworthiness. It is also interesting that this only occurred in the large group 
context. It may be that in a larger group context, what is stated in a structural 
apology is seen as more realistic than when the same statement is made by a 
smaller group. This suggests that, in the case of a large group, an apology that seeks 
to promote equality and mentions potential compensation is a more effective way 
of enhancing trust than an apology that explicitly mentions ways in which trust 
could be rebuilt. This could be explained using the Needs-Based Model (Nadler & 
Shnabel, 2015), which highlights the point that a social exchange that specifically 
empowers the victim group can be a successful route to identity restoration. 
A limitation of the present study is that there was no control group condition; 
nor was there a condition in which the different apology types were combined. These 
conditions were omitted mainly for pragmatic reasons. The absence of a control 
condition means that it is not possible to compare the effects of the different 
apologies with a no apology baseline, or at the very least a baseline apology in which 
none of the factors is emphasised. Despite the fact that intergroup apologies 
attracted low forgiveness ratings, compared to individual apologies, they may have 
elicited greater forgiveness than a condition in which no apology was offered or none 
of the factors was emphasised. With respect to a ‘combined’ apology condition, in 
his initial discussion of the three apology factors, Nadler (2012) stated that all three 
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factors are needed for intergroup reconciliation to occur. Strong effects of apology 
type on forgiveness were not observed in this study, and this may well be because 
the three factors need to be considered together, rather than independently. Both 
of these limitations were addressed in Study 6.  
Study 6 
In Study 6 a ‘combined’ apology condition was included that incorporated 
the structural, relational, and identity-related factors, and compared it with a 
control apology condition that did not include any of these factors. As in Study 5, 
the manipulation was implemented by adding a concluding paragraph to the real 
apology that was issued by an IRA spokesperson.  
I also decided to focus on the large group apology source. In Study 5 
evidence was found suggesting that it is a lack of trust that hampers the 
effectiveness of apology in an intergroup setting. Given that there were few 
differences between the two group conditions, I decided to concentrate on the 
large group (IRA) condition because this group is more familiar to British 
participants, and because the real-world apology that served as the basis for the 
research was one issued by the IRA.   
In an effort to address the lack of trust in group apologies, it was also 
decided to vary another dimension of the apology, namely the degree of expressed 
remorse. Crossed with the ‘combined’ vs. control apology conditions, a high 
remorse vs. standard remorse factor was also included. Although there is relatively 
little empirical research investigating the effects expressed remorse in intergroup 
apologies, there are several suggestions that it is important to show remorse in 
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order to promote forgiveness and enhance perceptions that the transgression will 
not be repeated (e.g., de Grieff, 2008; Gold & Weiner, 2000). 
It was predicted that both the ‘combined’ apology and the apology including 
an explicit expression of remorse would lead to more positive perceptions of the 
transgressor and, in turn, greater levels of forgiveness, in comparison to the control 
apology condition. It also seemed intuitively plausible that the two factors would 
interact, such that the most effective apology would be one including the combined 
factors and high remorse.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred and eighty participants (90 males & 90 females) completed 
this study. They had a mean age of 50.86 years (SD = 8.68, range = 39). This study 
had a fully between-subjects design resulting from the factorial combination of 
Apology Factors (present vs. absent) and Remorse (high vs. control). Participants 
were randomly allocated to one of the four conditions. 
The minimum number of participants required was determined by a power 
analysis (G*power 3; Faul et al., 2007). To detect a medium effect size for main 
effects and interactions with 80% confidence to a with a significance level of .05, at 
least 158 participants were needed. Two hundred and fifty-two participants started 
this study, 72 of whom were excluded before finishing. Twenty-three of these did 
not provide consent to use their data, while the remaining 49 failed the attention 
check.  
Apology and Moral Emotions   
92 
 
Manipulations 
 Apology Factors. In the apology factors present condition, the additional 
concluding paragraph included all three factors that were examined in Study 5 
(structural, relational, and identity-related). This combined factor paragraph 
included one sentence from each of the independent concluding paragraphs from 
Study 5. In the control condition, the participants read the original apology without 
the concluding paragraph.  
 Remorse. In the high remorse condition, intensifying words or phrases were 
added throughout the statement of apology. Examples include grievous errors as 
opposed to errors, sincere apologies as opposed to apologies, and deeply sorry as 
opposed to sorry. The full transcripts of the apologies used can be found in 
Appendix 10. 
Measures & Procedure 
 The measures of forgiveness and positive perceptions of the perpetrator 
group, as well as demographic questions, were the identical to those used in Study 
5. The procedure was also the same as that used in Study 5.  
Results 
None of the demographic variables was significantly associated with any of 
the dependent variables. The effect of condition on the binary forgiveness measure 
was analysed using a chi-square. The effect of the manipulation on the forgiveness 
scale and intergroup perceptions was analysed using a series of 2 (Apology Factors: 
present vs absent) x 2 (Remorse: high vs control) ANOVAs. The means, standard 
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deviations and 95% confidence intervals for all of the dependent measures, as well 
as the percentage of “yes” responses to the binary forgiveness question, are shown 
in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) of all dependent variables 
measured in Study 6, broken down by apology content and degree of expressed 
remorse. 
 Apology Factors  
Included 
Apology Factors  
Not Included 
 High Remorse Control  High Remorse Control  
Binary 
Forgiveness 
(% ‘yes’ responses) 
 
31.11% 45.65% 42.22% 25.00% 
 
Forgiveness Scale 
(1-5) 
 
3.04 
(.65) 
3.23 
(.54) 
3.06 
(.52) 
2.80 
(.56) 
Positive 
Perceptions (1-5) 
3.14 
(.99) 
3.34 
(.78) 
3.25 
(.74) 
2.67 
(.83) 
 
Forgiveness 
 For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of ‘yes’ responses was 
36.11%. A chi-square analysis showed that there was no significant association 
between the proportion of yes responses and whether or not apology factors were 
present, χ²(1) = .44, p = .507, or whether remorse was high or control, χ²(1) = .02, p 
= .877. 
A follow-up logistic regression analysis was performed to ascertain the 
effects of the Apology Factors, the Remorse manipulation and their interaction on 
the likelihood of forgiveness. The logistic regression model was not statistically 
significant, χ²(3) = 5.46, p = .141. The interaction was also non-significant. The 
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model explained 4% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in binary forgiveness and 
correctly classified 64% of cases.  
  Turning to the forgiveness scale, there was a significant main effect of 
Apology Factors, F(1, 176) = 5.51, p = .020, ηp2 = .03, but no main effect of Remorse, 
F(1, 176) = .16, p = .693, ηp2 < .01. When the apology factors were present 
forgiveness scores were significantly higher (M = 3.13) than they were in the control 
condition (M = 2.94). There was also a significant interaction effect, F(1, 176) = 7.08, 
p = .009, ηp2 = .04. Simple effects analysis showed that this resulted from two 
significant simple effects. First, within the control remorse condition there was a 
significant simple main effect of Apology Factors, F(1, 176) = 12.50, p = .001, 
showing that inclusion of the apology factors led to a higher forgiveness score (M = 
3.23) than did the control apology (M = 2.80). Second, within the control apology 
condition, there was a significant simple main effect of remorse, F(1, 176) = 4.54, p 
= .035, showing that the high remorse apology led to a higher forgiveness score (M 
= 3.06) than did the control remorse apology (M = 2.80). 
Positive Perceptions3 
 The main effect of Apology Factors on positive perceptions of the 
perpetrator was significant, F(1, 176) = 5.12, p = .025, ηp2 = .043. Scores were 
significantly higher when the apology factors were included (M = 3.24), compared 
to when they were not (M = 2.96). There was no significant main effect of Remorse, 
F(1, 176) = 2.32, p = .129, ηp2 = .01, but there was a significant interaction effect, 
 
3 The results of exploratory analyses of the individual positive perception items 
(sincerity, remorse, trust and believability) are reported in Appendix 11. 
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F(1, 176) = 9.64, p = .002, ηp2 = .05. Simple effects analysis revealed the same 
pattern as was found for the forgiveness variable. There was a significant simple 
main effect of the Apology Factors manipulation within the control remorse 
condition, F(1, 176) = 14.22, p < .001, whereby the inclusion of the apology factors 
conclusion led to higher scores (M = 3.34) than did the control apology (M = 2.67). 
There was also a simple main effect of Remorse within the control Apology Factors 
condition, F(1, 176) = 14.22, p = .001, with the high remorse condition leading to 
higher scores (M = 3.25) than the control remorse condition (M = 2.67). 
Mediation and Moderated Mediation Analyses 
 Regression analysis was used to test whether the effect of Apology Factors 
on forgiveness scale ratings was mediated by positive perceptions. Results 
confirmed that inclusion of the Apology Factors significantly predicted both 
forgiveness ratings, b = .20, SE = .09, p = .022, and positive perceptions, b = .28, SE = 
.13, p = .030; positive perceptions, in turn, significantly predicted forgiveness 
ratings, b = .50, SE = .03, p < .001. When controlling for positive perceptions, 
Apology Factors no longer significantly predicted forgiveness, b = .06, SE = .06, p = 
.313. More than half of the variance in forgiveness was accounted for by the 
predictors (R2adj. = .56). The indirect effect was tested using a bootstrapping 
estimation approach with 5000 re-samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The 
coefficient for the indirect effect was significant, b = .14, SE = .06, 95% bias-
corrected CI = .02, .27. An additional test was conducted to investigate the potential 
moderating effect of the remorse manipulation on this mediation effect. It was 
shown that the effect of apology factors on positive perceptions was indeed 
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significantly moderated by the remorse manipulation, b = -3.11, SE = 1.00, p < .001. 
The coefficient for the indirect effect was significant in the control remorse 
condition, b = . 3.34, SE = .87, 95% bias-corrected CI = 1.71, 5.14, but was not 
significant in the high remorse condition, b = -.52, SE = .92, 95% bias-corrected CI = -
2.40, 1.23. 
Discussion 
 The aim of Study 6 was to examine the effects of combining the three 
apology factors that were studied separately in Study 5, comparing this combined 
condition with a control apology that made no reference to these factors, and also 
to assess the impact of enhancing the expression of remorse in an intergroup 
apology. Both manipulations had a significant impact on forgiveness and on 
perceptions of the perpetrator group, although they did not interact in the 
expected manner. 
First, and consistent with Nadler’s (2012) argument, the presence of the 
‘combined’ apology factors conclusion did increase levels of forgiveness. The joint 
presence of these apology factors also led to more positive perceptions of the out-
group. However, these effects were both stronger when the apology included no 
further enhancement of expressed remorse. A similar mediation pattern to that 
observed in Study 5 was also observed: Positive perceptions of the perpetrator fully 
mediated the impact of the apology factors on forgiveness. This is consistent with 
the suggestion that in order to attain forgiveness through an intergroup apology, 
the perpetrating group must be perceived as at least somewhat trustworthy and 
sincere.   
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A second finding was that, in absence of the apology factors, the inclusion of 
an enhanced expression of remorse in an apology can be effective, enhancing both 
forgiveness and positive perceptions of the perpetrator, relative to an apology with 
a standard expression of remorse. Unexpectedly, however, when the intergroup 
apology included both the apology factors and high expressions of remorse, 
forgiveness ratings were lower, albeit not significantly so. Contrary to the expected 
interaction between the Apology Factors and Remorse manipulations, the observed 
pattern shows that the positive effects of each manipulation were strongest in the 
absence of the other manipulation.  
A possible explanation for this unexpected result is that combining the two 
factors resulted in an information overload, with the result that the impact of each 
factor was undermined. The results suggest that the positive effects of the 
‘combined’ apology factors was somewhat undermined by the added remorse 
manipulation, as well as the positive effects of the remorse manipulation being 
undermined by the added ‘combined’ apology factors. Attempting to account for 
why such attenuation occurs would be key to understanding how the two factors 
could be combined to have a positive effect on intergroup reconciliation. A second 
way to account for these results is that the two manipulations may send conflicting 
messages. The apology factors are practical and future-oriented, whereas a strong 
expression of remorse focuses on past events. These mixed messages may undercut 
each other and thereby limit the effectiveness of each manipulation. Again, the 
Needs-Based Model (Nadler and Shnabel, 2015) could be useful in accounting for 
this result. According to this model, which argues the need for empowerment in 
reconciliation efforts, it could be that, individually, the apology factors and 
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expressions of remorse are seen as ‘empowering.’ Thus, the forward-looking 
changes included in the apology factors could be regarded as empowering, as could 
the sense that the transgressing group is remorseful, which elevates the moral 
identity of the victim group. However, interweaving the apology factors and the 
expression of remorse may make what is being communicated unclear. It may be 
that if these two components were introduced more independently, they would 
operate in concert.     
A third possible explanation is that the high remorse manipulation as 
implemented here was too complex. Expressions of remorse were distributed 
throughout the text, rather than concentrated in a single paragraph, as the apology 
factors manipulation was. Moreover, expressions of high remorse can entail several 
moral emotions, such as guilt, shame, and regret. Each of these emotions might 
have a different impact on the reader or listener. Indeed, the expression of such 
complex emotions does not always have a positive effect. Hornsey and Wohl (2013) 
found that, under certain conditions, when out-groups expressed complex 
‘secondary’ emotions in an apology, this had a more negative effect on 
reconciliation than if they had not offered any apology at all. Although Hornsey and 
Wohl argued that this might be because in-groups do not regard perpetrator out-
groups as capable of experiencing such emotions, the present findings show that in 
the absence of the ‘combined’ apology factors, expressing high remorse did have a 
positive impact on forgiveness and on perceptions of the perpetrator group.  
Study 7 was designed to explore the effects of a clearer separation of the 
manipulations of the remorse and apology factors. I also took the opportunity to 
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study the effects of implementing the high remorse condition by contrasting the 
moral emotion expression of guilt with that of shame. The reasoning for this change 
is to see whether the differences already found between these emotions (Lickel et 
al., 2005; Shepherd, Spears, & Manstead, 2013) extend to their effects within 
apologies, as well as to investigate whether expressing either emotion is more 
effective than an apology without expression of these emotions.   
Study 7 
 The aim of Study 7 was to gain further insight into the unexpected results of 
Study 6. This was achieved by having a cleaner separation between the two 
manipulations included in the intergroup apology. In Study 6, the ‘combined’ 
apology factors came in the concluding paragraph, whereas the high remorse 
expression was distributed throughout the text, including the concluding 
paragraph. To distinguish more clearly between the two manipulations, in the 
current study the apology factors manipulation was again implemented in the final 
paragraph of the apology, but in the high emotion expression condition, either 
shame or guilt was expressed only in the opening paragraph, followed by two 
further paragraphs of text before the concluding paragraph. 
 A second change introduced in this study concerns the content of what was 
expressed in the high emotion paragraph. In Study 6, the moral emotions of ‘guilt’ 
and ‘shame’ were both expressed in the high remorse condition. We know from 
previous research that guilt and shame are associated with different appraisals and 
action tendencies (Schmader & Lickel, 2006; Tracy & Robins, 2006). A clearer 
understanding of how the expression of these emotions influences the efficacy of 
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intergroup apologies can be gained by separating expressions of guilt from 
expressions of shame. Therefore, separate shame expression and guilt expression 
conditions were included in Study 7, along with a no-emotion control condition. 
 A third change introduced in this study concerned the control condition. In 
Study 6, the apology factors conclusion was simply added to the text of the original 
IRA apology and it could therefore be argued that any positive effects resulting 
from its inclusion were simply due to the provision of additional information. To 
counter this, the control condition used in Study 7 included a concluding paragraph 
of similar length to the apology factors paragraph, but without any content relating 
to the three apology factors.  
 It was predicted that both the inclusion of the apology factors and the 
expression of emotion in the intergroup apology would result in higher forgiveness 
ratings and more positive perceptions of the perpetrator group. Also, due to 
previous research suggesting that shame is perceived as a more powerful emotion 
than guilt (Lickel et al., 2005; Shepherd et al., 2013), I thought it possible that the 
expression of shame would be more effective than an expression of guilt in eliciting 
higher forgiveness levels and more positive perception of the perpetrator group.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
Two hundred and twenty-eight participants (113 males & 115 females) 
completed this study. They had a mean age of 55.54 (SD = 11.08, range = 47). As in 
the previous studies, participants were selected based on age (> 35 years) and 
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location (living in mainland Britain). The study had a fully between-subjects design 
comprising the six conditions resulting from the factorial combination of Apology 
Factors (present vs absent) and Emotion (guilt or shame or no emotion control), 
with participants randomly allocated to one of them. 
The minimum number of participants required was determined by power 
analysis (G*power 3; Faul et al., 2007). To detect a medium effect size for main 
effects and interactions with 80% confidence to a with a significance level of .05, at 
least 179 participants were needed. 
It should be noted that 292 participants started this study. Thus 64 
participants were excluded before finishing the study, 16 for not providing consent 
to use their data and 48 because of a failed attention check.  
Manipulation 
 Apology Factors. This manipulation was identical to that used in Study 6, 
with the exception that the Apology Factors absent condition included a concluding 
paragraph of similar length and sentence structure to the one used in the Apology 
Factors present condition, but without any reference to the three apology factors. 
 Emotion Expression. The first paragraph of the intergroup apology included 
a final sentence that included expressions of either guilt or shame. This read as 
follows: “There is an immense feeling of guilt [shame] over the fact that we as a 
group were able to commit the acts that we did.” There was also a no emotion 
control condition, in which this sentence was omitted. The full transcripts for the 
apologies used can be found in Appendix 12. 
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Measures 
Manipulation Checks. To check the effectiveness of the Emotion Expressed 
manipulation, participants responded to single-item statements about the presence 
of guilt or shame in the apology. Responses were made using a 5-point scale from 
‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree.’ 
 Other Measures. Forgiveness and positive perceptions of the perpetrating 
group, as well as demographic questions, were measured in the same way as in 
Studies 5 and 6. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was the same as that used in Studies 5 and 6.  
Results 
None of the demographic variables was significantly associated with any of 
the dependent variables. The means, standard deviations for all dependent 
measures, as well as the percentage of “yes” responses to the binary forgiveness 
question, are shown in Table 3.3. 
Manipulation Checks 
 Guilt. Emotion had a significant effect on perceptions of guilt, F(2, 222) = 
10.75, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that significantly more 
guilt was perceived in both the guilt (M = 3.62, p < .001) and the shame (M = 3.26, p 
= .047) conditions, compared to the no emotion condition (M = 2.85). The 
difference between the guilt and shame conditions was not significant. 
Interestingly, the apology factors manipulation also had a significant effect on the 
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perception of guilt, F(1, 222) = 5.71, p = .018, ηp2 = .03, with those in the apology 
factors included condition (M = 3.40) perceiving more guilt in the apology than 
those in the condition where the apology factors were not included (M = 3.08). 
 Shame. There was a significant effect of Emotion on perceptions of shame, 
F(2, 222) = 17.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that 
significantly more shame was perceived in the shame condition (M = 3.68), 
compared to both the guilt (M = 2.88) and no emotion (M = 2.88) conditions. The 
apology factors manipulation did not significantly affect the perception of shame, 
F(1, 222) = 1.53, p = .217, ηp2 = .01. 
Table 3.3 
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) of all dependent variables 
measured in Study 7, broken down by apology content and type of emotion 
expressed. 
 Apology Factors Included Apology Factors Not Included 
 Expressed 
Guilt 
Expressed 
Shame 
Control 
Expressed 
Guilt 
Expressed 
Shame 
Control 
Binary 
Forgiveness 
(% ‘yes’ 
responses) 
62.16% 64.86% 42.11% 56.41% 63.16% 35.90% 
Forgiveness 
Scale (1-5) 
 
3.60 
(.38) 
3.65 
(.48) 
3.23 
(.52) 
3.45 
(.72) 
3.49 
(.59) 
2.96 
(.50) 
Positive 
Perceptions 
(1-5) 
 
3.11 
(.74) 
3.22 
(.64) 
2.98 
(.78) 
2.79 
(.78) 
3.20 
(.92) 
2.58 
(.84) 
Perceived 
Guilt (1-5) 
3.68 
(1.16) 
3.38 
(1.01) 
3.16 
(1.08) 
3.56 
(1.05) 
3.13 
(.99) 
2.54 
(.88) 
 
Perceived 
Shame (1-5) 
2.89 
(.84) 
3.73 
(.80) 
3.05 
(1.06) 
2.87 
(1.08) 
3.63 
(1.03) 
2.69 
(.98) 
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Forgiveness 
For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of ‘yes’ responses was 
54%. A chi-square analysis showed that there was no significant association 
between proportion of yes responses and whether or not apology factors were 
present, χ²(1) = .47, p = .493. However, a significant association was found between 
the proportion of ‘yes’ responses and whether guilt, shame, or no emotion was 
expressed, χ²(2) = 10.86, p = .004. The percentage of yes responses was lower in the 
no emotion condition (39%) than in the guilt (59%) and shame conditions (64%). 
The standardised residuals suggest that this significant effect is focused more in the 
control condition, with more “no” responses than expected (standardised residual = 
1.9), in comparison to the residuals relating to the “no” responses for guilt (-.7) and 
shame (-1.3). 
 Turning to the forgiveness scale, there were significant main effects of 
Apology Factors, F(1, 222) = 7.08, p = .008, ηp2 = .03,  and Emotion, F(2, 222) = 
17.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, but no significant interaction, F(2, 222) = .34, p = .713, ηp2 
< .01. Forgiveness ratings were significantly higher when the apology factors were 
included (M = 3.49), compared to when they were not (M = 3.30). Post-hoc tests 
with Bonferroni correction showed that the main effect of emotion expression was 
due to the fact that both emotion conditions, guilt (M = 3.52) and shame (M = 
3.57), resulted in significantly higher forgiveness ratings than did the no emotion 
condition (M = 3.09).  
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Positive Perceptions4 
 There was a significant main effect of Apology Factors on positive 
perceptions of the perpetrating group, F(1, 222) = 5.62, p = .019, ηp2 = .03, with 
significantly higher forgiveness ratings in the apology factors included condition (M 
= 3.10), compared to the condition without these factors (M = 2.86). There was also 
a significant main effect of Emotion, F(2, 222) = 5.77, p = .004, ηp2 = .05. Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc tests showed that positive perceptions were significantly higher 
in the shame condition (M = 3.21) than in the no emotion condition (M = 2.78, p = 
.003). Positive perceptions in the guilt condition (M = 2.95) did not differ 
significantly from either the no emotion condition (p = .528) or the shame condition 
(p = 135). 
Mediation Analysis 
 Regression analysis was used to investigate whether the impact of the 
apology factors variable had on forgiveness was mediated by the positive 
perception of the perpetrator group. Inclusion of apology factors significantly 
predicted both forgiveness, b = .19, SE = .08, p = .014, and positive perceptions, b 
=.25, SE = .11, p = .020. The positive perceptions variable, in turn, was a significant 
predictor of forgiveness, b = .54, SE = .03, p < .001. When positive perceptions of 
the transgressor were controlled for, the inclusion of apology factors was no longer 
a significant predictor of forgiveness, b = .06, SE = .05, p = .275. More than half of 
the variance in forgiveness was accounted for by the predictors (R2adj. = .56). The 
 
4 The results of exploratory analyses of the individual positive perception items 
(sincerity, remorse, trust and believability) are reported in Appendix 13. 
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indirect effect was tested using a bootstrapping estimation approach with 5000 re-
samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). This indicated that the indirect coefficient was 
significant, b = .13, SE = .06, 95% bias-corrected CI = .03, .26. 
Regression analysis was also used to investigate whether positive 
perceptions of the perpetrating group also mediated the relationship between 
emotion expression and forgiveness. Using the no emotion condition as the dummy 
variable, it was shown that the shame condition significantly predicted both 
positive perceptions, b = .43, SE = .13, p = .001, and forgiveness, b = .48, SE = .09, p 
< .001. The guilt condition significantly predicted forgiveness scores, b = .43, SE = 
.09, p < .001, but not positive perceptions, b = .17, SE = .13, p = .185. As a result, the 
guilt condition was not considered further. The positive perceptions measure was a 
significant predictor of forgiveness, b = .51, SE = .03, p < .001.  When positive 
perceptions of the perpetrating group were controlled for, the expression of shame 
remained a significant predictor of forgiveness, b = .26, SE = .06, p < .001, relative to 
the no emotion condition. More than two-thirds of the variance in forgiveness was 
accounted for by the predictors (R2adj. = .67). The indirect effect was tested using a 
bootstrapping estimation approach with 5000 re-samples (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
This indicated that the coefficient for the indirect effect was significant, b = .22, SE = 
.06, 95% bias-corrected CI = .10, .35. 
Discussion 
 One aim of this study was to test the prediction that a cleaner separation of 
the apology factors and moral emotion expression manipulations would result in 
higher forgiveness ratings and more positive evaluations of the perpetrator group, 
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such that the two manipulations would no longer undermine each other when 
presented in combination. There was a good measure of support for this prediction. 
Including both the apology factors and the expression of emotion led to higher 
forgiveness ratings, relative to their respective control conditions. The interaction 
between the factors was not significant; thus although their combination did not 
lead to significantly higher forgiveness ratings, there was no evidence, as there had 
been in Study 6, fact that one manipulation undermined the effectiveness of the 
other. Instead, it seems that an intergroup apology can lead to greater forgiveness 
by including either the future-oriented structural, relational and identity-related 
apology factors proposed by Nadler (2012), or the expression of moral emotions 
such as guilt and shame, which communicate an acceptance of responsibility for 
wrongdoing and imply that the wrongdoing will not recur.  
 The positive impact of the two manipulations was also evident in the 
evaluations of the perpetrator group. Perceptions of the perpetrator were more 
positive when the apology factors were included rather than absent, and when 
shame was expressed than when no emotion was expressed, although the 
expression of guilt did not significantly impact these perceptions. In previous 
research, Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel (2007) have also reported differential effects 
for shame and guilt, with shame predicting intentions that related to avoidance and 
withdrawal, whereas guilt did not independently predict any action intentions. 
 The greater impact of shame, compared to guilt, may reflect the fact that it 
is regarded as a more powerful emotion. This was also reflected in the 
manipulation checks. While ratings of shame were significantly higher within the 
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shame condition, compared to both the control and the guilt condition, ratings of 
guilt were not significantly higher in the guilt condition than in the shame condition, 
although both were significantly higher than the control condition. If shame is 
regarded as a stronger emotion, it may be that expressions of shame carry the 
implication that the person or group in question also feels guilty. Indeed, reports of 
shame and guilt often co-occur (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992). 
However, shame differs from guilt on more dimensions than extremity; for 
example, on some theoretical accounts shame reflects a ‘bad self’ rather than a 
‘bad act’ (Tangney et al., 1992), and it may be that a group that is prepared to 
acknowledge such a fundamental flaw in its identity is seen as one that is more 
committed to the reconciliation process. The positive findings resulting from shame 
expression add to the growing evidence that shame can have prosocial outcomes 
(Gausel, Vignoles, & Leach, 2016; Leach & Cidam, 2015).  
 A final point to be made in relation to this study is with respect to the 
mediating effect of the positive perceptions of the perpetrating group. The effect of 
apology factors on forgiveness levels was fully mediated by these positive 
perceptions, echoing the pattern observed in Studies 5 and 6. There was also 
evidence that the positive effect on forgiveness of expressing shame was partially 
mediated, though the partial nature of this mediation suggests that these beneficial 
effects of shame expression may also work through a different, complementary 
process. It is worth bearing in mind that the ‘positive perceptions’ measure used 
consisted of items assessing trust, sincerity, remorse and believability. Exploring 
these perceptions independently in greater detail might help to distinguish whether 
the mediating roles of trust and believability are different to those of sincerity and 
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remorse, and whether the effects of the apology factors and the expression of 
shame increase forgiveness through different pathways. 
General Discussion 
 The objective of this research was to investigate whether the varying of the 
content of an intergroup apology would increase its effectiveness in promoting 
intergroup reconciliation, as indexed by willingness to forgive the perpetrator group 
and by evaluations of this group. Forgiveness was assessed using a binary, yes/no 
measure and an intergroup forgiveness scale tailored to the Northern Ireland 
context. The advantages of using a multi-item scale are evident from the fact that 
significant effects of the apology factors manipulation were found in Studies 6 and 
7 for the scale, but not for the binary measure.  Moreover, in Study 5 there was a 
substantial difference between intergroup and individual apologies on both 
forgiveness measures, with individual apologies eliciting higher forgiveness. Across 
the three studies, these effects on forgiveness of both apology content and apology 
source were fully or partially mediated by more positive perceptions of the 
sincerity, remorse, trustworthiness and believability of the perpetrator(s), 
consistent with the argument that a lack of perceived trust and sincerity represent 
major obstacles to the effectiveness of intergroup apologies.  
One way in which apology content was varied was by including the 
structural, relational, and identity-related factors proposed by Nadler (2012), who 
has argued that these three factors need to be addressed in order to achieve 
genuine intergroup reconciliation. It was hypothesized that exposing participants to 
apologies incorporating these factors would increase forgiveness and enhance 
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evaluations of the perpetrator group. Between them, the present studies show that 
the three factors identified by Nadler do have a positive effect on forgiveness, as 
well as on positive perceptions of the transgressors. Although the results of Study 5 
suggest that these apology factors are not effective when used independently of 
each other, the results of Studies 6 and 7 show that they are effective when used in 
combination. This is consistent with Nadler’s (2012) claim that all three factors are 
needed to achieve true intergroup reconciliation.  Importantly, the presence of all 
three factors in Studies 6 and 7 led to significant improvements in the evaluations 
of the perpetrating group, and these perceptions fully mediated the effect of the 
apology factors on forgiveness ratings. 
 A second way in which apology content was varied was by including 
expressions of moral emotions. In Study 6, expressions of remorse were distributed 
across the apology statement. Although the inclusion of these expressions did 
result in greater forgiveness and more positive evaluations of the perpetrator 
group, these effects were unexpectedly limited to the conditions in which the 
apology factors were not included. Indeed, when the statement included the 
apology factors and expressions of strong remorse, both forgiveness ratings and 
evaluations of the perpetrator group were lower than when either of these content 
variables was included on its own. Study 7 showed that a greater separation 
between these content variables, with the moral emotion expression at the start of 
the apology and the apology factors at the end, yielded clearer evidence of their 
effectiveness. Now the expression of emotion (whether this was guilt or shame) 
elicited greater forgiveness regardless of the presence or absence of the apology 
  Chapter 3 
111 
 
factors, although it was only the expression of shame that influenced the positive 
perceptions of the perpetrating group, relative to a no emotion control condition.   
There are some possible limitations to be acknowledged of the present 
research. First, the three studies reported here all took the form of scenario studies 
in which third-party observers responded to different versions of a statement of 
apology issued by a group, the IRA, that had perpetrated violent acts for political 
ends.  It could be argued that the judgments made by the participants do not 
necessarily reflect how those who were more directly involved in ‘The Troubles’ 
would have reacted. In response to this objection, I would argue that all the 
participants belonged to a national group that was one of the targets of this 
violence and were all old enough to be able to recall some of the events for which 
the IRA issued its apology. Moreover, the statement that was used as the basis for 
the research was an official apology issued by the IRA. Furthermore, some of the 
participants did report that ‘The Troubles’ had had a direct impact on their lives, but 
their responses did not significantly differ from those who had not been directly 
affected. It would nevertheless be important for further research to study the 
reactions of participants in which a larger proportion of members have been 
directly or indirectly mistreated by another group and are then exposed to an 
apology issued by the perpetrator group. 
 In conclusion, the three studies reported here provide good support for the 
hypothesis that the content of an intergroup apology can influence forgiveness of 
and evaluations of a perpetrator group. Such evidence serves as an antidote to the 
view that intergroup apologies are generally ineffective in achieving intergroup 
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reconciliation. Intergroup apologies that explicitly address the structural, relational, 
and identity-related factors proposed by Nadler (2012) do result in enhanced 
perceptions of a perpetrator group and thereby increase forgiveness of the group’s 
past behaviour. Furthermore, intergroup apologies that include clear expressions of 
shame also lead to more positive perceptions of the perpetrator group and this in 
turn increases the likelihood that the group’s actions will be forgiven. 
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Chapter 4 
Emotion and Intergroup Cooperation: How expressions of guilt, shame 
and pride influence behaviour in the Centipede Game 
Attempting to repair relationships that have been damaged by a 
transgression is relatively common in everyday life. In interpersonal relationships, 
there are several different routes that can be taken, all of which can have positive 
effects on relationships (e.g., Fehr, Gelfand, & Nag, 2010; Riek & Mania, 2011). In 
the case of intergroup relationships, rebuilding the relationship after a 
transgression seems to be much more difficult. It has been argued that the reason 
for this discrepancy between interpersonal and intergroup situations is that the 
latter are characterised by more competition, fear, deception, and greed (Cohen, 
Gunia, Kim-Jun, & Murnighan, 2009; Wildschut & Insko, 2007). An experimental 
context that illustrates this interpersonal/intergroup distinction is that of economic 
games. Findings of increased mistrust, defection and all-round competitiveness in 
intergroup scenarios are common in studies using the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Dictator 
Game, and Ultimatum Game, as well as many other economic game variants 
(Kugler, Kausel & Kocher, 2012). In the present research we examine the capacity 
for intergroup reconciliation in the context of the Centipede Game (Rosenthal, 
1981), an economic game that measures the degree to which two parties (in our 
case, two groups) cooperate. 
Most research on relationship repair in economic games has explored this in 
an interpersonal setting and has yielded evidence that trust and cooperation can be 
restored following breaches. For example, it has been shown that denial of 
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responsibility or denial of intent to be unfair (Van Dijke & De Cremer, 2011) are 
effective strategies for restoring trust, as is offering financial compensation (De 
Cremer, 2010), although in both cases it was also suggested that apologising was 
the optimal strategy. There also seems to be leeway given to individuals who say 
that they did not fully understand the game, with studies showing that reparative 
acts are effective so long as the intent to be unfair was uncertain (De Cremer, Van 
Dijk & Pilluta, 2010; Desmet, De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2011). One study highlighting 
this was conducted by Cohen, Wildschut and Insko (2010), who showed that task-
focused communication can increase interpersonal cooperation, through activating 
norms associated with fairness and trust. This suggests that relationship repair is 
possible within interpersonal economic games, and also that it is possible to 
achieve using communication, rather than compensation, which provides a basis for 
examining whether this also applies to intergroup economic games, for which 
research is currently limited. 
One way in which relationships can be repaired via communication, or at 
least improved, is through the use of emotional expressions. Social appraisal theory 
(Manstead & Fischer, 2001) and the Emotion as Social Information (EASI) theory 
(Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef, De Dreu & Manstead, 2010) suggest that emotion 
communication has the potential to influence behaviour through inferential or 
affective processes. Drawing on this, we can imagine that the expression of a 
negative self-conscious emotion, such as guilt, shame, or regret following a 
transgression could have a beneficial impact on a relationship, whether it is an 
interpersonal or intergroup relationship. Riek (2010) has shown that feelings of guilt 
often mediate the relation between factors such as feelings of responsibility, anger, 
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severity and closeness, and the likelihood of seeking forgiveness. In theory, the 
communication of these negative self-conscious emotions should increase the 
likelihood of forgiveness and reconciliation.   
Interpersonal research that has investigated the impact of expressions of 
self-conscious emotions does offer evidence in support of this. Apologies that were 
driven by guilt and/or shame motivations have been found to increase forgiveness 
following a transgression. Zeelenberg, van Dijk, and Manstead (1998) showed how 
relationships can be repaired following expressions of regret, while Vaish, 
Carpenter and Tomasello (2011) showed that children as young as five would prefer 
to interact with transgressors who are remorseful. Mock jurors have also been 
found to be more lenient to defendants who appear remorseful (MacLin, Downs, 
MacLin, & Caspers, 2009). 
The majority of research investigating the role of self-conscious emotions in 
economic games focuses on the experience of these emotions and how this 
influences behaviour. For example, Ketelaar and Au (2003) show that individuals 
who experience guilt in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma or Ultimatum Game 
displayed greater cooperation or generosity in subsequent rounds. This finding was 
replicated by de Hooge, Zeelenberg and Breugelmans (2007), although they found 
no equivalent effect for shame. Later research by the same authors, however, did 
show that shame can increase pro-social behaviour (de Hooge, Breugelmans, & 
Zeelenberg, 2008).  Despite the majority of research focusing on the experience of 
these emotions, there is some research that highlights the potential benefits of the 
expression of negative self-conscious emotions, with studies showing that 
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expressions of remorse and regret are more likely to be met with cooperative 
behaviour (De Melo, Zheng, & Gratch, 2009; van der Schalk, Kuppens, Bruder, & 
Manstead, 2015; Shore & Parkinson, 2018). 
These findings suggest that negative self-conscious emotions can lead to 
relationship repair and future cooperation, whether it be the experience or 
expression of such emotions. It should be noted, however, that in the studies cited 
above, these benefits arose in interpersonal settings, rather than intergroup ones. 
There is a dearth of evidence that the expression of self-conscious emotions can 
boost intergroup cooperation in economic games, although the few studies there 
are suggest that guilt or regret expressions can enhance cooperation within 
intergroup economic games (Rychlowska et al., 2019; Shore et al., 2019). 
The Centipede Game 
The Centipede Game (Rosenthal, 1981) is an economic game that involves 
reciprocal cooperation between players. At each step of the game, one player 
decides whether to stop the game and accept the monetary allocations currently on 
offer, or to transfer the decision to the other player. Every time the decision is 
transferred to the other player, the total monetary allocation to the two players 
increases; however, if the other player chooses to stop the game, the first player 
will end with a lower allocation than if he or she had stopped the game earlier. 
There is a finite number of steps (or ‘nodes’), with the final node involving the 
highest payout to the players. One of the most important reasons for using the 
Centipede Game is that trust and cooperation are key factors involved in the 
playing of the game (Krockow, Colman, & Pulford, 2016a). The game was chosen for 
  Chapter 4 
117 
 
the present research because it is easy to adapt to an intergroup game and because 
of its sequential structure. In a multi-round version of the game, if one player 
decides to stop the game early, resulting in a lower payout for the other player, 
there will be an opportunity to restore trust in a subsequent round. This structure 
also allows for interventions mid-way through the game, when people can stop 
playing to send or receive any messages between groups and then return to what 
they were doing before. This enabled me to investigate the role that 
communication has in influencing motivations, strategies and general behaviour. 
Prior research using the Centipede Game has shown that groups stop the 
game significantly earlier than individuals do (Bornstein, Kugler, & Ziegelmeyer, 
2004). Verbal protocol analysis has also shown that there are different motivations 
for cooperation depending on the temporal stage of the game, with most players 
who cooperate early doing so because they are experimenting with the game, while 
those who continue to cooperate late in the game do so for prosocial reasons 
(Krockow, Colman & Pulford, 2016b).  
Overview of Studies 
The Centipede Game shown in Figure 1 was used in both of the present 
studies. Each node in the game denotes a decision that has to be made by one of 
the two parties (A or B). In these studies the players consisted of two 3-person 
groups. The group can decide to proceed (Go) or stop. If the game reaches node 5, 
it is completed. Thus a game ends when one of the groups decides to stop, or when 
the game reaches node 5. A group’s designation as “A” or “B” switches with each 
new game. In both studies, groups were given an opportunity to communicate with 
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each other. Games before and after this intergroup interaction are referred to as 
“Phase 1” and “Phase 2”, respectively. The studies were run using online software 
(veconlab.econ.virginia.edu).  
Figure 4.1: Example Centipede/Intergroup Cooperation Game. 
 The payout of the game consisted of a number of lottery tickets that the 
groups would receive, with each payoff point translating into one lottery ticket for 
their group. Participants were (correctly) informed that the lottery draw would 
involve all groups participating in the current study. Thus group members were 
playing for real stakes. 
 The Centipede Game was renamed the “Intergroup Cooperation Game” for 
the purposes of these studies. This was because the term ‘centipede’ might have 
been aversive for some participants, and because framing it as a cooperation game 
should have increased the motivation to cooperate (Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 
2004), especially given the lottery ticket incentive.  
The aim of these studies was to explore the role that emotion 
communication plays when involved in an intergroup game based on cooperation 
or competition. Previous research suggests that it is unusual for individuals or 
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groups to cooperate fully when playing this game (Krockow et al., 2016a.) I 
therefore anticipated that groups would be quite competitive, despite the 
renaming of the game. To the extent that one group behaves less cooperatively 
than the other group, there is a reason for members of the ‘victim group’ to feel 
aggrieved and for members of the ‘perpetrator group’ to feel some degree of regret 
or remorse, or perhaps even a little smug. Providing the groups with an opportunity 
to communicate made it possible for groups to express their emotions. It was 
predicted that this communication of emotion between the groups would have an 
influence on behaviour in Phase 2. 
It could be argued that the two groups playing the centipede game should 
be described as ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, rather than ‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims’, given 
the natural inclination to want to gain more tickets than the opposing group. 
However, the broader context of the game made it clear that the tickets to be won 
would be shared by the two groups, such that if the groups cooperated their joint 
net allocation of tickets would be greater than that of groups that did not 
cooperate. Given that the number of tickets allocated would ostensibly increase the 
groups’ chances of success in the lottery, it seems reasonable to think of groups 
that fail to cooperate as jeopardising the opposing teams’ chances of winning the 
lottery. In this sense it seems appropriate to use the terms ‘perpetrator’ and 
‘victim’, respectively, to describe groups that act competitively and cooperatively. It 
is also worth acknowledging that there is an opportunity for both groups to steal in 
this game, in which case both could be regarded as ‘perpetrating groups’. However, 
there are many real-world conflicts in which both parties can be construed as 
perpetrators, which then influences the prospects for reconciliation. This is one 
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reason for thinking that the centipede game can offer insights into real-world 
intergroup behaviour.  
It should be noted that all studies reported in this chapter were approved by 
the Cardiff University Research Ethics Committee (EC.16.10.11.4598G). 
Study 8 
The purpose of Study 8 was to examine how behaviour in the game would 
be influenced when groups were given the opportunity to communicate their 
emotions between two phases of the game, by expressing pride, guilt or shame. 
Groups played six games in Phase 1, and a further six games in Phase 2. The fact 
that there were six games in each phase meant that there was ample opportunity 
for groups to develop and implement a strategy for playing the game.  
 Between the two phases, groups were asked to report the extent to which 
they felt pride, guilt, and shame about the group’s performance in Phase 1, in the 
knowledge that their answers would be shared with the opposing group. Guilt and 
shame were chosen because previous research has shown that guilt and shame are 
associated with different appraisals and actions tendencies (Schmader & Lickel, 
2006; de Hooge et al., 2007). Although the differential effects of expressing guilt 
and shame in economic games is not a topic that has been widely researched, 
outside the context of economic games it has been shown that shame is generally 
perceived to be a more powerful emotion than guilt (Lickel et al., 2005; Shepherd, 
Spears, & Manstead, 2013) and in intergroup scenarios the expression of shame has 
been shown to be more helpful and less insulting to victim groups  than an 
expression of guilt (Giner-Sorolla, Castano, Espinosa, & Brown, 2009). The current 
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study aims to investigate whether this difference between guilt and shame is also 
found in an intergroup economic game. While the abovementioned studies focus 
on the effects of negative self-conscious emotions, there is also some research 
highlighting the effects of positive self-conscious emotions. Van der Schalk, Bruder 
and Manstead (2012) reported effects of both regret and pride, with anticipated 
pride for either fair or unfair behaviour leading to increased likelihood of engaging 
in that behaviour in the future. Pride was therefore included in the current research 
with a view to exploring how the communication of this positively-valenced 
emotion would affect the behaviour of those to whom it is communicated. 
 It was expected that expressions of guilt and shame would co-occur in group 
expressions of emotion, reflecting a common finding in research investigating these 
emotions (e.g., Lickel et al., 2005; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007). It was also 
expected that those who received expressions of guilt and shame would exhibit 
greater intergroup cooperation in Phase 2. The rationale for this prediction is that 
groups behaving uncooperatively in Phase 1 would be more likely to express guilt 
and/or shame, and that expression of these emotions would help to restore trust 
between the groups, which is consistent with results of studies showing the positive 
effects that negative self-conscious emotions can have on future cooperation (De 
Melo et al., 2009; van der Schalk et al., 2015). By contrast, it was predicted that 
when pride was expressed by groups, behaviour in Phase 2 would be dependent on 
the behaviour in Phase 1. If such expressions of pride were related to the high 
number of points won in Phase 1, the pride expression would be interpreted as 
pride about having behaved competitively, and this might well provoke competitive 
reactions in Phase 2 on the part of the group receiving this expression. However, if 
Emotion Expression in the Intergroup Centipede Game 
122 
 
the pride expressions were unrelated or even negatively related to the number of 
points won in Phase 1, the pride would be interpreted as pride about behaving 
cooperatively, and this would be likely to elicit reciprocal cooperative behaviour in 
Phase 2. This context-dependent prediction for pride is consistent with Verbeke, 
Belschak, and Bagozzi (2004), who argued that pride can be regarded as 
appropriate or excessive (in which case it is defined as hubris) and with Wubben, De 
Cremer, and van Dijk (2012), who found that ‘authentic’ pride elicits more prosocial 
behaviour than does ‘hubristic’ pride. 
All analyses in this study are conducted at the ‘group’ level (i.e., using group 
as the unit of analysis), something that is not routinely done when investigating 
reconciliation in economic game studies. Although this limits statistical power, it is 
an appropriate reflection of the fact that group members were asked to arrive at 
collective decisions, rather than individual ones. 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-four participants (67 female, 17 male; mean age = 19.75 years) took 
part in this study. They were psychology undergraduates who participated in 
exchange for partial course credit. Participants were divided into 28 three-person 
groups. Allocation to groups was done on a random basis, but participants were led 
to believe that this allocation was based on responses to a questionnaire completed 
online prior to the study taking place.   
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Given that this was not an experimental study and there was no prior 
literature on which to base estimates of effect size, the number of participants 
recruited was determined primarily by the available number of participants in the 
participant pool within the time period set aside for running the study. 
Design 
 The study used a correlational design in which differences in group 
behaviour between Phases 1 and 2 of the game were correlated with emotions 
expressed by each group during the interval between the two phases. 
Measures 
Emotions. Groups were asked to complete single-item questions about the 
extent to which they felt pride, guilt, or shame about the group’s performance in 
Phase 1. It was explained that their responses would be shared with the opposing 
group before commencing Phase 2 (and that they would see the opposing group’s 
responses). Responses to these items were made on a 1-6 rating scale where 1 was 
labelled “not at all” and 6 was labelled “very much”. In this chapter, I have chosen 
to focus on the effects of how the emotions expressed by the other group influence 
the behaviour of the group observing these expressions.  
 Game Behaviours. Several game-specific variables were recorded, including 
number of tickets won, average node at which the group exited (hereafter average 
node exit), number of ‘steals’ from the other group (defined as the total number of 
times the group chose to exit a game), and the percentage of cooperative moves 
made. These variables were recorded for both Phase 1 and Phase 2.  
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Procedure 
On signing up to the study participants completed a questionnaire under the 
impression that their answers would help to determine allocation to groups that 
would participate in the study. This was intended to increase their identification 
with the group to which they were allocated. On arrival at the lab they were asked 
to remain in a waiting room until all six participants had arrived. Here they received 
an information sheet describing the game and reminding them of the lottery ticket 
prize. They were then divided into two groups of three and led to one of two rooms 
in which computers had been set up ready to play the “Intergroup Cooperation 
Game”. Groups first read the instructions for the game and participated in one 
practice game, playing against a scripted computer program in which it played one 
cooperative move and one steal. Participants’ understanding of how the game 
worked was checked before the groups played against each other in Phase 1. One 
group was randomly chosen to be “Player A” for the first of six games in this phase, 
with the other group taking the role of “Player B,” after which the groups switched 
roles such that each group was A for three games and B for the other three. At the 
end of Phase 1 there was an interval during which participants completed the 
emotion measures. Responses were shared with the opposing group. Then Phase 2 
took place, following the same structure as Phase 1. At the end of Phase 2, there 
was a debrief for all participants in which the purpose of the study was explained. 
All participants received an equal number of lottery tickets.  
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Results 
All data used in this study were analysed at the group level, rather than at the level 
of the individual.  
Game Variables in Phase 1 and Phase 2 
There were no significant correlations between Phase 1 and Phase 2 scores 
for any of the game variables. This suggests that there was no consistent strategy 
used across the two phases, and I interpret this difference between Phases 1 and 2 
as a reflection of the impact of the emotions expressed between the two phases. To 
examine these differences, game variable difference scores were calculated by 
subtracting variables in Phase 1 from those in Phase 2.  In what follows, trends in 
the data are illustrated with examples from the raw data (see also Appendix 14) and 
the relations between emotion measures and game variables, both within and 
between phases, will be reported using correlation and regression analyses.  
Expressing Pride 
A high score for pride (5 or 6, where 6 was the maximum) was expressed by 
at least one group in 50% of the games (see Sessions 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 12, in 
Appendix 14). From observing these games, it can be seen that games in Phase 2 of 
these sessions tended to be less cooperative. Generally, groups to whom pride was 
expressed after Phase 1 tended to steal more in Phase 2 than they did in Phase 1. 
Sessions 3 and 12 (see Table 4.1) highlight this trend and are particularly interesting 
because they involve groups that were completely cooperative in Phase 1. Although 
these groups remained cooperative at the start of Phase 2, the combination of the 
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out-group’s pride expression and being stolen from again seems to have 
encouraged them to steal at the end of Phase 2. 
Table 4.1.  
Raw game data for sessions 3 and 12 in Study 8. The table shows the actions taken 
by opposing groups in each game of each phase, as well as the emotions expressed 
in the communication interval. “S” denotes that the group stole, and the 
accompanying number denotes the round number on which they exited. “C” denotes 
a fully completed round (which by definition ended at round 5). 
  Session 3 Session 12 
Phase Game Group 5 Group 6 Group 23 Group 24 
1 
1 S4 . C5 C5 
2 S3 . C5 C5 
3 S4 . C5 C5 
4 C5 C5 C5 C5 
5 S4 . . S2 
6 C5 C5 . S1 
Expression 
Pride 5 4 5 5 
Guilt 2 1 1 5 
Shame 2 1 2 2 
2 
7 S4 . C5 C5 
8 C5 S5 C5 C5 
9 S4 . . S3 
10 S3 . S1 . 
11 . S1 S2 . 
12 . S2 S1 . 
 
These observations are confirmed by correlation analyses. The expression of 
pride by the out-group group was significantly associated with all measures of 
changes in in-group game behaviour between Phase 1 and Phase 2: total tickets (r = 
-.49, p = .008), average node exit (r = -.54, p = .003), number of steals (r = .62, p < 
.001), and percentage of cooperative moves made (r = -.63, p < .001). Thus the 
more that one group expressed pride, the greater the competitiveness between the 
groups in Phase 2, relative to Phase 1, as highlighted by the increase in the number 
of steals made by one group following high expression of pride by the other group. 
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Expressing Guilt and Shame 
 As anticipated, there was a strong positive correlation between the 
expression of guilt and the expression of shame (r = .88, p < .001). High scores for 
both variables were only observed in around 30% of the games (see Sessions 1, 7, 
and 13, shown in Table 4.2). Observing how these games were played suggests that 
the expression of these emotions had a positive effect on cooperation during Phase 
2. Sessions 1, 7, and 13 were much more cooperative in Phase 2 than they had been 
in Phase 1. However, these sessions also reveal that expression of these emotions 
did not lead to stable intergroup cooperation: As can be seen in Sessions 7 and 13, 
despite the cooperation evident in the earlier games of Phase 2, the groups began 
stealing again in the final few rounds this phase.  
Turning to the correlations between the expression of guilt or shame and 
the difference in Phase 1 and Phase 2 game behaviour, there were significant 
associations for all game measures: total tickets (guilt: r = .52, p = .005; shame: r = 
.55, p = .002), average node exit (guilt: r = .59, p = .001; shame: r = .64, p < .001), 
and percentage of cooperative moves (guilt: r = .52, p = .005; shame: r = .71, p < 
.001). Out-group expression of shame was also significantly negatively associated 
with the difference in number of steals (r = -.59, p = .001), while the corresponding 
correlation with out-group expression of guilt was marginally significant (r = -.36, p 
= .058). Overall, this pattern of correlations shows that expression of guilt or shame 
was associated with more cooperative behaviour in Phase 2 than in Phase 1. 
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Table 4.2.  
Raw game data for sessions 1, 7 and 13 in Study 8. The table shows the actions 
taken by opposing groups in each game of each phase, as well as the emotions 
expressed in the communication interval. “S” denotes that the group stole, and the 
accompanying number denotes the round number on which they exited. “C” denotes 
a fully completed round (which by definition ended at round 5). 
  Session 1 Session 7 Session 13 
Phase Game 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
Group  
13 
Group  
14 
Group  
25 
Group  
26 
1 
1 . S3 C5 C5 C5 C5 
2 S1 . S4 . . S4 
3 . S1 S3 . S4 . 
4 . S2 . S3 . S4 
5 . S1 S1 . S2 . 
6 S1 . . S1 S1 . 
Expression 
Pride 3 2 3 3 2 3 
Guilt 5 5 5 5 6 4 
Shame 4 6 6 5 6 5 
2 
7 C5 C5 C5 C5 C5 C5 
8 . S4 C5 C5 C5 C5 
9 C5 C5 C5 C5 C5 C5 
10 . S4 C5 C5 C5 C5 
11 S2 . C5 C5 S2 . 
12 . S2 S4 . S1 . 
  
Predictive Effects of Pride, Guilt, and Shame 
 I computed a series of multiple linear regressions to predict the differences 
in game behaviour between Phase 1 and Phase 2 on the basis of the emotion 
measures. Due to the high correlation between the expressions of guilt and shame, 
it was decided that only one of these two expressions would be entered into the 
regression model, along with pride. Because of its stronger correlations with all of 
the game variables, including a significantly negative association with number of 
steals, expressed shame, rather than guilt, was chosen as the negative emotion 
predictor. Considering the extent to which the out-group’s expressions of shame 
and pride predicted the difference in game variables between Phases 1 and 2, a 
  Chapter 4 
129 
 
significant regression equation was found for these expressions as predictors of 
difference in total tickets, F(2,27) = 10.94, p < .001, R2adj. = .42, with shame being 
the only significant predictor. However, both shame and pride were significant 
predictors of all other game measures, for which the regression and standardized 
regression coefficients are shown in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3.  
B and beta values for prediction of differences in game measure scores between 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 by outgroup expression of shame and pride (Study 8). 
 (Constant) Shame Pride 
 B SE B B SE B 𝛽 B SE B 𝛽 
Tickets -7.49 8.62 5.51 1.47 .57** -2.92 1.80 -.25 
Node Exit -.52 .58 .51 .10 .65** -.31 .12 -.32* 
Steals -.86 .75 -.37 .13 -.42** .53 .16 .49** 
Coop Moves .03 .14 .09 .02 .53** -.09 .03 -.43** 
Note: * = p < .05; ** = p < .01 
 
Discussion 
 My aim in Study 8 was to allow groups of participants to play the Centipede 
Game naturally, without any experimental manipulation, and to examine whether 
the communication of the extent to which groups reported feeling proud, guilty, or 
ashamed was associated with game behaviour in Phase 2. Several features of the 
results show that this was the case. The fact that behaviour in Phase 1 was not 
significantly related to behaviour in Phase 2 suggests that the communication of 
emotion between the two phases had an impact. The fact that there were many 
significant associations between the emotions expressed by the opposing group 
and the difference scores between Phases 1 and 2 game behaviours is consistent 
with the argument that expressing these emotions had an impact on how the game 
was played. It was predicted that the expression of pride following competitive 
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behaviour would be associated with more competitive behaviour in Phase 2, and 
that the expression of guilt and shame would be associated with more cooperative 
behaviour in Phase 2. Both predictions were supported by the results.  
 The most important finding of this study in relation to intergroup 
reconciliation is that the expression of both guilt and shame were associated with 
more cooperative behaviour in Phase 2 in comparison to Phase 1. These emotions 
were expressed when there had been uncooperative behaviour in Phase 1 and their 
expression was associated with a more cooperative behaviour in Phase 2. This is 
consistent with De Melo et al. (2009) and van der Schalk et al. (2015), who showed 
that the expression of a negative self-conscious emotion following a transgression 
increases cooperation in economic games. Also shown in this study was that the 
shame expression appears to be the stronger of the two negative self-conscious 
emotions in predicting cooperation: the expression of shame had a significant 
negative association with number of steals, which was not the case with the 
expression of guilt. This is not a new finding in intergroup scenarios. Giner-Sorolla 
et al. (2009) found that the expression of shame can be more helpful and less 
insulting than the expression of guilt in intergroup scenarios. The results from the 
present study, together with the findings of Giner-Sorolla et al. (2009), suggest that 
shame is a more effective emotion to express than guilt when aiming to repair 
relationships.  
 A counter-productive emotion to express, from the perspective of 
intergroup relationship repair, is pride. The expression of pride between the two 
phases was associated with a significantly less cooperation in Phase 2. This is largely 
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due to the fact that when one group expressed pride, the group that received that 
expression tended to steal more in the subsequent rounds. It may be that 
competitive behaviour towards groups that expressed pride is due to the pride-
expressing group being untrustworthy or it could be that pride-expressing groups 
were being punished. If the latter is the case, it suggests that expressions of pride 
may have been interpreted as a form of boasting, or hubris, as mentioned by 
Verbeke et al. (2004) and Wubben et al., (2012), which would help to explain why 
the receiving group wanted to exact some form of revenge. This finding shows that 
emotion communication can hinder and damage relationships just as easily as it can 
repair them.  
 A limitation of this study is the small sample size. It was considered 
important to collect and analyse behaviour at the group level, rather than analysing 
individual-level data, but this methodology does limit the statistical power of the 
study. A further limitation of this study is that emotion expressions may have been 
made in relation to different behaviours. For example, pride may have been 
expressed in relation to having done well in the game by being competitive, but it 
may also have been expressed in relation to having been cooperative, which could 
also have resulted in doing well in the game. It is therefore difficult to pinpoint the 
motivations underlying the emotion expressions. I attempt to address both of these 
limitations in Study 9. 
Study 9 
 Although Study 8 establishes that intergroup repair is possible following 
group-serving behaviour in the Centipede Game, it demonstrates this in a general 
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way, with a variety of strategies possibly being used. In Study 9, I aimed to constrain 
the number of strategies. Controlling the behaviour of one group through computer 
simulation of the group’s decisions and communications made it possible to have 
the group perform in a uniformly uncooperative way and then express exactly the 
same degree of either a positively or negatively valenced self-conscious emotion.  
 With regard to the self-conscious emotion expressed by the group, I decided 
to limit this to either pride or shame. The results of Study 8 suggested that shame 
expression is more strongly associated with the subsequent behaviour of the 
receiving group. Shame and guilt ratings were also highly correlated. I therefore 
dropped expressions of guilt from Study 9, and decided instead to include a no-
emotion control condition in order to explore how the receiving group would 
behave in the absence of any expression of self-conscious emotion.  
 Because the results of Study 8 suggested that there was a tendency for 
groups to steal from groups that expressed pride, I also decided to include a 
measure of altruistic punishment at the end of the game. The purpose was to gain a 
better insight into the motivations of the groups that reacted to pride expressions 
by cooperating less. Previous research has shown that altruistic punishment is 
related to levels of anger and other negative emotions (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; 
Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). After the out-group’s selfish behaviour in the Phase 1 
and its subsequent expression of pride, an in-group might simply mistrust the out-
group, which should be reflected in uncooperative game behaviour but little 
tendency to engage in altruistic punishment; alternatively, the in-group might be 
angry about the out-group’s behaviour, and therefore be willing to give up some of 
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its own tickets in order to punish the out-group.  This also enabled me to explore 
whether the specific effects of pride and shame exacerbate or alleviate these 
feelings, relative to the control group. Although this measure of altruistic 
punishment could be construed as measuring ‘spite’, spite is generally 
conceptualised as involving an intention to hurt others (Pillutla & Murnighan, 
1996). This does not necessarily involve self-sacrifice, which is the key component 
of any index of altruistic punishment. It is therefore reasonable to regard the 
measure used in the current study as a measure of altruistic punishment: 
punishment of another or others that is costly to the self or ingroup  (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002). 
I again predicted that the expression of shame following non-cooperation in 
Phase 1 would lead to more cooperation in Phase 2 than would a no emotion 
control condition. I also predicted that the expression of pride following non-
cooperation in Phase 1 would lead to less cooperation in Phase 2 than would a no 
emotion control condition. Finally, I expected that the expression of pride after 
uncooperative behaviour in Phase 1 would give rise to greater altruistic punishment 
following Phase 2 than would be observed in either the shame or control 
conditions.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred and sixty-eight participants (141 female, 27 male; mean age = 
19.58) took part in this study. They were psychology undergraduates who 
participated in exchange for partial course credit. The study had a fully between-
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subjects design comprising three conditions, with groups randomly allocated to one 
of them. The materials used were the same as Study 8, except for the 
communicative interaction phase, where the expressed emotions were pre-
determined. 
The minimum number of groups required to reveal a significant difference 
between pride and shame expressions was determined by power analysis (G*power 
3; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The average value of the correlation 
coefficients for the associations of pride and shame with each game variable 
difference score in Study 8 was r = .595. This corresponds to a large f-effect size of 
.74. To detect an effect of this size in main effects with 95% confidence and with a 
significance level of .05, at least 35 groups would be needed. In Study 9, 56 groups 
were used.  
Manipulation 
Emotion Expression. In the interactive communication stage, the participant 
groups received an expression of pride or an expression of shame, or were in the 
control condition in which they were told that emotion ratings would not be shared 
between groups. Those in the pride condition received ratings reflecting a high 
score for pride (5 on a 1-6 scale) and a low score for shame (2 on a 1-6 scale). These 
ratings were reversed for groups in the shame condition (i.e., scores of 2 for pride 
and 5 for shame).  
Measures 
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Game Behaviours. The same game variables were recorded as in Study 8: 
total tickets won, average node exit, number of steals, and percentage of 
cooperative moves made. These variables were recorded for the games in Phase 2. 
No variables were recorded in Phase 1 because all groups were exposed to the 
same pattern of play from the pre-programmed opponent group. 
Prosocial Behaviour: A composite variable was created using the average z-
score for average node exit, the inverse of number of steals, and the percentage of 
cooperative moves made. 
Altruistic Punishment. Following Phase 2, group members were asked to 
respond individually to the question “If you could give up any number of your 
group’s tickets to remove double that amount of your opponents’ tickets, how 
many tickets would you give up?”. Responses were made by writing down the 
number of tickets participants were prepared to give up. This variable was 
operationalized as a percentage score of the total tickets attained by the group. 
Procedure 
On signing up to the study, participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire under the impression that their responses would determine their 
group membership, which was in fact allocated randomly. When they arrived in the 
lab they were left in a waiting room until all six participants had arrived. They were 
then divided into two groups of three, given the impression that the two groups 
would play against each other, and led into two separate rooms with computers 
that were ready to play the “Intergroup Cooperation Game”. Groups read the 
instructions for the game and played one practice game against a computer 
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program in which they saw the computer make both one cooperative move and 
one steal. Group members were then asked to ensure that they understood how 
the game worked before participating in the first game with the ‘other group’. After 
two games in which the programmed opponent group ended the game at the 
earliest opportunity, there was an interval during which participants completed the 
felt emotion measures. The experimental groups then received what appeared to 
be the opponents’ emotion ratings. Next, Phase 2 commenced, in which all groups 
completed two further games, but now the opponent group was programmed to 
cooperate at every move. This was followed by the altruistic punishment measure, 
before the two groups came together again to be debriefed. 
Results 
 A Shapiro-Wilk test of normality showed that all dependent variables were 
non-normally distributed (all ps < .001). Non-parametric statistical tests were 
therefore used to analyse the data. 
Effect of Emotion Expression on Game Variables and Prosocial Behaviour 
 The means and standard deviations for all group-level dependent variables 
are shown in Table 4.4. Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that emotion condition had 
significant effects on all game variables. Regarding overall tickets won, H(2) = 15.52, 
p < .001, Dunn-Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that the shame condition differed 
significantly from both the pride condition (p < .001, d = 1.47) and the control 
condition (p = .043, d = .97). The difference between the pride and control 
conditions was not statistically significant (p = .079, d = .55). Thus groups in the 
shame condition gained significantly more tickets (M = 17.79) than did those in the 
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pride (M = 11.68) or control (M = 14.11) conditions. Although similar patterns of 
means were observed for average node exit, H(2) = 15.86, p < .001, number of 
steals, H(2) = 8.68, p = .013, percentage of moves that were cooperative, H(2) = 
15.76, p < .001, and the composite prosocial behaviour measure, H(2) = 15.41, p < 
.001, Dunn-Bonferroni post-hoc adjustments showed that the only significant 
pairwise differences for these variables were those between the shame and pride 
conditions, with the control condition not differing from either of the other two 
conditions. In all cases, groups in the shame condition behaved in a significantly 
more cooperative way than did those in the pride condition.  
Effect of Emotion Expression on Altruistic Punishment 
 The means and standard deviations for this dependent variable are also 
shown in Table 4.4. A Kruskal-Wallis test showed that emotion condition had a 
significant effect on the percentage of tickets participants were willing to use to 
punish the opponent group, H(2) = 26.18, p < .001. Dunn-Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
showed that all three conditions differed significantly from each other. Those in the 
shame condition (M = 2.89) punished the uncooperative group significantly less 
than those in the received pride condition (M = 14.66, p < .001, d = .95) and those in 
the control condition (M = 7.56, p = .037, d = .49). Those in the pride condition 
punished the other group more than those in the control condition (p = .033, d = 
.51).  
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Table 4.4.  
Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent Measures in Study 9, by Condition 
 Control Pride Shame 
Tickets gained 14.11 11.68 17.79 
 (4.09) (4.73) (3.46) 
Average node exit 3.00 2.32 3.92 
 (1.14) (1.10) (.99) 
Number of steals 1.50 1.84 1.21 
 (.71) (.50) (.79) 
Percent cooperative moves  45.78 23.16 67.53 
 (33.06) (29.70) (27.67) 
Prosocial Behaviour 
Composite average z-score 
-.01 
(.92) 
-.57 
(.77) 
.58 
(.84) 
Altruistic Punishment - 
Percentage tickets used to punish 
opposing group 
7.56 
(11.34) 
14.66 
(15.95) 
2.89 
(7.25) 
 
Discussion 
 The aim of Study 9 was to explore the impact of shame and pride 
expressions following uncooperative behaviour in the Centipede Game. It was 
predicted that the expression of shame would lead to more cooperation following a 
transgression and that the expression of pride would lead to less cooperation. 
There was a good measure of support for these predictions.  
 The results of Study 9 show that the expression of shame led to greater 
cooperation. Groups in the shame condition finished with more tickets than did 
groups in both the pride and the control conditions. This shows that expressing 
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shame is not only more effective in repairing the relationship between groups than 
is expressing pride, but also more effective than not expressing any emotion. 
Although the differences between the shame and control conditions were not 
consistently significant, as was also the case for the differences between the pride 
and control conditions, the observed pattern of means was highly consistent across 
measures and also consistent with our predictions. 
 A limitation of Study 9 is that the expression of pride and shame could be 
regarded as confounded with each other to some degree. A group that expresses 
pride about its decision making is unlikely to express shame; likewise, a group that 
expresses shame about its decision making is unlikely to express pride. Thus the 
extent to which these conditions are orthogonal can be questioned. Although there 
is no empirical evidence from the current study to address this issue, the ratings 
collected in Study 8 show that although expressions of pride were indeed negatively 
correlated with expressions of shame, r = .44, p =.023, this correlation is not large 
enough to conclude that these expressions are simply opposites. The presence of 
one does not necessarily mean the absence of the other. 
 The results of Study 9 also shed further light on why groups in the pride 
condition reacted by being less cooperative. Members of groups in the pride 
condition were more willing to engage in costly punishment of the opposing group 
than were groups in the shame or control conditions. This is consistent with the 
view that expressing pride following uncooperative behaviour was not only seen as 
uncooperative, giving rise to less cooperation in subsequent games, but was also 
potentially perceived as anti-social and therefore increased the tendency to engage 
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in altruistic punishment, presumably in an effort to persuade the offending group to 
abide by social norms.  
General Discussion 
 The aim of this research was to investigate whether emotion expression in 
an intergroup economic game can lead to relationship repair following 
transgression. The Centipede Game was used because it is a sequential, multi-
round game, in which levels of trust could fluctuate. It also provided a good 
opportunity to implement an interactive communication stage, which helped in 
establishing whether emotional communication influences motivations and 
behaviour in an intergroup setting. Across both Studies 8 and 9, there was support 
for the notion that emotion expressions impact intergroup relationships, both by 
showing ways in which expression of negative emotions can repair relationships, 
and also by showing how expression of positive emotions can hinder intergroup 
cooperation. 
 Both Studies 8 and 9 show that relationship repair via emotion expression is 
possible. In Study 8 I found that both guilt and shame expressions were associated 
with more cooperative actions when the Centipede Game was played in an 
unconstrained setting. In Study 9 I found that receiving an expression of shame 
following a transgression led to more cooperation than receiving an expression of 
pride or receiving no emotion information at all. These findings show that 
improving intergroup relationships through emotional expression is possible.  
 Considering guilt and shame specifically, previous research has suggested 
that they are distinct emotions, serving different functions (Schmader & Lickel, 
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2006; Tracy & Robins, 2006). However, both are negative self-conscious emotions 
and were associated with greater intergroup cooperation in Study 8. Previous 
research had shown that the experience of guilt, but not shame, leads to improved 
relationships in economic games. Study 8 shows that the expression of shame was 
more strongly associated with cooperative behaviour (the reduction of stealing 
moves in particular) than was the expression of guilt, and Study 9 shows that the 
expression of shame is effective in relationship repair in intergroup scenarios. 
Although both studies point to the positive effect that shame can have, it should be 
noted that these are intergroup settings and that shame expression may not be as 
effective in interpersonal scenarios. It may also be the case that the experience of 
shame in interpersonal settings is less functional than is the expression of this 
emotion in an intergroup context.  
 The expression of pride had consistent effects in Studies 8 and 9. In Study 8 
it was shown that the expression of pride was associated with less cooperation and 
a higher chance of being stolen from. Study 9 showed that pride expressions lead to 
something over and above less cooperation. As well as the expression of pride 
giving rise to uncooperative behaviour, there was also a larger chance of being 
punished after expressing it. This suggests that the expression of pride not only 
hinders relationship repair, but also motivates those who receive it to engage in 
altruistic punishment. It could be that the observation of pride after being 
uncooperative leads to anger, which would explain both being less cooperative in 
response but also being motivated to punish the pride-expressing group.  
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In both studies it is clear that past behaviour by a group is not the only 
factor that shapes subsequent intergroup behaviour: The emotions expressed by 
the group can also have a significant impact, consistent with what would be 
expected on the basis of theoretical models such as social appraisal (Manstead & 
Fischer, 2001) and Emotions as Social Information (EASI; Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef 
et al., 2010). Members of a group that has been treated badly by an out-group do 
not act towards that group solely on the basis of its behaviour; they also make 
inferences about the appraisals and intentions of the out-group, and are readier to 
cooperate with the out-group if it appears to be ashamed of its actions than if it 
expresses pride, or in the absence of any emotional communication. 
 To conclude, these studies show that emotion expressions do impact 
behaviour in an economic game, the Centipede Game. I have demonstrated the 
positive impact of expressing negative self-conscious emotions such as guilt and 
shame, as well as the negative impact of expressing the positive self-conscious 
emotion of pride. I started this chapter by noting that repairing relationships is a 
common occurrence in everyday life, but that previous research suggests that this is 
much more difficult to achieve in intergroup settings. The present studies show that 
emotional expression can play an important role in repairing intergroup 
relationships and in particular that expressing shame about a transgression can 
improve intergroup cooperation following a transgression 
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Chapter 5 
 Step by Step: Testing the Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies 
Civil wars that end through progressive negotiation and interaction are 
twice as likely to reignite, compared to wars that end through victory for one side 
(Toft, 2010). This stark fact suggests that reconciliation attempts between groups 
often fail. Despite this apparent lack of effectiveness of reconciliation, the use of 
intergroup apologies in an effort to achieve reconciliation is becoming more 
frequent. The increase in large-scale apologies being delivered by countries, 
political parties, businesses and corporations has led to the suggestion that we have 
entered an ‘age of apology’ (Brooks, 1999). Such apologies are offered for both 
current and historical transgressions in an effort to improve intergroup relations. 
However, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that these apologies do 
improve such relations. The present research uses a recent model of intergroup 
reconciliation, the Staircase Model (Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011) to examine the 
conditions under which intergroup apologies are most likely to be effective.   
An intergroup apology is one that is offered in a group-to-group context and 
differs from an interpersonal apology in that the latter is offered from one individual 
to another. Research shows that interpersonal apologies are often effective in 
eliciting forgiveness (e.g., McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997; Riek & Mania, 
2011). The effectiveness of interpersonal apologies in promoting forgiveness has led 
to the assumption that intergroup apologies should have similar effects. For 
example, Tavuchis (1991) argued that apologies should be seen as a panacea for 
Step-by-Step: Testing the Staircase Model 
144 
 
 
repairing relationships, regardless of whether they are interpersonal or intergroup 
in nature.   
Indeed, there is some evidence that intergroup apologies can be effective. 
As noted earlier in this thesis, Leonard, Mackie, and Smith (2011) found that an 
apology offered to university students from a group of university professors who 
had written an article in a local newspaper criticizing student lifestyle was more 
effective in gaining forgiveness than not offering an apology. There are also findings 
from research conducted in the context of more violent conflict to suggest that an 
intergroup apology can reduce motivations for revenge and avoidance (Brown, 
Wohl, & Exline, 2008). Furthermore, there is evidence that intergroup apologies can 
increase perceptions of perpetrator remorsefulness and that they usually leave the 
victim group feeling more satisfied (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). 
However, other findings suggest that recipients of an intergroup apology feel 
ambivalent and that increased perceptions of perpetrator remorsefulness often fail 
to translate into forgiveness (Hornsey, Wohl, & Philpot, 2015). In fact, there is 
surprisingly little evidence that intergroup apologies lead to true intergroup 
forgiveness. For example, Bombay, Matheson, and Anisman (2013) found that 
although intergroup apologies were regarded positively, victims were generally 
pessimistic about genuine improvements in intergroup relations. Thus intergroup 
apologies often seem to fail to achieve what they are intended to achieve. 
It is therefore important to understand what it is about intergroup apologies 
that stops them from achieving forgiveness, in order that reconciliation attempts 
can be modified to take account of these factors. There have been suggestions that 
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intergroup apologies cannot be trusted, perhaps because intergroup situations are 
characterized by greater competition and fear, leading to mistrust (Halabi, Nadler, & 
Dovidio, 2012; Insko et al., 1988). By definition, in the case of an interpersonal 
apology the recipient needs to put his or her trust in another individual, whereas in 
the case of intergroup apology one or more persons have to trust many other 
individuals. This provides a relatively straightforward reason why intergroup 
apologies are less likely to succeed. A further point is that it is commonly thought 
that intergroup apologies are self-serving and insincere, and that there is no 
genuine concern for the victim group (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009); rather, the 
apology is offered to make the perpetrating group feel better about the situation. It 
follows that increasing the perceived trustworthiness and sincerity of an intergroup 
apology is likely to be pivotal to its success. 
Potential reasons why intergroup apologies are problematic with respect to 
sincerity and trust arise not from the apology itself, but from the actions and 
behaviour surrounding it. Perpetrator groups may believe (or be thought to believe) 
that the offering of an apology can ‘close the book’ on the past, leaving the 
wrongdoing(s) forgotten (Corntassel & Holder, 2008). This creates the impression 
that there will be no further actions based on what is said in the apology. Such an 
impression would presumably lead to these apologies being regarded as 
untrustworthy and insincere. One way of alleviating this concern would be to make 
concrete promises about changes in behaviour. The effectiveness of an apology 
based on promised behavioural changes should be enhanced by trust-building 
interactions between the perpetrator or victim groups before the actual apology is 
delivered. This assertion is supported by Nadler (2012, p. 294) who describes the 
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outcome of positive intergroup reconciliation as “Trustworthy positive relations 
between former adversaries who enjoy secure social identities and interact in an 
equality-based social environment.”  
Previous accounts of intergroup reconciliation typically treat it as an 
outcome to be sought, rather than as part of a process. Treating reparative 
intergroup interactions as a multi-stage process, in which the apology is just one 
component, could help us to understand how impressions that intergroup apologies 
are self-serving and insincere can be avoided. Given the apparently low efficacy of 
intergroup apologies when taken in isolation, it makes sense to support them with 
other actions, both before and after the apology is delivered.  
The Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies 
The Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies (Wohl et al., 2011) is a 
framework that seeks to identify the context in which intergroup apologies are 
effective. It sets out a series of steps (or ‘stairs’), starting with the perpetrating 
group’s acceptance of collective guilt and its willingness to set history records 
straight, and is structured in such a way that each successive step should bring 
about an improvement in intergroup relations, thereby gaining enough momentum 
to proceed to the next step. Wohl and colleagues claim that each step provides a 
foundation for subsequent steps, creating genuine intergroup communication and 
trust-building. The five steps are as follows: accepting collective guilt, setting 
straight the records of history, discussing reparations, offering an intergroup 
apology, and post-apology engagement.  To my knowledge, the model has not yet 
been tested empirically for its effectiveness in promoting reconciliation. Despite the 
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original article suggesting that the Staircase Model is a framework that may not 
need to be tested, I argue that the premise and structure of the model offer a novel 
and interesting way to explore a process perspective on intergroup reconciliation. 
The present research was designed to provide a test of the model and to investigate 
the effectiveness of viewing an apology as a part of a broader reconciliatory 
process, as opposed to as a ‘stand-alone’ tool to achieve an outcome. 
Accepting collective guilt provides a moral foundation and entails the 
perpetrator group accepting its responsibility for what has happened. Setting 
straight the records of history allows the two groups to arrive at a shared 
interpretation of events, and also enables victims to be heard, understood and 
validated. Discussing reparations marks the beginnings of repair, and establishes a 
shared understanding of what resources are likely to be needed to put matters 
right. Intergroup apology is the key communicative step; it involves the expressions 
of regret and provides a validation for the victims. Post-apology engagement is 
designed to promote genuine reconciliation and harmony between the groups. The 
idea here is that promises of reparation are not the same as reparation; for genuine 
forgiveness, the perpetrators need to demonstrate through actions that they have 
changed. 
Overview of the Studies 
The aim of the three studies reported below was to apply the Staircase 
Model to examples of historical conflicts. In the first study the Staircase Model was 
applied to a border conflict between Thailand and Cambodia that took place in 
2008.  Here participants acted as third-party observers, and their perceptions of the 
Step-by-Step: Testing the Staircase Model 
148 
 
 
perpetrating group were recorded. In the second study the Staircase Model was 
applied to ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland that took place between the 1970s 
and 1990s and involved sustained conflict between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
and the British government and army. Here the (British) participants were persons 
who were adults at the time of The Troubles. They therefore had a closer 
involvement in the events being described. This proximity to the conflict was 
increased in the third study, where again the Staircase Model was applied to ‘The 
Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, but this time using a Northern Irish sample. 
All studies used a variation of an additive procedure to introduce the 
different steps of the Staircase Model. In Step 1 participants learned that the 
perpetrating group recognized that they were to blame and accepted collective 
guilt. Step 2 described an agreement between the two groups about the 
documenting of the events, as well as members of both groups participating in the 
drawing up of this agreement. Step 3 provided information that the perpetrating 
group promised to disarm, promised compensation to those affected, and promised 
to ensure the safety of the victim group. Step 4 included an intergroup apology, in 
the form of a public statement, the structure and content of this apology being 
modeled on a real apology given by an IRA spokesperson (The Guardian, 2002). Step 
5 included details of reparations, such as compensation, being delivered, and the 
sending of flowers and representatives to a service of remembrance. In all studies, 
there was also a control condition in which participants were simply told that there 
had been no contact between the perpetrating and victim groups.  
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In the absence of previous empirical tests of the model, my predictions are 
derived directly from the structure of the model. With each additive step in the 
model, there should at least be a progressive increase in positive perceptions of the 
perpetrator group. There should also be a progressive decrease in negative 
emotions felt towards the perpetrator group. It is predicted that the intergroup 
apology, because it is not presented in isolation, but rather is part of a broader 
reconciliatory process, will have a significant positive effect on forgiveness. 
However, it is also anticipated, given that each step involves different content, that 
the steps may have differential effects on these outcome variables, such that some 
steps have a greater influence on certain outcomes than those that precede or 
follow them. Below all measures, manipulations and exclusions used in all three 
studies are reported. 
All three studies followed the same format, in which there are six conditions 
(1 control condition and 5 conditions relating to the Staircase Model). To estimate 
the required sample size, I conducted a power analysis. I powered the studies to 
have a good chance of detecting effects that are medium-to-large in size. G*Power 
3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) showed that to have an 80% chance of 
detecting a large effect size (F = .40) a sample size of 90 would be required (15 per 
cell), and that to have an 80% chance of detecting a medium effect size (F = .25) a 
sample size of 216 would be required (36 per cell). The cell sizes of the present 
studies ranged between 19 and 39, and were not increased after any data analysis 
took place. It should also be noted that all measures, manipulations and exclusions 
related to these studies are reported. All studies reported in this chapter were 
approved by the Cardiff University Research Ethics Committee (EC.16.01.12.4441). 
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Study 10 
The context chosen for Study 10 was a border conflict between Cambodia 
and Thailand, a real-life conflict that came about after a long dispute over 
ownership of the land on which the Preah Vihear Temple is located. The temple was 
situated within Cambodia’s borders but in the summer of 2008, 50 Thai troops 
entered Cambodia, occupying the district surrounding the temple. This military 
intervention resulted in 41 deaths, several of them being Cambodian civilians. In 
2013, the International Court of Justice was forced to step in, declaring that Thai 
troops should leave the area because the temple was located in Cambodian 
territory. The Staircase Model was applied to Thailand’s attempts to apologize for its 
transgression and achieve reconciliation with Cambodia.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred and nineteen psychology students (14 males & 105 females; 
mean age of 19.89) participated for course credit. The study had a fully between-
subjects design. There were six conditions, corresponding to the 5 steps of the 
Staircase Model plus a control condition. Participants were randomly allocated to 
one of these conditions. An attention check was used, in the form of a question 
asking participants “How many deaths were thought to have been caused as a 
result of the Thai military intervention?” All participants passed this check. 
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Manipulation 
Staircase Model Manipulation. The control condition was labelled Step 0; 
here participants were given a basic description of the events of the conflict and 
told that there had been no contact between Cambodia and Thailand since the 
conflict. If assigned to Step 1, participants also read the relevant transcript. If 
assigned to Step 2, participants would read the transcript for Step 1, followed by 
the transcript for Step 2. This additive process continued to Step 5, where 
participants read all transcripts. Full versions of the transcripts can be found in 
Appendix 15.  
Measures 
Forgiveness. This construct was measured in two ways. A single item, “After 
reading this, do you think Thailand should be forgiven?” was responded to using 
binary ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ response options. This was followed by an adapted version of 
the Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory (Trim-18; 
McCullough, Root, & Cohen, 2006). This 18-item measure assesses forgiveness and 
consists of subscales measuring avoidance, revenge, and benevolence motivations. 
Trim-18 was originally designed as an interpersonal forgiveness measure; for the 
current research the items were adapted to be group related. The adapted version 
of the measure can be found in Appendix 2. Responses to the items were made 
using 5-point response scales (1 = Strongly Disagree to 5 = Strongly Agree). The 
Cronbach’s alpha was high for all three subscales: Avoidance ( = .84), Revenge ( = 
.74), and Benevolence ( = .78). 
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Positive Perceptions. Four single-item questions were used to assess positive 
perceptions of the perpetrator group. These items assessed the perceived sincerity, 
remorsefulness, trustworthiness, and believability of the group. As with the 
forgiveness measure, responses were made using a 5-point response scale from 
‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree.’ The Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was 
.80. 
Emotion Measures. Single-item questions were used to assess how 
participants felt towards the perpetrator group after reading the transcript. These 
items related to feelings of anger, fear, sadness, and disgust. Again, they were 
responded to using a 5-point scale from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree.’ 
Procedure 
Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to 
endorse an on-screen consent form. Next, demographic measures were completed. 
The structure of the main questionnaire was as follows: description of the 
Cambodia/Thailand conflict, attention check, Staircase Model manipulation, binary 
measure of forgiveness and then, in random order, the Trim-18, positive 
perceptions items, and emotion items (with items within each set also presented in 
random order). After completing these measures, participants were thanked and 
debriefed. 
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Results 
There were no significant associations between the demographic variables 
and any of the dependent measures. To investigate the association between the 
Staircase Model manipulation and the binary forgiveness item, a chi-square analysis 
was computed. The effect of the manipulation on the Trim-18, positive perceptions, 
and emotion variables was analyzed using a series of one-way ANOVAs, with 
condition (step 0 through step 5) as the factor. To avoid alpha level inflation, 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests were used to follow up any significant effects.  
Forgiveness 
For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of forgiveness (i.e., 
‘yes’ responses) was 71.42%. Although a chi-square analysis showed that the 
association between the steps of the Staircase Model and responses to the binary 
measure of forgiveness was not significant, χ²(5) = 6.86, p = .231, there is a 
significant linear-by-linear association χ²(1) = 5.98, p = .014, showing that the odds 
of forgiveness increase with increasing steps of the model. This is borne out when 
inspecting the data, in that there are more ‘yes’ responses in all conditions, relative 
to the control condition, and the percentage of such responses is noticeably higher 
(> 80%) in the later steps (see Table 5.1). 
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Table 5.1 
Binary forgiveness rates for each step of the Staircase Model (Study 10). 
Step Number Binary Forgiveness Rate 
0 55.00% 
1 65.00% 
2 63.16% 
3 80.95% 
4 80.00% 
5 84.21% 
 
However, contrary to prediction, condition did not have a significant main 
effect on any of the Trim-18 subscales (Avoidance, F(5, 113) = .87, p = .507, ηp2 = 
.04; Revenge, F(5, 113) = .51, p = .772, ηp2 = .02; Benevolence, F(5, 113) = .74, p = 
.595, ηp2 = .03). Means and standard deviations for each step, both for the total 
measure and the subscales are shown in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the Trim-18 subscales, at 
each step of the Staircase Model (Study 10).  
Step Number Avoidance Revenge Benevolence 
0 
 
2.72 
(.46) 
2.06 
(.64) 
3.68 
(.41) 
1 
 
2.49 
(.62) 
1.99 
(.72) 
3.83 
(.57) 
2 
 
2.33 
(.60) 
2.00 
(.58) 
3.92 
(.42) 
3 
 
2.35 
(.73) 
2.14 
(.51) 
3.90 
(.60) 
4 
 
2.51 
(.86) 
1.99 
(.61) 
3.89 
(.51) 
5 
 
2.44 
(.74) 
2.22 
(.48) 
3.96 
(.62) 
 
Positive Perceptions 
Means and standard deviations for positive perceptions of the perpetrator 
group at each step are shown in Table 5.3. There was a significant main effect of 
condition on positive perceptions, F(5, 113) = 9.29, p < .001, ηp2 = .29. Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc tests showed that all conditions apart from step 1 resulted in 
significantly higher scores than Step 0, the control condition. Step 5, the final step, 
also led to significantly higher scores than Steps 1 (p = .007) and 2 (p = .050). 
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Table 5.3 
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the positive perceptions of 
the perpetrator group and the measured emotions each step of the Staircase Model 
(Study 10). 
Step Number Positive Perceptions Anger Fear Sadness Disgust 
0 2.74 
(.56) 
4.70 
(.57) 
3.65 
(1.27) 
3.90 
(1.02) 
3.95 
(.76) 
1 3.20 
(.61) 
3.30 
(1.42) 
3.65 
(1.14) 
3.90 
(.97) 
4.05 
(1.00) 
2 3.30 
(.54) 
3.26 
(.81) 
3.16 
(1.02) 
3.47 
(.96) 
4.05 
(.85) 
3 3.60 
(.52) 
3.14 
(.79) 
2.10 
(.89) 
3.67 
(.80) 
3.67 
(1.46) 
4 3.63 
(.59) 
3.05 
(1.15) 
2.40 
(1.19) 
3.80 
(.77) 
2.50 
(1.05) 
5 3.87 
(.67) 
2.58 
(.84) 
2.11 
(1.20) 
3.42 
(1.26) 
2.58 
(1.22) 
 
Emotion Variables 
Means and standard deviations for all emotion variables at each step are 
shown in Table 5.3. Condition had a significant effect on anger, F(5, 113) = 10.77, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .32, with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showing that all steps led 
to significantly lower scores than did Step 0, the control condition. Thus applying 
the first step of the Staircase Model resulted in a significant decrease in anger 
levels, as can be seen in Figure 5.1.  
Condition also had a significant effect on fear, F(5, 113) = 8.58, p < .001, ηp2= 
.28, with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showing that Steps 3, 4, and 5 all led 
to significantly lower scores than steps 0 and 1. This indicates that although there 
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was no significant decrease in fear levels after Steps 1 and 2, there was a significant 
decrease after Step 3, which involves the discussion of reparations, as can be seen 
in Figure 5.2. 
There was also a significant main effect of condition on disgust, F(5, 113) = 
8.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .28, with Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showing that 
Steps 4 and 5 led to significantly lower scores than did any of the other conditions. 
This indicates that disgust levels only decreased significantly after Step 4, the 
intergroup apology, as can be seen in Figure 5.3. 
Condition did not have a significant effect on sadness F(5, 113) = .90, p = 
.481, ηp2 = .04, as can be seen in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.1. Mean anger ratings with 95% confidence intervals for each 
step of the Staircase Model. 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Mean disgust ratings with 95% confidence intervals for each 
step of the Staircase Model 
 
Figure 5.2. Mean fear ratings with 95% confidence intervals for each step 
of the Staircase Model. 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Mean sadness ratings with 95% confidence intervals for each 
step of the Staircase Model. 
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Discussion 
The aim of this study was to conduct an initial empirical test of the Staircase 
Model by examining how its application to an international reconciliation attempt 
influenced the perceptions of persons who were not directly involved in the conflict. 
It was predicted that proceeding through steps in the model would have positive 
effects on forgiveness, intergroup perceptions, and emotions. The predictions were 
partly supported. Being exposed to the steps of the model had positive effects on a 
binary measure of forgiveness, on perceptions of the perpetrating group, and on 
emotions. However, there was no significant effect on the multi-item subscale 
measuring forgiveness motivations of avoidance, revenge, or benevolence.   
Focusing first on the supportive evidence, the findings show that a 
sequentially structured attempt to achieve intergroup reconciliation can increase 
positive perceptions of the perpetrator group (Philpot & Hornsey, 2008), reflecting 
significant increases in perceptions of sincerity, remorse, trust, and believability. 
This finding is important because any increase in these perceptions should be 
helpful in combatting the tendency to regard intergroup apologies as ‘self-serving’ 
(Blatz et al., 2009). 
A possible limitation of this study is that any effects shown could have 
resulted purely from the increasing provision of information about the conflict and 
its aftermath, with the specific location of each step in the sequence not being 
necessary to achieve the observed benefits. However, there are aspects of the 
results that suggest that that the sequence in which information about 
reconciliation attempts is provided was important. For example, a significant 
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reduction in fear was only seen after step 3, when reparations were discussed, and 
fear remained low from this point onwards. Similarly, disgust levels only reduced at 
step 4, after the intergroup apology, and remained low after the next step, the post-
apology engagement. These findings suggest that different steps address different 
needs, as predicted by the model, and at the very least that the steps in 
combination help to increase the success of the reconciliation attempt. Showing 
that the model has different effects at different steps serves to support the 
structure of the model. 
Turning now to the results that were inconsistent with the predictions, it was 
surprising that the subscales of the Trim-18 were not significantly influenced by the 
manipulation. A possible reason for this is that the Trim-18 was originally designed 
to assess the motivations of individuals who are victims of an interpersonal 
transgression. The fact that participants in the current study were not themselves 
victims of the conflict may have made it harder for them to respond to items about 
specific motivations. Participants who do not themselves feel victimized by a 
conflict may not be motivated to avoid, be vengeful, or even to forgive; 
alternatively, they may not feel that it is their place to make such judgments. One 
way to test this explanation would be to apply the model to a conflict in which 
participants have a closer connection with the events in question, even if they do 
not themselves belong to the victim group. This is what I set out to do in Study 11. 
Study 11 
Study 11 used the context of ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, and more 
specifically the role played by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in that conflict. 
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Because participants in this study were adults living in mainland Britain, IRA attacks 
on Britain and on British identity were emphasized in the research materials 
describing the ‘The Troubles.’ Participants in this study had to be over the age of 35, 
meaning that they would have been at least 18 years old when the ‘Good Friday 
Agreement’ that brought an end to the intergroup conflict in Northern Ireland was 
signed, in 1998. This measure was taken with the aim of ensuring that participants 
would have first-hand memories of at least some of the events referred to in the 
study. After reading a description of ‘The Troubles,’ participants were told that an 
inquiry had established that the IRA is still in existence today, although its members 
maintain that they are committed to peaceful protest only. This was followed by the 
Staircase Model manipulation, in which participants were exposed to statements 
made by current IRA members about the group’s past. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Two hundred and thirty-five participants (115 males & 120 females; mean 
age of 52.32) completed this study. Participants were recruited via the research 
company Pureprofile (www.pureprofile.com). This enabled a sample of participants 
to be chosen based on age (> 35 years) and location (mainland Britain). Similar to 
Study 10, this study had a fully between-subjects design comprising six conditions, 
with participants randomly allocated to one of them. 
Although 280 participants started the survey, some were excluded before 
finishing because they did not provide consent (n = 8), failed an attention check (n = 
20), or simply did not finish the study (n = 17). The attention check was included to 
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ensure that participants paid careful attention to information written in the 
transcripts they were given.  
Manipulation 
Staircase Model Manipulation:  As in Study 10, participants were randomly 
allocated to conditions that corresponded to a step number in the Staircase Model. 
The transcripts for these different steps are available in Appendix 16. 
Measures 
Forgiveness. The forgiveness measures were the same as those used in 
Study 10. Thus, there was one binary measure with the item was, “After reading 
this, do you think the IRA should be forgiven?” with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ response options; 
and the multi-item Trim-18 Scale (McCullough et al., 2006). The Cronbach’s alphas 
for the motivation subscales were again high: Avoidance ( = .89), Revenge ( = 
.86) and Benevolence ( = .91).  
Positive Perceptions: The single-item questions and response scales 
assessing perceptions of the perpetrating group were the same as those used in 
Study 10.  
Emotion Measures: The single-item questions and response scales assessing 
emotions felt towards the perpetrator group were asked twice: once after the 
description of the IRA’s actions during ‘The Troubles,’ but before the manipulation; 
and a second time, after the condition manipulation. The emotion items were the 
same as those used in Study 10.  
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Demographics: To control for the possible influence of confounding 
variables, participants were asked their religion, their knowledge of ‘The Troubles’ 
and the IRA, whether they had any Irish relatives, and whether they or their family 
had been affected by either The Troubles or the IRA, either directly or indirectly. 
Procedure 
Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to 
sign an on-screen consent form. Next, they completed demographic measures. The 
structure of the main questionnaire was as follows:  first came the description of 
‘The Troubles’ and role of the IRA, then the attention check, followed by the 
Staircase Model manipulation, the discrete measure of forgiveness, and then a 
random ordering of the Trim-18, positive perception items, and emotion items 
(with items within each set also presented in a random order). Participants were 
then thanked and debriefed. 
Results 
The association between condition and responses to the binary forgiveness 
measure was analyzed using chi-square. The effect of the manipulation on the Trim-
18 measure, including its subscales, and positive perceptions was analyzed using a 
series of one-way ANOVAs. To protect against alpha inflation, Bonferroni-corrected 
post-hoc tests were used to follow up significant effects. The emotion variables 
were analyzed with a repeated-measures ANOVA, with the Staircase condition as 
the between-subjects factor and time as the within-subjects factor.  
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There was a significant relationship between age and self-reported sadness 
(at time 2), with older respondents reporting greater sadness after the staircase 
manipulation (r = .14, p = .039). Therefore, age was controlled for when analyzing 
the sadness measures. There were no other significant associations with 
demographic variables, including the variables regarding religion, knowledge of ‘the 
Troubles,’ whether or not respondents had Irish relatives, and whether or not 
participants or their families had been affected by ‘The Troubles’ or the IRA.  
Forgiveness 
For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of forgiveness rating 
(i.e., ‘yes’ responses) was 47.66%. The overall chi-square analysis showed that there 
was a significant association between step of the Staircase Model and how people 
responded to this measure, χ²(5) = 12.35, p = .030. Table 5.4 shows a clear trend for 
forgiveness rates to increase with increasing step numbers, rising from 28.21% in 
Step 0 to 64.10% in Step 5.  
Table 5.4 
Binary forgiveness rates for each step of the Staircase Model (Study 11). 
Step Number Binary Forgiveness Rate 
0 28.21% 
1 41.03% 
2 45.00% 
3 51.28% 
4 56.41% 
5 64.10% 
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The Staircase Model had a significant main effect on avoidance motivations 
of the Trim-18, F(5, 229) = 5.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .11. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc 
tests showed that Step 0 had significantly higher avoidance scores than all of the 
other steps. There was no significant main effect on the revenge subscale, F(5, 229) 
= 1.72, p = .131, ηp2 = .04, or the benevolence subscale, F(5, 229) = 2.12, p = .063, 
ηp2 = .04, although the latter effect approached significance. The means and 
standard deviations for the full measure and the three subscales at each step can 
be seen in Table 5.5.  
Positive Perceptions 
There was a significant main effect of the Staircase Model on positive 
perceptions of the perpetrator, F(5, 229) = 4.92, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc tests showed that Steps 2 (p = .002), 3 (p = .010), 4 (p = .002), 
and 5 (p = .002) all led to significantly more positive perceptions in comparison to 
Step 0. The means and standard deviations for the perpetrator perception variables 
can be found in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5 
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the Trim-18 subscales and 
positive perceptions of the perpetrator group at each step of the Staircase Model 
(Study 11).  
Step Number Avoidance Revenge Benevolence Positive Perceptions 
0 3.33 
(.82) 
2.66 
(.87) 
3.15 
(1.02) 
2.04 
(.78) 
1 2.91 
(.68) 
2.29 
(.70) 
3.61 
(.57) 
2.51 
(.83) 
2 2.65 
(.73) 
2.30 
(.90) 
3.52 
(.92) 
2.88 
(.98) 
3 2.68 
(.76) 
2.51 
(.83) 
3.46 
(.90) 
2.79 
(.99) 
4 2.72 
(.77) 
2.25 
(.85) 
3.68 
(.86) 
2.88 
(.99) 
5 2.51 
(.82) 
2.22 
(.80) 
3.68 
(.81) 
2.90 
(1.15) 
 
Emotion Variables 
A series of 2 (time of measurement; within-subjects) x 6 (condition; 
between-subjects) ANOVAs assessed the effects of time and condition on each 
emotion. Means and standard deviations for each emotion variable can be seen in 
Table 5.6. 
Anger. There was a significant main effect of time on anger, F(1,229) = 50.23, p < 
.001, ηp2  = .18, with anger scores at time 2 (M = 3.32) being significantly lower than 
those at time 1 (M = 3.68). The main effect of Staircase condition on anger was 
close to significance, F(5,229) = 2.22, p = .053, ηp2 = .05. There was also a significant 
interaction, F(5,229) = 12.02, p < .001, ηp2 = .21. Simple effects analysis showed that 
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this interaction was driven by opposing patterns in the different Staircase 
conditions. At Step 0, anger increased at time 2, but for all other steps, anger 
reduced at time 2.  
Fear. The main effect of time was not significant, F(1,229) < .01, p = .948, ηp2  
< .01. There was also only a marginally significant main effect of Staircase condition, 
F(5,229) = 2.13, p = .063, ηp2  = .04, but the interaction was significant, F(5,229) = 
12.72, p < .01, ηp2 = .22. Simple effects analysis showed that this interaction effect 
was driven by step 5, where fear was significantly reduced at time 2.  
Disgust. There was a significant main effect of time, F(1,229) = 14.04, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .06, with disgust at time 2 (M = 3.54) being significantly lower than at 
time 1 (M = 3.75). There was also a significant main effect of Staircase condition, 
F(5,229) = 2.86, p = .016, ηp2 = .06, which Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests 
showed was due to disgust at step 5 being significantly lower than after step 0. The 
interaction was also significant, F(5,229) = 8.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .15. Simple effects 
analysis showed that this was driven by steps 0, 4, and 5. At step 0 disgust scores 
increased at time 2, whereas at steps 4 and 5 disgust scores decreased significantly 
at time 2.    
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Table 5.6 
Mean emotion ratings (with standard deviations in parentheses) at each step of the Staircase Model at Time 1 and Time 2 (Study 11). 
Step 
Number 
Anger Fear Sadness Disgust 
Time1 Time2 Time1 Time2 Time1 Time2 Time1 Time2 
0 3.69 
(.98) 
4.15 
(1.04) 
2.44 
(1.02) 
3.38 
(1.25) 
3.77 
(1.18) 
3.62 
(1.23) 
3.77 
(.99) 
4.23 
(1.09) 
1 3.64 
(.93) 
3.36 
(.78) 
2.62 
(1.04) 
2.69 
(1.03) 
3.87 
(.89) 
3.74 
(.97) 
3.92 
(.96) 
3.79 
(.95) 
2 3.60 
(.98) 
3.08 
(.94) 
2.83 
(1.13) 
2.70 
(1.11) 
3.78 
(1.00) 
3.58 
(1.22) 
3.73 
(1.04) 
3.55 
(1.09) 
3 3.56 
(1.21) 
3.10 
(.97) 
2.41 
(1.14) 
2.21 
(1.06) 
3.38 
(1.27) 
3.41 
(1.16) 
3.67 
(1.26) 
3.49 
(1.12) 
4 3.82 
(.85) 
3.05 
(.92) 
2.82 
(1.05) 
2.56 
(1.14) 
3.87 
(.89) 
3.82 
(1.00) 
3.87 
(.89) 
3.26 
(.82) 
5 3.74 
(1.12) 
3.15 
(1.18) 
2.59 
(1.09) 
2.13 
(1.08) 
3.59 
(1.19) 
3.36 
(1.27) 
3.56 
(1.27) 
2.92 
(1.18) 
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Sadness: There was a significant main effect of time, F(1, 228) = 6.31, p = 
.013, ηp2 = .03, with sadness at time 2 (M = 3.59) being significantly lower than it 
was at time 1 (M = 3.71).  There was no significant effect of Staircase condition, 
F(5,228) = 1.09, p = .369, ηp2 = .02, and the interaction effect was also not 
significant, F(5,228) = .84, p = .523, ηp2 = .02.  
The greater personal relevance of the intergroup conflict in this study is 
evident from comparing the percentages of those who were willing to forgive the 
perpetrating group (71.42% in Study 10 vs 47.70% in Study 11). Independent 
samples t-tests comparing scores across the two experiments found significantly 
lower scores in Study 11 for positive perceptions of the perpetrator, t(323.94) = 
7.07, p < .001, d = .79, as well as significantly lower scores on the Trim-18 
benevolence subscale, t(340.99) = 4.61, p < .001, d = .50. There were also 
significantly higher scores in Study 11 on the avoidance (t(352) = 3.81, p < .001, d = 
.41) and revenge (t(315.00) = 3.94, p < .001, d = .44) subscales. However, there 
were no significant differences between the two studies on any of the emotion 
variables.  
Discussion 
The aim of Study 11 was to replicate the positive effects of applying of the 
Staircase Model in a context that was more directly relevant to the participants. As 
in Study 10, positive effects of applying the model were observed for the binary 
forgiveness measure, perceptions of the perpetrator, and for emotions. It was 
predicted that having a conflict that was more relevant to the participants would 
increase the personal investment to a point where motivations could be changed. 
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This hypothesis was also supported, in that the Staircase Model had significant 
effects on the avoidance motivation subscale of the multi-item measure of 
forgiveness. 
The key finding of this study is that applying the Staircase Model to a setting 
in which participants had a closer relation to the historical events meant that the 
model was able to have a positive impact on forgiveness rates. This provides 
important support for the model, given the general pessimism about the 
effectiveness of intergroup apologies and their ability to promote forgiveness 
following a conflict. As in Study 10, different variables were differentially affected at 
certain steps, and this can be regarded as evidence in support of the stepwise 
structure of the model. 
While these consistent effects of particular steps on different variables 
found in Studies 10 and 11 support the view that proceeding through the steps of 
the model will have a beneficial effect on intergroup perceptions, and thereby 
promote reconciliation, the evidence does not unequivocally support the 
sequencing of the steps as proposed in the model. It could be that the steps 
themselves have independent effects and that presenting them in a different 
sequence would result in the same effect, which would call into question the 
‘staircase’ notion that is inherent to the model. I set out to test this possibility in 
Study 12.  
Study 12 
Again, the context of ‘The Troubles’ and the IRA was chosen, but this time I 
attempted to make the involved status of the participants even more salient than 
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was the case in Study 11. This was achieved by recruiting participants from 
Northern Ireland. This should result in greater personal relevance of the 
transgression and the subsequent reconciliation efforts.   
With regard to the Staircase Model, I chose to focus on Step 4, the 
intergroup apology, by varying where in the sequence of steps it was located. This 
was again done in a cumulative manner, with the apology appearing (a) on its own, 
(b) after step 1, (c) after steps 1 and 2, or (d) after steps 1, 2, and 3 – the last of 
these being its proper location in the Staircase Model. In addition, a control 
condition was included, in which no apology was offered, and I added an 
‘alternative model’ condition, in which all of the information preceding the apology 
remained the same but was presented in a different order. The idea here was to test 
the importance of the sequencing of the steps within the model. If the sequence 
proposed by the Staircase Model is important, perceptions of the perpetrator 
group, emotions felt towards this group, and willingness to forgive the group should 
all be greater when the apology follows step 3, by comparison with the alternative, 
re-ordered condition.  
A consistent finding in Studies 10 and 11 was that disgust felt towards the 
perpetrator group only reduced after the intergroup apology was offered. To 
explore this further, I distinguished between different facets of disgust. It has been 
proposed that there are different facets of disgust, one more physical in nature and 
associated with avoidance of physical contamination, and the other being socio-
moral in nature and associated with avoidance of social or cultural contamination 
(Tyber, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009). I aimed to investigate whether the 
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intergroup apology would affect measures of these different facets of disgust in 
different ways. I also wanted to examine whether feelings of disgust would be 
reduced by the intergroup apology regardless of the context in which it is given, or 
whether this effect depended on other steps in the model. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
Two hundred and twenty-two participants (110 males & 112 females; mean 
age of 50.49) completed this study. Participants were recruited via the research 
company Pureprofile (www.pureprofile.com). Participants who were resident in 
Northern Ireland were recruited. Similar to the previous studies, this study had a 
fully between-subjects design comprising six conditions, with participants randomly 
allocated to one of them. Although 260 participants started the study, some were 
excluded before finishing because they did not provide consent (n = 12), failed an 
attention check (n = 22), or simply did not finish the study (n = 4).  
Manipulation 
Staircase Model Manipulation.  The placement of the intergroup apology in 
the Staircase Model was manipulated. In condition 1, participants read the 
intergroup apology; in condition 2 they read the first step of the Staircase Model 
followed by the apology; in condition 3 they read the first two steps of the model 
followed by the apology; in condition 4, the apology followed steps 1, 2, and 3, as in 
the original model. The fifth condition was a re-ordering of the model, with the 
intergroup apology still being the final step, but the preceding steps were 3, 2, 1 
  Chapter 5 
173 
 
(discussing reparations, documenting history, accepting collective guilt). There was 
also a control condition (condition 0) in which participants were told there had not 
been any contact from the perpetrator group. The transcripts relating to the 
different conditions are available in Appendix 17. 
Measures 
Forgiveness. The forgiveness measures were the same as those used the 
previous studies. Thus, there was one binary measure, reading “After reading this, 
do you think the IRA should be forgiven?” with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ response options; and 
the multi-item Trim-18 measure (McCullough et al., 2006).  
Positive Perceptions. The single-item questions and response scales 
assessing perceptions of the perpetrating group were the same as those used the 
previous studies.  
Disgust Measures. To examine more closely the effect of intergroup apology 
on reducing disgust, observed in the previous studies, three items were used to 
measure physical disgust (‘I feel physically sick,’ ‘I feel my stomach turning,’ and 
‘My stomach is quivering;’  = .90) and another three items to measure socio-moral 
disgust (‘The IRA are bad people,’ ‘The IRA are morally wrong,’ and ‘The IRA are 
evil;’  = .91).  
Demographics. To control for the influence of possible confounding 
variables, participants were asked to report their religious affiliation, political views, 
their knowledge of ‘The Troubles’ and the IRA, and whether they or their family had 
been affected by either The Troubles or the IRA, either directly or indirectly. 
Step-by-Step: Testing the Staircase Model 
174 
 
 
Procedure 
Participants were first given a brief description of the study and asked to 
sign an on-screen consent form. Next, they completed the demographic measures. 
The main questionnaire began with a brief description of ‘The Troubles’ and role of 
the IRA. Then followed the attention check, the Staircase Model manipulation, the 
discrete measure of forgiveness, and a random ordering of the Trim-18, positive 
perception questions, and disgust questions (with items within each set also 
presented in a random order). Participants were then thanked and debriefed. 
Results 
Political views were strongly correlated with all the main dependent 
variables. As expected, the more that participants considered themselves to be 
‘unionists/loyalists,’ the less likely they were to have positive scores on all 
dependent variables. Because of this, political views were controlled for in all 
subsequent analyses. This was done by including the political views variable as a 
covariate in each analysis (apart from the one involving the binary forgiveness 
measure, where an alternative strategy was adopted); means and standard 
deviations reported below are adjusted for the influence of the covariate. There 
were no significant associations with any other demographic variable, including 
variables assessing religious affiliation, knowledge of ‘The Troubles,’ and whether 
participants or their families had been directly or indirectly affected by ‘The 
Troubles’ or the IRA.  
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Forgiveness 
For the binary forgiveness item, the overall frequency of forgiveness rating 
(i.e., ‘yes’ responses) was 44.14%. The overall chi-square analysis showed that there 
was an association between condition and responses to this question, χ²(5) = 23.02, 
p < .001. Table 5.7 shows a clear trend for forgiveness rates to increase as the 
placement of the intergroup apology moves to a successively later step in the 
sequence, from 22.22% in the control condition to 65.79% in condition 4, the 
sequence matching the staircase model, before dropping to 32.43% in the 
alternative sequence condition. To account for the influence of political views, 
subsequent analyses were conducted with the participants split, with those scoring 
1-5 as broadly “Nationalist/Republican” and those scoring 6-10 as broadly 
“Unionist/Loyalist.” The percentages of ‘yes’ answers for these two groups are also 
shown in Table 5.7. The chi-square analysis for those coded as 
“Nationalist/Republican” showed that there was a significant association between 
condition and responses to this question, χ²(5) = 13.96, p = .016. Here we see a 
much larger percentage of forgiveness score in condition 4 (80.95%), compared 
with both the control condition (28.57%) and the alternative sequence condition 
(50.00%). The chi-square analysis for those coded as “Unionist/Loyalist” showed 
that there the association between condition and responses to this question did not 
reach the conventional significance threshold, χ²(5) = 10.19, p = .070. Here we see a 
larger percentage of forgiveness score in conditions 2,3, and 4 (all 47.06%), 
compared with the control condition (13.33%), condition 1 (22.72%) and the 
alternative sequence condition (19.05%). 
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Table 5.7 
Binary forgiveness rates for each Apology Condition and when groups are split into 
“Nationalist/Republican” and “Unionist/Loyalist” (Study 12). 
Condition Overall 
‘Nationalist/ 
Republican’ 
‘Unionist/ 
Loyalist’ 
0. Control 22.22% 28.57% 13.33% 
1. Apology only 31.58% 43.75% 22.73% 
2. Step 1 then Apology 55.56% 63.16% 47.09% 
3. Steps 1 and 2, then Apology 56.76% 65.00% 47.09% 
4. Steps 1 to 4 65.79% 80.95% 47.09% 
5. Alternative Sequence 32.43% 50.00% 19.05% 
 
The means and standard deviations for the three Trim-18 subscales at each 
step are shown in Table 5.8. Condition had a significant main effect on the 
avoidance motivation subscale, F(5, 215) = 5.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. Bonferroni-
corrected post-hoc tests showed that the control condition and the condition 
consisting of only the intergroup apology led to significantly higher avoidance 
scores than all other conditions apart from the alternative sequence condition. 
There was also a significant main effect on the revenge subscale, F(5, 215) = 2.25, p 
= .050, ηp2 = .05, although Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that none of 
the conditions differed significantly from each other. Finally, there was a significant 
main effect on the benevolence subscale, F(5, 215) = 4.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .10, with 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showing that the control condition elicited  
significantly lower benevolence scores than any of the other conditions.  
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Table 5.8 
Mean values (with standard deviations in parentheses) for the Trim-18 subscales and 
positive perceptions of the perpetrator group in each apology condition (Study 12).  
Condition Avoidance Revenge Benevolence 
Positive 
Perceptions 
0. Control 3.91 
(.86) 
3.08 
(.81) 
2.85 
(.65) 
2.01 
(.82) 
1. Apology only 3.88 
(.81) 
3.07 
(.94) 
3.25 
(.78) 
2.26 
(1.05) 
2. Step 1, then Apology 3.29 
(.99) 
2.62 
(.89) 
3.54 
(.74) 
2.61 
(1.12) 
3. Steps 1 and 2, then 
Apology 
3.28 
(.88) 
2.63 
(.85) 
3.39 
(.74) 
2.66 
(1.19) 
4. Steps 1 to 4 3.26 
(.79) 
2.61 
(.88) 
3.61 
(.76) 
2.74 
(1.00) 
5. Alternative Sequence 3.80 
(.89) 
2.89 
(1.14) 
3.38 
(1.00) 
2.01 
(1.12) 
 
Positive Perceptions 
The means and standard deviations for the positive perception measures 
are shown in Table 5.8. There was a significant main effect of condition on the 
positive perceptions of the perpetrator group, F(5, 215) = 4.22, p = .001, ηp2 = .09. 
Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that the control condition led to 
significantly lower positive perceptions than both condition 4 (Steps 1 to 4; p = 
.037) and condition 3 (Steps 1 and 2 plus apology; p = .050). The difference between 
the control condition and condition 2 (Step 1 plus apology; p = .060) also 
approached significance. Condition 5 (alternative sequence) led to marginally lower 
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positive perception scores than both condition 4 (Steps 1 to 4; p = .044) and 
condition 3 (Steps 1 and 2 plus apology; p = .059).  
Disgust 
The measures of the two facets of disgust were positively and significantly 
correlated (r = .47, p < .001). Both facets were also strongly correlated with all of 
the other dependent variables (all ps < .001). Although the strength of the 
correlations of the two disgust measures with many of the other dependent 
variables is similar, the socio-moral disgust measure is much more strongly related 
to the revenge motivation subscale (r = .60) than is the physical disgust measure (r 
= .34). Means and standard deviations for the two disgust measures are shown in 
Table 5.9.  
Socio-Moral Disgust. There was a significant main effect of condition, F(5, 
215) = 6.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed that all 
conditions that included an apology led to a significantly lower score than the 
control condition. 
Physical Disgust. There was also a significant main effect on this measure, 
F(5, 215) = 6.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .13. Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests showed 
that condition 4 (Steps 1 to 4) led to significantly lower physical disgust (M = 1.87) 
than did the control condition (M = 2.93, p < .001), condition 1 (apology alone; M = 
2.71, p = .001), and condition 5 (alternative sequence; M = 2.58, p = .008). 
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Table 5.9 
Mean disgust ratings (with standard deviations in parentheses) for each apology 
condition (Study 12).  
Step Number Socio-Moral/Image Disgust Physical Disgust 
0. Control 4.34 
(.66) 
2.94 
(1.02) 
1. Apology 3.62 
 (1.09) 
2.76 
(1.06) 
2. Step 1, Apology 3.53 
(1.12) 
2.32 
(.88) 
3. Steps 1 and 2, Apology 3.51 
(1.12) 
2.34 
(1.00) 
4. Full Staircase 3.56 
(1.05) 
1.80 
(.91) 
5. Alternative Model   3.59 
(1.32) 
2.61 
(1.12) 
 
Discussion 
The aims of this study were to provide a more stringent test of the staircase 
model and to investigate more closely the impact of intergroup apology on 
forgiveness, perceptions of the perpetrator group, and disgust. It was argued that 
for the specific sequencing of the Staircase Model to be supported, the sequence 
proposed in the model should have more positive effects than the alternative 
sequence on measures of forgiveness, positive perceptions of the perpetrator 
group, and disgust. This was shown to be the case for the binary measure of 
forgiveness, with more than two-thirds of participants in the proposed sequence 
condition responding ‘yes,’ compared to fewer than one-third of participants in the 
alternative sequence condition. The proposed sequence condition also led to more 
Step-by-Step: Testing the Staircase Model 
180 
 
 
positive perceptions of the perpetrator group than did the alternative sequence 
condition –although here the difference fell just short of statistical significance – 
and to lower scores on the physical disgust measure. These findings provide good 
support for the sequencing of steps proposed in the Staircase Model. Also 
supportive of the model are the findings that the theoretically proposed sequence 
differed from the control condition in eliciting more positive perceptions of the 
perpetrator group and lower physical disgust. 
Turning to the specific impact of intergroup apology, particularly interesting 
findings from this study relate to the measures of avoidance motivation and disgust. 
It is striking that the offering of the apology alone did not reduce avoidance 
motivation, but that when the intergroup apology was set in a broader context – 
even if this context simply meant that the apology followed the first step of the 
model – it did reduce avoidance motivation, except in the alternative sequence 
condition. This highlights the point that simply offering an intergroup apology is 
unlikely to be effective in improving intergroup relations.  
Distinguishing between socio-moral and physical disgust also led to some 
interesting findings with regard to the impact of the intergroup apology. Although it 
was found that all conditions that included an apology resulted in lower socio-moral 
disgust scores than did the control condition, it was only the theoretically proposed 
sequence, with the apology following three previous steps in the model, that led to 
reduced physical disgust, relative to the control condition, the apology-alone 
condition, and the alternative sequence condition. This shows that offering an 
intergroup apology may be sufficient to reduce socio-moral disgust felt towards the 
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perpetrator group, but that the apology is only effective in reducing feelings of 
physical disgust when it is presented at the point proposed in the Staircase Model.  
General Discussion 
The aim of this research was to provide an initial test of the Staircase Model 
by applying it to real world intergroup conflict settings. It was hypothesized that 
exposing participants to the steps proposed by the model, and in the sequence 
proposed by the model, would result in increased forgiveness, more positive 
perceptions of the perpetrator group, and reduced negative emotions felt towards 
the perpetrator group. It was also predicted that these effects would vary as a 
function of the number of steps to which participants were exposed, and that 
outcome variables would be differentially affected by the different steps.  
Across the three studies a good level of support for each of these 
hypotheses was found. There was evidence in all three studies that being exposed 
to all steps of the model, and in the sequence proposed by the model, led to 
increased forgiveness, more positive perceptions of the perpetrator group, and 
reduced negative emotion felt towards the perpetrator group. 
To assess forgiveness, I used both a binary measure and an adapted version 
of the Trim-18 forgiveness scale. Although scores on the three subscales of the Trim-
18 were not significantly influenced by the Staircase Model in Study 10, it was 
argued that an intergroup conflict seen as more directly relevant by participants 
might be required in order for changes in motivation to become apparent. After 
switching the intergroup conflict to one that was more relevant to participants in 
Studies 11 and 12, evidence of an impact on this measure was found, with 
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avoidance subscale scores being significantly reduced in both studies, and lower 
scores on the vengeance subscale and higher scores on the benevolence subscale 
also observed in Study 12, where the participants were drawn from the population 
most directly affected by the intergroup conflict. This suggests that changes in 
motivation as captured by the Trim-18 measure can be influenced by applying the 
Staircase Model, but only when the intergroup conflict in question is one that is 
relevant to participants. 
The increased forgiveness scores were accompanied by more positive 
perceptions of the perpetrator group, including more positive ratings on items 
measuring trust and sincerity. If intergroup apologies fail because they are seen as 
insincere, and the groups offering them are regarded as untrustworthy, here is 
evidence that proceeding through the steps of the Staircase Model can reduce 
perceptions of insincerity and untrustworthiness.  
Exposing participants to the steps in the Staircase Model also had consistent 
effects on participants’ self-reported emotions. In Studies 10 and 11, anger was 
reduced at each step of the model, with all steps resulting in significantly lower 
scores than the control condition. This is consistent with previous evidence that 
intergroup apologies reduce anger (Leonard, Mackie, & Smith, 2011; Maitner, 
Mackie, & Smith, 2006).  Fear decreased significantly after step 3 in Study 10, but 
not until step 5 in Study 11. Step 3 entails discussion of proposed reparations for the 
victim group. When the conflict is more personally relevant to participants, it 
appears that reducing fear felt towards the perpetrator group depends on steps 
beyond proposed reparations. Step 5 entails concrete behaviours undertaken by the 
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perpetrator group. Disgust was the only emotion that was reduced significantly 
after the intergroup apology, step 4 of the model.  This was the case both in Study 
10, where I focused on differences in emotion between conditions, and in Study 11, 
where the focus was on interactions between condition and time of measurement, 
reflecting changes in emotion as a result of the steps taken.  
The results from Study 12 shed further light on the effect of intergroup 
apology on feelings of disgust. Consistent with the findings of Studies 10 and 11, 
offering an intergroup apology in isolation led to lower socio-moral disgust. 
However, when the apology was embedded in the broader context of the model, it 
also reduced physical disgust. This suggests that the function of an apology in 
intergroup contexts differs from its function in interpersonal contexts. In the latter 
case, it is generally assumed that expressions of apology trigger forgiveness because 
the apology recipient accepts that the harm done was unintentional and/or that it 
will not recur. In an intergroup context, feelings of disgust towards another group 
are known to be related to a tendency to engage in dehumanization, and intergroup 
disgust predicts prejudice and discrimination (Hodson, Kteily, & Hoffarth, 2014).  
There is also evidence that brain areas associated with disgust reactions are 
activated when individuals view targets who are considered to be ‘less than human’ 
(Harris & Fiske, 2006). This suggests that reducing disgust felt towards another 
group should diminish any tendency to dehumanize its members. If intergroup 
apologies are effective in specifically reducing disgust, whether socio-moral or 
physical, this suggests that they can play a key role in achieving intergroup 
reconciliation. This also highlights the value of the Staircase Model: by decomposing 
the reconciliation process into different steps, it helps to identify the specific effects 
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of each step in that process. The fact that both disgust and fear were only reduced 
after certain steps suggests that particular kinds of information have specific effects 
on the reconciliation process.  
Some limitations of the present research should be acknowledged. All three 
studies were scenario studies in which participants responded to information about 
historical transgressions. It could be argued that their responses may not reflect 
how those who were more directly involved in the conflicts in question would have 
reacted. Although it is clearly important for future research to address this issue by 
studying the perceptions and emotions of members of groups who have been 
directly mistreated by another group and who are then exposed to a reconciliation 
attempt made by the perpetrating group, it is worth remembering that many 
intergroup apologies are demanded and offered years or even decades after the 
original conflict or transgression, and that the parties involved in the giving and 
receiving of such apologies are not those who were directly involved. It is also worth 
pointing out that there were some participants in Studies 11 and 12 who reported 
that they had been directly affected by the conflict, and that although this was not a 
large subgroup, their judgments did not differ significantly from those of other 
participants.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the results of the current research 
suggest that current views of the limited effectiveness of intergroup apologies (e.g., 
Hornsey et al., 2015) may be unduly pessimistic. In all three studies, it was found 
that disgust felt towards the perpetrator group only reduced after an intergroup 
apology was offered, and in Studies 11 and 12 this reduction in disgust was coupled 
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with increases in positive perceptions of the perpetrator group and an increase in 
readiness to forgive the group for its actions. It therefore seems that when an 
intergroup apology is offered in a context established by the preceding steps of the 
model, it can pave the way to reconciliation by reducing feelings of disgust, 
enhancing perceptions of the outgroup, and making forgiveness more likely.  
To conclude, the three studies reported here provide good support for the 
key assumptions of the Staircase Model of intergroup apology. The results show 
that applying the model has the potential to increase forgiveness, improve 
intergroup perceptions, and reduce negative emotions. There is also evidence that 
the different steps of the model have differential effects on these outcome 
measures. At the outset of this chapter I alluded to evidence that civil wars that are 
ended through negotiation are more likely to recommence than are those that are 
ended by a military victory. The present findings offer a more optimistic perspective 
on the prospects for peaceful reconciliation following intergroup conflict, provided 
the reconciliation effort is structured in the way proposed by the Staircase Model. 
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Chapter 6 
General Discussion 
When apologising for a wrongdoing, does one expect to be forgiven? Should 
one expect to be forgiven? It would seem that the answer to these questions is 
clear in the case of interpersonal apologies, where the evidence suggests that the 
answer is ‘yes’. However, things are much less clear-cut in the case of intergroup 
apologies. In this thesis I have explored the key differences between intergroup and 
interpersonal apologies; I have investigated whether changing the content of an 
intergroup apology makes it more effective; I have examined the role that emotion 
expression can play in promoting reconciliation; and I have empirically tested the 
Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies, which led to a consideration of the role 
that intergroup apologies play in the intergroup reconciliation process. 
In this final chapter, I summarise the findings of the 12 studies reported in 
the four empirical chapters of this thesis. I then identify the consistencies that in 
these findings and use these consistencies to answer the three theoretical 
questions set out in Chapter 1: “What makes intergroup apologies so different to 
interpersonal apologies?”, “Why are intergroup apologies ineffective?”, and “Is it 
possible to improve the efficacy of intergroup apologies?”. I go on to discuss 
possible limitations of my research, and I end this concluding chapter by discussing 
the practical implications of this thesis, including the prospects for continuing this 
line of research to a point where intergroup apologies can genuinely be regarded as 
functional and powerful tools for achieving intergroup reconciliation. 
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Summary of the empirical findings 
In Chapter 2 I set out to explore the effectiveness of intergroup apologies in 
difference scenarios, introducing a series of manipulations that have a positive 
influence on the effectiveness of interpersonal apologies with a view to seeing how 
these affected intergroup apologies. The intention was to show that there are 
paradoxes in intergroup apologies and to pinpoint the ways in which they differ 
from their interpersonal counterparts. In Study 1, I explored the influence of how 
much the victim of a transgression desires an apology from the perpetrator, 
something that is an integral factor in achieving forgiveness, especially within the 
justice system (Petrucci, 2002). Using a fictitious intergroup transgression between 
two Canadian universities, I was able to manipulate whether participants who were 
members of the ‘victim’ group felt both a personal and a collective desire to receive 
an apology from the transgressor group. Following the delivery of an apology, I was 
able to show that the apology itself had no positive impacts, irrespective of 
whether or not participants had desired an apology. The results of this study 
highlight that desiring an apology in an intergroup setting appears to have different 
consequences than it does in an interpersonal setting. The results also point to the 
first paradox of intergroup apology: despite members of a victim group wanting an 
apology from the perpetrating group, they are no more likely to forgive the 
perpetrating group if an apology is forthcoming. This hints at the lack of trust that 
seems to characterise intergroup relations: the victim group wants the perpetrating 
group to apologise but is unwilling to accept the apology when it is given. 
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In Study 2 I explored the difference in reactions to collective apologies 
versus collective non-apologies using the Centipede Game (Rosenthal, 1981), an 
economic game of trust and cooperation.  Groups of three persons took part under 
the impression that they were playing against another 3-person group. In reality 
groups played against a computer program that was consistently unfair towards 
their group in the first phase of the game. All groups then entered what appeared 
to be an online chatroom in which the groups could communicate with each other. 
Now the ostensibly unfair group either did or did not apologise for its behaviour in 
phase 1. I found that the offering of an intergroup apology did lead to a higher 
chance of receiving an “accepting” or “positive” response in the chatroom. 
However, an intergroup apology did not lead to more cooperative behaviour on the 
part of the ‘exploited’ group in the second phase of the game. This study again 
highlights something that is often shown in the literature on real-life intergroup 
apologies, namely that although the initial reaction to such apologies can be 
positive, the ensuing behaviour is no more positive than if the apology had not 
been given. This is a second paradox of intergroup apologies: Even when they are 
well received in the first instance, they tend not to result in more positive relations 
between the two groups at a behavioural level. 
Two separate factors were manipulated in Study 3: whether the apology 
following a real life transgression was interpersonal, in the sense of being offered 
by an individual, or intergroup, in the sense of being offered on behalf of the group 
that was ostensibly at least partly responsible for the transgression; and whether 
the leader of the transgressing group who offered the apology was the person in 
charge of the group at the time of the transgression or a new leader. Change of 
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leadership was studied because research shows that a new leader can lead to 
greater levels of trust and to a speedier resolution of the conflict (Ballinger & 
Schoorman, 2007; Flores, 2012). The context of the Grenfell Tower fire was used to 
investigate these issues, using an apology given by the leader of the Kensington and 
Chelsea council (De Peyer, Evening Standard, 2017), who apologised for the neglect 
of the safety of the building, as well as for the council’s poor response to the fire. 
The wording of the apology was manipulated such that it read either as an 
interpersonal or intergroup apology. Also varied was the identity of the council 
leader issuing the apology, who was said to be either the ‘old’ or a ‘new’ leader. 
This study again revealed clear differences in the way that participants responded 
to interpersonal and intergroup apologies, with positive effects arising from an 
interpersonal apology, but not from an intergroup one. Furthermore, a ‘new’ 
leader’ elicited more forgiveness for the council leader but did not influence 
forgiveness of the council. These findings illustrate a further paradox of intergroup 
apologies: Although almost exactly the same words can be used by individuals and 
by groups when apologising for the self-same transgression, the interpersonal 
version is more effective than the intergroup one. 
In Study 4 I investigated two issues: first, the effectiveness of denying the 
group’s responsibility for a negative event, in comparison to offering an intergroup 
apology; and second, what happens if an intergroup apology is given after an initial 
attempt to deny the group’s responsibility. The context in which these issues were 
studied was the revoking of the taxi firm Uber’s licence to operate in London, as a 
result of negative events allegedly perpetrated by Uber drivers. Participants were 
allocated to one of three conditions. In one condition they read an article in which 
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Uber denied responsibility for the negative events; in another, they read an article 
in which Uber apologised for these negative events; and in a third condition they 
read an article in which Uber initially denied responsibility for the negative events 
but then went on to apologise for them. I found that denying responsibility was 
more effective than issuing an apology in terms of maintaining participants’ 
intentions to use the company; and at least as effective as an apology in terms of 
eliciting forgiveness, increasing positive perceptions of the company, and reducing 
negative feelings about the company. One ray of hope from this study concerning 
intergroup apologies is that the strongest effect was that there was a backlash in 
the condition where the company first attempted to deny responsibility and then 
issued an apology: Participants in this condition were less forgiving, had less 
positive perceptions, possessed stronger negative emotions and were less likely to 
use the company in the future. Although in one sense the results of this study show 
the ineffectiveness of intergroup apology, they also show that participants prefer 
the perpetrating group to be honest about its role in a transgression, rather than 
seeking to deny responsibility. This suggests that accepting responsibility for an 
intergroup transgression is an important step in the reconciliation process. 
It was concluded that the studies reported in Chapter 2 were effective in 
illustrating the severity of the discrepancy between interpersonal and intergroup 
apologies in a variety of contexts, as well as in demonstrating some of the 
paradoxes that surround intergroup apologies. While many of the findings reported 
in this chapter cast doubt on the effectiveness of intergroup apologies, there was 
also some evidence that an intergroup apologies can elicit an initially positive 
reaction, and that it is better for a group to apologise for wrongdoing than to seek 
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to deny responsibility for a negative outcome but then have to ‘come clean’. My 
aim in the subsequent chapters was to explore the conditions under which 
intergroup apologies are effective.   
In Chapter 3, I investigated the role played by apology content in shaping 
reactions to intergroup apologies. My main aim in the studies reported in this 
chapter was to examine the importance of communicating structural, relational, 
and identity-related messages in the intergroup apology. A secondary aim was to 
explore the role of moral emotions, both generically (in the sense of expressing 
remorse) and more specifically (in the sense of expressing guilt and shame). In all 
three studies reported in this chapter, I investigated the effects of varying the 
content of apologies, using the context of ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland (based 
on the apology transcript issued by the Irish Republican Army; The Guardian, 2002). 
The participants in all studies were British, living in mainland Britain. In Study 5, I 
investigated the independent effects of communicating structural, relational, and 
identity-related messages embedded within an apology by asking participants to 
read an apology in which the concluding paragraph was varied to highlight one of 
these three factors. I also manipulated who gave the apology. In one condition it 
came from a large group, in another condition it came from a smaller group, and in 
a third condition it came from an individual. The clearest finding from this study 
was that the interpersonal apology was much more effective than either of the 
intergroup apologies, regardless of the manipulated content. Although the effect of 
apology content was not significant, there was some evidence that an apology 
emphasising structural factors was more effective when it came from a large group, 
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perhaps because a large group was seen as having the capacity to bring about the 
structural changes mentioned in the apology.  
In Study 6, I examined the effect of combining the three apology content 
factors within the final paragraph of an intergroup apology, comparing this with a 
condition in which this final paragraph was omitted, and focusing only on the ‘large 
group’ as the source of the apology.  I also took the opportunity to vary another 
aspect of apology content, namely how much remorse was expressed in the 
apology. The results revealed that the intergroup apology including structural, 
relational and identity factors was more effective than the one that did not. 
However, there was an unexpected interaction reflecting the fact that the 
intergroup apology expressing high remorse was only more effective than the one 
that did not in the condition in which the other apology factors were not included. 
Thus, adding high remorse to an apology that included structural, relational and 
identity factors did not make the intergroup apology more effective. It seems that 
the expression of remorse somehow undercut the impact of the final paragraph 
emphasising structural, relational and identity factors. 
An attempt was made in Study 7 to account for the counter-intuitive results 
of Study 6. First, I separated the manipulation of emotion from the manipulation of 
other aspects of apology content, by having the expression of emotion appear early 
in the apology and the other content aspects at the end. Second, I was more 
specific about the emotions being expressed, using one condition to express guilt, 
another to express shame, with the third condition being a no emotion control. 
Now there were significant main effects of both manipulations. Inclusion of the 
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combined apology factors in the final paragraph and the expression of emotion led 
to higher forgiveness ratings, relative to their respective control conditions. 
Although the interaction between the two manipulations was not significant, there 
was no evidence, as there was in Study 6, that one manipulation undermined the 
effectiveness of the other. Instead, it seems that intergroup apologies are more 
effective when they include either the future-orientated structural, relational and 
identity-related apology factors proposed by Nadler (2012), or the expression of 
emotions such as guilt and shame, which communicate an acceptance of 
responsibility for wrongdoing and imply that the offense will not recur. Support for 
this separation of strategies (one more future-oriented, focused on solutions; the 
other more past-oriented, focused on acceptance of blame for wrongdoing but 
carrying the implication that the wrongdoing will not recur) also comes from the 
mediation analyses conducted in the studies reported in Chapter 3. In all studies, 
having positive perceptions of the transgressor group seems key to attaining 
forgiveness. In Study 5, it fully mediated the effect of apology source on 
forgiveness, and in Studies 6 and 7, it fully mediated the effect of the combined 
apology factors on forgiveness. This mediation was only partial, however, when 
considering the effect of shame expression on forgiveness, suggesting that the 
beneficial effects of shame (and of emotion expression more generally) may work 
through a separate process. 
Given the evidence from the studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3, in the 
research reported in Chapter 4 I decided to shift away from a focus on intergroup 
apologies and towards the study of intergroup reconciliation, concentrating on the 
way in which expression of emotion influences behaviour following an intergroup 
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transgression. The studies reported in this chapter used the Centipede Game 
(Rosenthal, 1981) to explore the role of guilt, shame, and pride in competitive 
intergroup settings. In Study 8, I used an intergroup version of the game to examine 
what would happen if groups were given an opportunity to communicate the three 
aforementioned emotions after six rounds of the game. Comparing group 
behaviour in the game before and after this emotional communication revealed no 
significant relations, suggesting that the emotional communication did have an 
effect on behaviour.  Moreover, the changes between the first and second phases 
of the game were in the expected direction, in that expressing guilt and/or shame 
was associated with more cooperative behaviour in the second phase, whereas the 
expression of pride was associated with more competitive behaviour. 
In Study 9, I decided to focus on the effects of emotional expression by a 
group after it has behaved in an uncooperative manner. To ensure that one group 
behaved equally uncooperatively throughout the study, members of all 
participating groups were led to believe that they would be playing the game 
against another co-present group but in fact both groups were playing against a 
pre-programmed group that behaved consistently uncooperatively in the first two 
games and then expressed either shame or pride (there was also a ‘no emotion’ 
control condition). The expression of shame consistently led to more cooperative 
behaviour in the second phase of the game, whereas the expression of pride 
consistently led to more competitive behaviour. Furthermore, it was also shown 
that an expression of pride led to an increased tendency for the ‘victim’ group to 
engage in altruistic punishment.  
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The findings from the two studies reported in Chapter 4 do offer some cause 
for optimism about intergroup apologies, in that they show that the expression of 
negative moral emotions, like guilt and shame, promote intergroup reconciliation. 
This finding is consistent with the evidence from Studies 6 and 7 reported in 
Chapter 3, where it was found that expressing remorse or shame increased the 
likelihood of forgiveness. The beneficial effect of emotion is something that could 
readily be applied to intergroup apologies (whether the expression forms part of 
the apology or is made separately, preferably – given the results of Study 6 – before 
the apology). Such emotion expression should increase the likelihood of 
cooperation and forgiveness. However, the negative role that emotional expression 
can play is also evident in this chapter. Expressing pride after behaving 
uncooperatively resulted in greater competitiveness on the part of the victim 
group, showing that pride expressions should be actively avoided in any intergroup 
conflict scenario.   
In Chapter 5 the focus returned to intergroup apologies, but now on their 
role in a broader intergroup reconciliation process, as opposed to their stand-alone 
effectiveness. This was undertaken by exploring the Staircase Model of Intergroup 
Apologies (Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011), a framework that sets out a series of 
steps towards intergroup reconciliation, in which making an intergroup apology is 
just one step. The steps in this model are: accepting collective guilt, setting straight 
the records of history, discussing reparations, offering an intergroup apology, and 
post-apology engagement. In Study 10, I applied the model to a border conflict 
between Thailand and Cambodia, and participants acted as third-party observers. 
Participants in different conditions read accounts of the conflict that cumulatively 
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included the different steps of the model. It was shown that being exposed to the 
steps of the model did have positive effects in terms of having improved 
perceptions of the perpetrating group, as well as less negative emotion felt toward 
it, and that these effects increased as the number of steps increased. However, it 
was also shown that the model did not have a strong effect on forgiveness, 
although it was suggested that the fact that the participants were third-party 
observers might help to account for this. 
In Study 11, I explored the model in a similar way, but now in the more 
directly relevant (to my participants) context of ‘The Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. 
Mainland British participants were exposed to different conditions in which they 
learned about actions and statements of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The 
different conditions were designed to include different steps of the model in a 
cumulative fashion. The results of Study 10 were almost fully replicated, with 
exposure to the steps of the model leading to an improved perception of the 
transgressor as well as a reduction in negative emotion felt toward the perpetrator 
group. It was shown that levels of anger and fear reduced significantly following 
early steps of the model but, interestingly, disgust only reduced significantly after 
the intergroup apology had been offered. 
In an attempt to bring the transgression ‘closer to home’, in Study 12 I again 
used the context of ‘The Troubles’ and the IRA, but now I recruited a Northern Irish 
sample, for whom the events would presumably be more salient. A further change I 
made in this study concerned the manipulation. Here I investigated whether 
presenting the elements of the model in or out of the theoretically proposed 
General Discussion 
198 
 
 
sequence would affect its influence. This generated several interesting findings. 
First, it was shown that presenting the elements of the proposed Staircase Model in 
the ‘correct’ sequence was more effective than an alternative model in which the 
steps were completely switched. Second, presenting the intergroup apology alone 
was not effective in reducing the avoidance motivation component of forgiveness, 
but when it was preceded by other steps it became more effective. There were also 
some interesting results regarding how placement of the intergroup apology in the 
sequential steps influenced different aspects of disgust. Socio-moral disgust was 
lower when an apology was given, regardless of the sequence, but physical disgust 
was only lower when the intergroup apology was presented in the location 
proposed by the Staircase Model. 
It is argued that the research reported in Chapter 5 offers some grounds for 
thinking that intergroup apologies can be effective and that it provides useful 
insights into how they work. Intergroup apologies are most likely to be effective 
when they are embedded within a broader reconciliation process and the way in 
which they work seems to be by reducing levels of disgust felt towards the 
perpetrating group. 
General Summary 
We live in an “Age of Apology” (Brooks, 1999) but the majority of research 
on intergroup apologies suggests that they fail to evoke forgiveness (Hornsey, 
Wohl, & Philpot, 2014), a reaction that is vital if intergroup reconciliation is to 
occur. In this thesis I have explored intergroup apologies in a range of contexts, 
using varying methods. A key theme of the work on apology, and one that is echoed 
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in some of the findings reported in the thesis, is the distinction between 
interpersonal and intergroup apologies. Research generally suggests that 
interpersonal apologies are effective (Darby & Schlenker, 1989; Exline & 
Baumeister, 2000; McCullough, Worthington, and Rachal, 1997) and that intergroup 
apologies are not (Chapman, 2007; Hornsey, Wohl, & Philpot, 2014; Philpot & 
Hornsey, 2008), and this differential effectiveness is also evident in this thesis. The 
results of Studies 3 and 5 highlight the fact that an interpersonal apology is more 
likely to result in forgiveness than is an intergroup one. Some paradoxes associated 
with intergroup apologies are also evident, ones that are not evident in their 
interpersonal counterparts. In Study 1 it was shown that wanting an intergroup 
apology does not increase the likelihood of forgiveness when such an apology is 
delivered, while in Study 2 it was shown that even if an apology is ‘accepted’, those 
who were on the wrong end of an intergroup transgression do not necessarily go on 
to behave in a more cooperative manner with the perpetrator group. 
A second key theme that emerges from the research reported in this thesis 
is the role of intergroup apology content. This was evident in Study 3, where simply 
replacing “we” by “I” and including the adjective “new” before “leader” resulted in 
positive changes in evaluations of those who were apologising. Intergroup 
apologies are often regarded as self-serving (Blatz, Day, and Schryer, 2014), so for 
such an apology to be effective it needs to deliver clear messages about how the 
situation of the victim group is to be improved and how the intergroup relationship 
is to be changed for the better. These are the key points underlying the structural, 
relational and identity-related factors that were included in apologies in Studies 6 
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and 7. The results of both studies show that including these messages within an 
intergroup apology does make the apology more effective.  
Staying with the theme of apology content, it is also evident from the 
research in this thesis that there is important role to be played by the expression of 
emotions when intergroup apologies are made. Evidence of the importance of 
emotion expression in intergroup relationship repair is evident in the results of 
Studies 8 and 9. There it was shown that the expression of guilt and/or shame can 
be very effective in repairing a relationship following an intergroup transgression. 
However, as was shown in Studies 6 and 7, it vitally important to ensure that the 
emotional component of an intergroup apology is separated from the more ‘future-
oriented’ components referred to in the previous paragraph. In Study 6, it was 
found that repeated expressions of remorse in an apology can undercut the 
effectiveness of messages about structural, relationship and identity-related issues. 
I interpret this as reflecting the fact that frequent expressions of remorse remind 
the audience of the past wrongdoing for which the group is admitting responsibility, 
and thereby encourage the audience to focus on the wrongdoing, rather than the 
group’s willingness to put things right. It is indeed important for the perpetrating 
group to acknowledge its responsibility and to express emotions such as guilt and 
shame, but this should be separated from (and probably precede, as in Study 7) the 
message components that focus on practical steps for achieving reconciliation.   
The mediation analyses reported in Chapter 3 suggest that there are at two 
types of apology content that have the capacity to improve the effectiveness of 
intergroup apologies, one relating to the three apology-related structural, 
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relational, and identity-related factors, the other relating to the expression of 
negative emotions, such as guilt and shame, that are felt regarding the 
transgression. If one seeks to use both of these routes, the studies inspired by the 
Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies (Wohl et al., 2011), reported in Chapter 5, 
provide a framework for doing so. I suggest that it is through my exploration of the 
Staircase Model in the three studies reported in Chapter 5 that this thesis provides 
us with the most positive conclusions about the potential impact of intergroup 
apologies. It seems that an effective way to overcome the perception that 
intergroup apologies are insincere and self-serving is by embedding them in a 
context in which other messages or events take place. These are the steps of the 
Staircase Model, where the apology is simply one component of the reconciliation 
process. Thus, forgiveness and reconciliation are not exclusively dependent on the 
apology itself.  In Studies 10, 11 and 12, it was evident that adopting this broader 
perspective is effective in enhancing the likelihood of intergroup reconciliation. It 
also became clearer what the specific impact of intergroup apology is in this 
process: making an apology seems to reduce levels of disgust felt towards the 
transgressor.  
Theoretical Implications  
Intergroup apology and its role in achieving reconciliation is not a topic that 
has been widely researched, but it one that is attracting increasing research 
attention. There are some studies (e.g., Brown, Wohl, & Exline, 2008; Leonard, 
Mackie, & Smith, 2011) that show the positive effects on intergroup relations that 
intergroup apologies can have, but there are also many studies showing their 
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ineffectiveness in eliciting forgiveness (e.g., Chapman, 2007; Hornsey, Wohl, & 
Philpot, 2014; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008). I believe that the studies reported in this 
thesis extend our understanding of intergroup apologies and intergroup 
reconciliation. I now return to the three questions raised in Chapter 1, to see how 
they can be answered on the basis of the current research: “What makes 
intergroup apologies so different to interpersonal apologies?”, “Why are intergroup 
apologies ineffective?”, and “Is it possible to improve the efficacy of intergroup 
apologies?” 
The first of these questions, “What makes intergroup apologies so different 
to interpersonal apologies”, was answered in part in the course of the literature 
review in Chapter 1, where I argued that identity and emotion are two key factors 
that differ between interpersonal and intergroup scenarios. With respect to 
identity, it seems reasonable to suggest that if personal identity is salient, as it 
typically would be in an interpersonal setting, the recipient of an apology is much 
less likely to regard the person offering the apology as an out-group member; by 
contrast, if social identity is salient, the person making the apology is likely to be 
seen as out-group member, and given what we know about ingroup bias and 
outgroup hostility, this in itself is likely to lead the apology recipient to view the 
apology as insincere or untrustworthy.  This point is highlighted by the 
interpersonal-intergroup discontinuity research conducted by Wildschut and Insko 
(2007), who evaluate two explanations for this discrepancy, finding compelling 
evidence for the explanation that intergroup relations are characterised by greater 
fear and greed. One component of this perspective is the identifiability explanation, 
suggesting that there is a lack of ability to assign responsibility for transgressions in 
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intergroup settings, compared to their interpersonal counterparts. Because it is 
relatively easy to assign responsibility for interpersonal transgressions, it should 
also be easier to establish whether you trust the transgressor’s apology.  
With respect to group-based emotions, it is clear that when social identities 
are salient, group members are more likely to appraise events that affect the 
wellbeing of their group in the same way, regardless of whether or not their 
personal wellbeing is affected (Smith & Mackie, 2015). Therefore, group members 
are more likely to experience the same emotional responses as other in-group 
members. It also may be the case that, to the extent that such emotions are shared 
with other in-group members, any negative emotions are likely to be more intense 
and longer-lasting. This possibility is mentioned by van Zomeren, Spears and Leach 
(2008), who suggest that group members can “psych up” other in-group members 
by expressing emotions such as anger. It is also possible to influence in-group 
members indirectly, by expressing emotions within media reports (Pescosolido, 
2002). The ability for in-group members’ emotions to corroborate, blend and 
potentially intensify in intergroup conflict situations is in turn likely to make it more 
difficult to reduce or regulate negative perceptions of and feelings towards 
transgressor groups. The fact that a change in emotion will also affect appraisals 
(Tiedens & Linton, 2001) may also mean that where negative perceptions or 
evaluations of transgressing groups were not initially held, they might develop due 
to emotional influence from other in-group members.  
The effects of the aforementioned distinctions can be seen within Study 5, 
where a mediation analysis showed that the effect of the apology source (the 
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interpersonal condition vs. the two intergroup conditions) was fully mediated by 
perceptions or appraisals (sincerity, remorsefulness and trustworthiness) of the 
transgressor(s). Thus, the fact that the intergroup apology was less likely to elicit 
forgiveness than its interpersonal counterpart was fully explained by the fact that 
participants were more likely to rate the perpetrators as lacking in sincerity, 
remorse, and trustworthiness. To the extent that participants viewed the 
transgressing group as an out-group, and considered themselves as part of the in-
group, this mediation by appraisals could have been influenced by emotions felt on 
behalf of the victim group. 
It is worth pointing out that the studies reported in Chapter 2 suggest that it 
is not just that intergroup apologies themselves are less effective than their 
interpersonal counterparts, but that it is also that case that other factors that 
should in principle lead to a greater reconciliation are also less effective in 
intergroup contexts. For example, in Study 1 it was found that wanting an apology – 
something known to make it more likely that the perpetrator will be forgiven if s/he 
does apologise in interpersonal scenarios (Petrucci, 2002) – did not play a similar 
role in an intergroup scenario. Another example came in Study 2, where it was 
found acceptance of an intergroup apology (as reflected in an immediate verbal 
response), another factor associated with reconciliation in interpersonal settings, 
did not necessarily mean that the victim group’s behaviour towards the perpetrator 
group was any more cooperative. Thus, it seems that the differences between 
interpersonal and intergroup wrongdoing scenarios extend beyond the differential 
effectiveness of apologies in these two settings. The lesser effectiveness of 
intergroup apologies appears to be part of a broader set of differences that reflect 
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the greater difficulty of achieving reconciliation between groups than between 
individuals. Greater greed and competition (Wildschut and Insko, 2007), intergroup 
bias (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), and dehumanization (Haslam, 2006) are just 
three examples of the obstacles that need to be overcome if intergroup apologies 
are to result in reconciliation.  
In seeking to answer the second question, “Why are intergroup apologies 
ineffective?”, it is instructive to consider examples of when intergroup apologies or 
intergroup reconciliation attempts were unsuccessful in the studies reported in this 
thesis. The mediation analyses in Chapter 3 highlight the need for transgressor 
groups to be seen more positively (or at least, less negatively) in order to achieve 
forgiveness and reconciliation. It is these perceptions of sincerity, remorsefulness, 
and trustworthiness that distinguish the effective interpersonal apology and the 
ineffective intergroup apologies in Study 5. So one answer to the question of why 
intergroup apologies are (often) ineffective is that the persons making them are 
regarded as insincere, in the sense of not really meaning what they are saying, 
perhaps because the apology has been made under duress (e.g., political pressure) 
rather than spontaneously, and/or long after the transgression in question, as 
opposed to immediately afterwards; as unremorseful, perhaps because often they 
are apologising for what other ingroup members have done, rather than what they 
themselves have done, which may constrain the extent to which they can be seen 
as genuinely remorseful; and as untrustworthy, in the sense that the promise that 
things will be different in the future – inherent in interpersonal apologies – is 
regarded with suspicion in the case of intergroup apologies (Blatz, Schumann & 
Ross, 2009; Hornsey & Wohl, 2013). A telling real-world example of how an 
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intergroup apology can be seen as sincere and remorseful is when Chancellor Willy 
Brandt of West Germany spontaneously dropped to his knees in front of the 
Memorial to Ghetto Heroes in Warsaw, in 1970 (see 
https://www.dhm.de/blog/2016/12/07/392/). Although Brandt himself had not 
been involved in Nazi war crimes, as Chancellor of the perpetrating nation he was 
faced with the seemingly impossible task of apologising for one of the worst 
atrocities ever committed by one group to another. The fact that the gesture was 
obviously spontaneous and heartfelt helped to make it more effective than mere 
words could have been. 
Another way of answering the same question emerges from the combined 
results of Studies 6 and 7. Between them, these two studies show that the structure 
and content of intergroup apologies matter. Although it might seem intuitively 
attractive to crank up expressions of remorse in intergroup apologies, and to 
combine such expressions with attempts to address key concerns of the victim 
group, such as ways to empower them and to recognise their identity as a group, it 
is possible for such remorse to undercut the influence of messages about 
empowerment and identity, as was the case in the results of Study 6. I interpreted 
these results as reflecting the fact that remorse focuses attention on the 
wrongdoing for which the apologiser is remorseful, and thereby deflects attention 
away from undertakings about the future relationship between the two groups. The 
results of Study 7 are consistent with this interpretation, in the sense that when the 
expression of group-based emotion (here, guilt or shame) came early in the apology 
and the apology factors came late, there was no longer an interaction between 
remorsefulness and the apology factors such that forgiveness was lower in the high 
  Chapter 6 
207 
 
remorse/apology factors present condition than in the low remorse/apology factors 
present condition. The implication is that intergroup apologies may fail if they try to 
achieve too many things at once, especially if achieving those outcomes requires 
slightly different mindsets on the part of the audience. 
A third way of answering the question about why intergroup apologies are 
often ineffective emerges from the results of the two studies reported in Chapter 4. 
Here it was found that any expression of pride on the part of one group – even a 
group that has behaved cooperatively in the past – seems to be damaging the 
prospects for future intergroup cooperation. When a perpetrator group seeks to 
apologise for its actions towards another group, it is therefore very important to 
avoid any form of words that could be construed (or misconstrued) as an attempt 
to defend or justify the perpetrator group’s behaviour. Apologies that fall short of 
being completely unreserved are likely to be dismissed as insincere and self-serving 
(Blatz et al., 2009).  
A fourth and final way of answering this question on the basis of my thesis 
research comes from Study 12. There I showed that when an intergroup apology 
was offered in isolation, it was not effective in promoting forgiveness. Instead – and 
this is a point that will be elaborated below – an intergroup apology should be part 
of a broader process in which the perpetrator group addresses concerns beyond its 
responsibility for the wrongdoing or harm that was done. Thus, a standalone 
apology runs the risk of being dismissed as meaningless if it is not accompanied by 
other messages that recognise the concerns of the victim group and by actions that 
address those concerns. Once again, the perception that an apology is insincere if it 
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is not accompanied by additional measures seems to be the most parsimonious 
way to explain this: When harm has been done by a perpetrator group to a victim 
group, simply saying ‘sorry’ will usually be insufficient to elicit forgiveness. 
This brings me to the third of the questions that I raised in the opening 
chapter: “Is it possible to improve the efficacy of intergroup apologies?”.  I argue 
that the research reported in this thesis has helped to identify several ways in 
which apologies can be made more effective. In Studies 6 and 7 I showed that 
combining structural, relational and identity-related messages within an apology 
increases the likelihood of forgiveness, as well as improving the perceptions of the 
transgressor. A further strategy for improving the efficacy of intergroup apologies 
revolves around emotion expression. It was shown in Studies 6, 7, 8 and 9 that the 
expression of negative moral emotions, such as remorse, guilt and shame, improves 
the effectiveness of apologies and increases the likelihood of intergroup 
reconciliation. These studies were all concerned with manipulating the content of 
an apology in order to promote forgiveness, but probably the most important 
evidence in this thesis regarding ways of making intergroup apologies more 
effective comes from the studies reported in Chapter 5, where I examined the 
Staircase Model of Intergroup Apologies. My evaluation of the Staircase Model 
shows that locating an intergroup apology within a broader, structured 
reconciliation process increases the likelihood of intergroup reconciliation.  
Thus, there are two ways in which the efficacy of intergroup apologies can 
be enhanced. First, the content of the apology needs to be carefully considered, 
such that it (a) acknowledges responsibility for the wrongdoing, (b) expresses 
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profound remorse, guilt, and/or shame about the wrongdoing, and (c) makes 
credible statements about how the status of the victim group will be improved, 
how the future relationship between the groups will be made more equal, and how 
the identity of the victim group will be respected and protected in the future. A 
second, complementary approach is to embed the apology in an extended set of 
messages and actions, such that it is preceded by an acceptance of the perpetrator 
group’s collective guilt, an effort to agree on the facts of the transgression, and a 
discussion of what reparations will be made; and followed by serious engagement 
between the two groups. In effect, then, the Staircase Model decomposes some of 
the intergroup apology components (such as the expression of negative moral 
emotion and the making of reparations in order the redress the structural 
imbalance between the two groups) into separate steps, extended over time. 
Which of these two approaches is preferable in a given situation is likely to depend 
on how much time is available, and to some extent on the gravity of the intergroup 
transgression. If the transgression is serious but does not completely undermine 
the intergroup relationship, and especially if time is in short supply, an intergroup 
apology that follows the first approach will have a reasonable chance of success. 
However, the graver the transgression, and the deeper the threat to the intergroup 
relationship, the longer is likely to be the reconciliation process that is needed, and 
the less likely it is that a one-off intergroup apology – even one containing all the 
elements of the first approach – will be sufficient, and the more appropriate it will 
be to adopt the extended approach of the Staircase Model.   
A further question has emerged in the course of conducting this research: 
“Should forgiveness be considered the primary outcome of intergroup apologies, or 
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do they serve a different purpose?”. The evidence from the final study reported in 
this thesis is that the primary function of intergroup apologies is to reduce victim 
group members’ feelings of disgust towards the perpetrator group. Although the 
key function of interpersonal apologies is to garner forgiveness, it may well be that 
intergroup apologies serve a different function, given the greater complexity of the 
relationship between perpetrator and victim. When the perpetrator is a group, 
rather than an individual, there is scope for intergroup processes such as prejudice 
and discrimination to occur. Feelings of disgust in an intergroup context are known 
to promote prejudice, discrimination, and dehumanization (Harris & Fiske, 2006; 
Hodson, Kteily, & Hoffarth, 2014). Thus, the finding that intergroup apologies 
reduce feelings of disgust should be regarded as pivotal for achieving reconciliation. 
For this reason, I would argue that even if intergroup apologies alone are not 
hugely effective in eliciting forgiveness, they nevertheless have the potential to play 
a key role in attaining genuine intergroup reconciliation. 
Limitations  
It needs to be acknowledged that the research reported in this thesis, like 
any research endeavour, has some limitations. One limitation is that the majority of 
the studies were conducted in the form of online surveys in which participants were 
asked to make judgments about historical events. Thus, it could be argued that 
although the historical events were real enough, they did not happen ‘to’ the 
participants, and the participants’ responses therefore do not represent how ‘real’ 
victim groups would respond to apologies for what happened. Although I concede 
that research participants responding to an apology they read on a computer 
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screen in the context of a study is undoubtedly different from members of a victim 
group responding to an apology made by a perpetrator group, either face-to-face or 
through the media, there are some good reasons for believing that the results of 
my research would generalise to real-life settings. First, not only were the historical 
events I used real ones, but it was also the case that the apology that served as the 
basis for much of the research was a real one, issued by the IRA. Second, although 
the participants were not themselves direct victims of the intergroup transgression, 
in several studies they did belong, broadly speaking, to the victim group, in the 
sense that one of the targets of the IRA was Britain (and therefore the British 
people). Third, although the transgressions were historical ones, in real life 
intergroup apologies are often made years, decades or even centuries after the 
original transgression took place (e.g., the Australian apology to the Stolen 
Generations came in 2007, while the transgressions occurred between the early 
1900s to the 1970s; or the Indian Residential Schools that were active from the late 
19th century to the late 20th century in Canada, which were only apologised for in 
2008). So what matters in such cases is not the response of the direct victims of the 
transgression, but rather how representatives of the victim group respond to 
apologies made by representatives of the perpetrator group, which is close to the 
circumstances modelled in several of my studies.  
A different kind of response to this limitation is to point to the laboratory 
studies that formed part of my research. Here, participants in these studies did 
think that they had been unfairly treated by another group, and they then 
interacted with this out-group both verbally and behaviourally, and I was able to 
show that at least some of the processes that I studied in the online research were 
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also applicable to this ‘in situ’ intergroup setting, where groups interacted with 
each other in real time (or believed that they were doing so). However, there is a 
limit to what can practically and ethically be studied in a laboratory, with groups 
allocated to different conditions, which is why the majority of my studies used 
scenarios based on real-life events.  
A key advantage of the scenario approach is that it enables the researcher 
to study a wide variety of contexts. In this thesis, intergroup apologies and/or 
intergroup reconciliation were investigated using historical transgressions in Studies 
5, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 12; real-life current event transgressions, including a real-life 
apology, were examined in Study 3 (Grenfell Tower) and Study 4 (Uber licence); and 
a fabricated transgression in the context of a real-life university rivalry was 
examined in Study 1. Alongside this variation in contexts, there was also a variation 
in the degree to which participants were victims. Although participants were simply 
third-party observers in Study 10, in every other study they had some connection 
with the transgression, as noted above. In Study 1 participants were led to believe 
the transgression was against their own university. In Study 3 participants were all 
based in London, where the tragedy of the Grenfell Tower Fire occurred, while in 
Study 4 I recruited participants in cities where Uber was actively operating. In 
Studies 2, 8, and 9, participants were the victims of selfishly uncooperative 
behaviour, but also had opportunities to engage in uncooperative behaviour 
themselves. In Studies 5, 6, 7, and 11, participants were from mainland Britain, and 
would have been adults at the time of ‘The Troubles’, meaning that there was a 
possibility of them being at least indirectly affected by the IRA’s activities.  Finally, 
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in Study 12, participants were recruited from the population of Northern Ireland, 
those whose lives would have been most impacted by ‘The Troubles’.  
So although it is not unreasonable to argue that some of the research 
reported here involved “hypothetical transgressions”, “hypothetical apologies” and 
“hypothetical reconciliation”, my counter-argument is that this limitation is offset 
by the considerable variation in the contexts studied, by the fact that in many 
studies the apologies were closely based on real apologies, and by the fact that in 
several studies participants did have a relationship, direct or indirect, with the 
victim group. 
Practical Implications 
A final question worth addressing concerns the practical implications of the 
present research. How can policy makers and practitioners benefit from the results 
of these studies? As should be clear from the preceding sections of this chapter, 
much of the research reported in this thesis suggests that intergroup apologies 
serve an important function in repairing intergroup relations following 
transgressions. As noted above, there are practical implications for the design of 
apology content and also practical implications for treating intergroup apologies as 
part of an extended process. We now have a better idea of what intergroup 
apologies should consist of, and also of how they can be integrated into a more 
general strategy for achieving intergroup reconciliation.  
Intergroup relations are often fraught and conflictual, making it likely that 
one group will act in a way that leads to adverse consequences for another group. 
Every intergroup conflict in human history ends at a certain point, and once it is 
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over relations between the two parties to the conflict need to be repaired if future 
conflicts are to be avoided. Despite the rather pessimistic tone of much research on 
intergroup apologies, they have an important role to play in repairing the 
intergroup relationship. Undoubtedly, intergroup apologies are less 
straightforwardly effective that their interpersonal counterparts. The tendency for 
there to be greater degree of suspicion and competition between groups than 
between individuals means that intergroup apologies are rarely taken at face value 
and are often seen as insincere and self-serving. However, the current research 
shows that there are steps that can be taken to reduce these problems and that if 
such steps are taken, intergroup apologies can be effective in changing perceptions 
of the perpetrator group, reducing disgust felt towards that group, and thereby 
eliciting forgiveness.  
Conclusion 
Intergroup apologies are becoming increasingly common in contemporary 
society, whether they are made by countries, governments, political parties, 
businesses, universities, or smaller, social groups. Despite this prevalence, 
published research prior to the work reported in this thesis had generally led 
researchers and commentators to be pessimistic about the effectiveness of such 
apologies. In the course of this thesis, I have shown that there are indeed some 
important differences in how interpersonal and intergroup apologies are received, 
with intergroup apologies being much less likely to give rise to forgiveness. This 
appears to confirm the pessimistic view of intergroup apologies. Nevertheless, I 
also show that intergroup apologies can be effective, provided they have the right 
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content, are delivered in the right way, and are seen as part of an extended effort 
to achieve intergroup reconciliation.  I would therefore argue that the view that 
intergroup apologies are ineffective is unduly pessimistic. They are not a panacea 
and in the case of serious intergroup conflicts they are unlikely to be effective 
unless they form part of a broader reconciliation attempt. However, I have shown 
that they can be effective and therefore argue that my thesis contributes to our 
understanding of intergroup apologies.  
I began this thesis by quoting from Tolstoy, who noted that one pitfall of 
apologies that it is easy to apologise and to wish the alleviation of pain and 
suffering that you may have caused, but not so easy to actively do anything about 
it. My hope is that this thesis will help to engender a more positive outlook on 
intergroup apologies and thereby to offer a way in which the pain and suffering that 
frequently accompanies intergroup conflict can be eased. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 216 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  References 
217 
 
References 
Abrams, D., Wetherell, M., Cochrane, S., Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1990). 
Knowing what to think by knowing who you are: Self-categorization and the 
nature of norm formation, conformity and group polarization. British Journal 
of Social Psychology, 29(2), 97-119, doi:10.1111/j.2044-309.1990.tb00892.x. 
Ballinger, G., & Schoorman, F. (2007). Individual Reactions to Leadership Succession 
in Workgroups. The Academy of Management Review, 32(1), 118-136, 
doi:10.2307/20159284. 
Barkan, E. (2000). The guilt of nations: Restitution and negotiating historical 
injustices. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press. 
Bar-Tal, D. (2007). Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts. American 
Behavioral Scientist, 50(11), 1430-1453, doi: 10.1177/0002764207302462. 
Baumeister, R. F., & Hastings, S. (1997). Distortions of collective memory: How 
groups flatter and deceive themselves. In J. W. Pennebaker, D. Paez, & B. 
Rimé (Eds.), Collective memory of political events: Social psychological 
perspectives (pp. 277-293). Hillsdale, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Inc. 
Berndsen, M., Hornsey, M. J., and Wohl, M. J. A. (2015). The impact of a victim-
focused apology on forgiveness in an intergroup context. Group Processes & 
Intergroup Relations, 18(5), 726-739, doi: 10.1177/1368430215586275. 
 
References 
218 
 
 
Beyens, U., Yu, H. B., Han, T., Zhang, L., and Zhou, X. L. (2015). The strength of a 
remorseful heart: Psychological and neural basis of how apology emolliates 
reactive aggression and promotes forgiveness. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 
1611, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01611. 
Bibas, S. & Bierschbach, R. A. (2004). Integrating remorse and apology into criminal 
procedure. Yale Law Journal, 114, 85. 
Blatz, C. W., Day, M. V., and Schryer, E. (2014). Official public apology effects on 
victim group members' evaluations of the perpetrator group. Canadian 
Journal of Behavioural Science, 46(3), 337-345, doi:10.1037/a0031729. 
Blatz, C. W., Schumann, K., & Ross, M. (2009). Government apologies for historical 
injustices. Political Psychology, 30, 219-241,  
doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00689.x. 
Bobick, T., & Smith, A. (2013). The impact of leader turnover on the onset and the 
resolution of WTO disputes. Review of International Organizations, 8(4), 
423-445, doi:10.1007/s11558-013-9171-3. 
Bombay, A., Matheson, K., & Anisman, H. (2013). Expectations among Aboriginal 
peoples in Canada regarding the potential impacts of a government apology. 
Political Psychology, 34(3), 443-460, doi:10.1111/pops.12029. 
Bornstein, G., Kugler, T., & Ziegelmeyer, A. (2004). Individual and group decisions in 
the Centipede game: Are groups more “rational” players? Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 40(1), 599-605, 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2003.11.003. 
  References 
219 
 
Brooks, R. L. (Ed). (1999). When sorry isn’t enough: The controversy over apologies 
and reparations for human injustice. New York: New York University Press. 
Brown, R. P., Wohl, M. J., & Exline, J. J. (2008) Taking up offences: Secondhand 
forgiveness and group identification. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 34, 1406-1421, doi:10.1177/0146167208321538. 
Cairns, E., & Hewstone, M. (2002). Northern Ireland: The impact of peacemaking in 
Northern Ireland on intergroup behaviour. In G. Salomon & B. Nevo (Eds), 
The nature and study of peace education (pp. 217–228). Hillsdale, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
Carreiro, D. (2018, March 19) Beyond 94: Where is Canada at with reconciliation, 
CBC News. 
Cehajic, S., Brown, R., & Castano, E. (2008). Forgive and forget? Antecedents and 
consequences of intergroup forgiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Political 
Psychology, 29(3), 351-367, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00634.x. 
Cehajic-Clancy, S., Goldenberg, A., Gross, J. J., & Halperin, E. (2016). Social-
psychological interventions for intergroup reconciliation: An emotion 
regulation perspective. Psychological Inquiry, 27(2), 73-88, 
doi:10.1080/1047840X.2016.1153945. 
Chapman, A. R. (2007). Truth commissions and intergroup forgiveness: The case of 
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Peace and Conflict: 
Journal of Peace Psychology, 13(1), 51-69, doi:10.1037/h0094024. 
References 
220 
 
 
Cheung-Blunden, V., & Blunden, B. (2008). Paving the road to war with group 
membership, appraisal antecedents, and anger. Aggressive Behavior, 34(2), 
175-189, doi:10.1002/ab.20234. 
Cohen-Chen, S., Halperin, E., Crisp, R. J., & Gross, J. J. (2014). Hope in the Middle 
East: Malleability beliefs, hope, and the willingness to compromise for 
peace. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5(1), 67-75, 
doi:10.1177/1948550613484499. 
Cohen, T. R., Gunia, B. C., Kim-Jun, S. Y., & Murnighan, J. K. (2009). Do groups lie 
more than individuals? Honesty & deception as a function of strategic self-
interest. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 1321-1324, 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.08.007. 
 Cohen, T. R., Wildschut, T., Insko, C. A. (2010). How communication increases 
interpersonal cooperation in mixed-motive situations. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 46(1), 39-50, 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.09.009. 
Corntassel, J., & Holder, C. (2008). Who’s sorry now? Government apologies, truth 
commissions, and indigenous self-determination in Australia, Canada, 
Guatemala, and Peru. Human Rights Review, 9, 465-489, 
doi:10.1007/s12142-008-0065-3. 
Cowen, R., & Watt, N. (2002, July 17). IRA says sorry for 30 years of ‘civilian’ deaths. 
The Guardian, p. 8. 
  References 
221 
 
Crerar, P. (2017, September 22). Uber London ban: TfL strips licence from car 
service app. London Evening Standard. 
Darby, B. W., & Schlenker, B. R. (1989). Children’s reactions to transgressions: 
Effects of the actor’s apology, reputation and remorse. British Journal of 
Social Psychology, 28, 353-364, doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8309.1989.tb00879.x. 
De Cremer, D. (2010). To pay or to apologize? On the psychology of dealing with 
unfair offers in a dictator game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(6), 843-
848, doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.006. 
De Cremer, D., van Dijk, E., & Pillutla, M. M. (2010). Explaining unfair offers in 
ultimatum games and their effects on trust: An experimental approach. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 20(1), 107-126, doi:10.5840/beq20102018. 
de Greiff, P. (2006). The handbook of reparations. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 
de Hooge, I. E., Breugelmans, S. M., & Zeelenberg, M. (2008). Not so ugly after all: 
When shame acts as a commitment device. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 95(4), 933, doi:10.1037/a0011991. 
de Hooge, I. E., Zeelenberg, M., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2007). Moral sentiments and 
cooperation: Differential influences of shame and guilt. Cognition and 
Emotion, 21(5), 1025-1042, doi:10.1080/02699930600980874. 
de Melo C. M., Zheng L., Gratch J. (2009). Expression of moral emotions in 
cooperating agents. In Ruttkay Z., Kipp M., Nijholt A., & Vilhjálmsson H. H. 
(eds) Intelligent Virtual Agents. IVA 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, vol 5773. Heidelberg, Berlin: Springer.  
References 
222 
 
 
De Peyer, R. (2017, July 4). 'I am truly sorry': New Kensington and Chelsea leader 
makes humble apology as probe into Grenfell Tower disaster widened. 
London Evening Standard. 
Desmet, P. T. M., De Cremer, D., & van Dijk, E. (2011). On the psychology of 
financial compensation to restore fairness transgressions: When intentions 
determine value. Journal of Business Ethics, 95(1), 105-115, 
doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0791-3. 
Doosje, B., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. S. R., (1998). Guilty by 
association: When one's group has a negative history. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 75(4), 872-886, doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.872. 
Eshet, D. (2015). Stolen Lives: The indigenous People of Canada and the Indian 
Residential Schools. Brookline, MA: Facing History and Ourselves. 
Exline, J. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Expressing forgiveness and repentance: 
Benefits and barriers. In M. E. McCullough, K. I. Pargament, & C. E. Thoresen 
(Eds.), Forgiveness: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 133-155). New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A. G. & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible 
statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical 
sciences. Behavior Research Methods, 39, 175-191, 
doi:10.3758/BF03193146. 
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature, 415(6868), 
137-140, doi:10.1038/415137a. 
  References 
223 
 
Fehr, R., & Gelfand, M. J. (2010). When apologies work: How matching apology 
components to victims’ self-construals facilitates forgiveness. Organizational 
Behaviour and Human Decision Processes, 113(1), 37-50, 
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2010.04.002. 
Flores, A. Q. (2012). A competing risks model of war termination and leader change. 
International Studies Quarterly, 56(4), 809-819. 
Freedman G., Burgoon E. M., Ferrell J. D., Pennebaker J. W., and Beer J. S. (2017). 
When saying sorry may not help: The impact of apologies on social 
rejections. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 1375, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01375. 
Gallego, M., & Pitchik, C. (2004). An economic theory of leadership turnover. 
Journal of Public Economics, 88(12), 2361-2382, 
doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.07.008. 
Gausel, N., Vignoles, V. L., & Leach, C. W. (2016). Resolving the paradox of shame: 
Differentiating among specific appraisal-feeling combinations explains pro-
social and self-defensive motivation. Motivation and Emotion, 40(1), 118-
139, doi:10.1007/s11031-015-9513-y. 
Giner-Sorolla, R., Castano, E., Espinosa, P., & Brown, R. (2009). Shame expressions 
reduce the recipient’s insult from outgroup reparations. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 44(3), 519-526, 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2007.08.003. 
Gold, G. J., & Weiner, B. (2000). Remorse, confession, group identity, and 
expectancies about repeating a transgression. Basic and Applied Psychology, 
22(4), 291-300, doi:10.1207/15324830051035992. 
References 
224 
 
 
Gross, J. J. (2002). Emotion regulation: affective, cognitive, and social 
consequences. Psychophysiology, 39(3), 281-91, 
doi:10.1017/S0048577201393198. 
Haesevoets, T., Folmer, C. R., De Cremer, D., & Van Hiel, A. (2013). Money isn’t all 
that matters: The use of financial compensation and apologies to preserve 
relationships in the aftermath of distributive harm. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 35, 95-107, doi:10.1016/j.joep.2013.02.003. 
Halabi, S., Nadler, A., & Dovidio, J. F. (2012) Positive responses to intergroup 
assistance: The roles of apology and trust. Group Processes & Intergroup 
Relations, 16(4), 395-411, doi:10.1177/1368430212453863. 
Harris, L. T., & Fiske, S. T. (2006). Dehumanizing the lowest of the low: 
Neuroimaging responses to extreme outgroups. Psychological Science, 17, 
847-853, doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01793.x. 
Harth, N. S., Kessler, T., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Advantaged group's emotional 
reactions to intergroup inequality: The dynamics of pride, guilt, and 
sympathy. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(1), 115-129, 
doi:10.1177/0146167207309193. 
Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 10(3), 252-264, doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4. 
 
 
 
  References 
225 
 
Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Voci, A., McLernon, F., Niens, U., & Noor, M. (2004). 
Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland: Social psychological 
dimensions of ‘The Troubles’. In N. R. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), 
Collective guilt: International perspectives (pp. 193-215). New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 53(1), 575-604, doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135109. 
Hodson, G., Kteily, N. S., Hoffarth, M. R. (2014). Of filthy pigs and subhuman 
mongrels: Dehumanization, disgust, and intergroup prejudice. Testing 
Psychometrics Methodology in Applied Psychology, 21(3), 267-284, 
doi:10.4473/TPM21.3.3. 
Hornsey, M. J., & Wohl, M. J. (2013). We are sorry: Intergroup apologies and their 
tenuous link with intergroup forgiveness. European Review of Social 
Psychology, 24(1), 1-31, doi:10.1080/10463283.2013.822206. 
Hornsey, M. J., Wohl, M. J., & Philpot, C. R. (2014). Collective apologies and their 
effects on forgiveness: Pessimistic evidence but constructive implications. 
Australian Psychologist, 50(1), 106-114, doi:10.1111/ap.12087. 
Insko, C. A., Hoyle, R. H., Pinkley, R. L., Hong, G., Slim, R., Dalton, G., Lin, Y. H. W., 
Ruffin, P. P., Dardis, G. J., Bernthal, P. R., & Schopler, J. (1988). Individual-
group discontinuity: The role of a consensus rule. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 24, 505-519, doi:10.1016/0022-1031(88)90049-2. 
 
References 
226 
 
 
Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Gaertner, L., Wildschut, T., Kozar, R., Pinter, B., Finkel, E. J., 
Brazil, D. M., Cecil, C. L., & Montoya, M. R. (2001). Interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity reduction through the anticipation of future interaction. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80(1), 95-111, 
doi:10.1037//0022-3514.80.1.95. 
Insko, C. A., Kirchner, J. L., Pinter, B., Efaw, J., & Wildschut, T. (2005). 
Interindividual-intergroup discontinuity as a function of trust and 
categorization: The paradox of expected cooperation. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 88(2), 365-385, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.2.365. 
Iyer, A., Schmader, T., & Lickel, B. (2007). Why individuals protest the perceived 
transgressions of their country: The role of anger, shame, and guilt. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(4), 572-587, 
doi:10.1177/0146167206297402. 
Johnson, N. D., &. Mislin, A. A. (2011). Trust games: A meta-analysis. Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 32(5), 865-889, doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.05.007. 
Ketelaar, T., & Au, W.T. (2003). The effects of feelings of guilt on the behaviour of 
uncooperative individuals in repeated social bargaining games: An affect-as-
information interpretation of the role of emotion in social interaction. 
Cognition & Emotion, 17(3), 429-453, doi:10.1080/02699930143000662. 
Kramer, R. M. (1994). The sinister attribution error: Paranoid cognition and 
collective distrust in organizations. Motivation and Emotion, 18(2), 199-230, 
doi:10.1007/BF02249399. 
 
  References 
227 
 
 
Krockow, E. M., Colman, A. M., & Pulford, B. D. (2016a). Cooperation in repeated 
interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game experiments, 1992-
2016. European Review of Social Psychology, 27(1), 231-282, 
doi:10.1080/10463283.2016.1249640.  
Krockow, E. M., Colman, A. M., & Pulford, B. D. (2016b). Exploring cooperation and 
competition in the Centipede game through verbal protocol analysis. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 46(6), 746-761, 
doi:10.1002/ejsp.2226. 
Kugler, T., Kausel, E. E., & Kocher, M. G. (2012). Are groups more rational than 
individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups. Wiley 
Interdisciplinary Reviews – Cognitive Science, 3(4), 471-482, 
doi:10.1002/wcs.1184. 
Kuppens, T., Yzerbyt, V. Y., Dandache, S., Fischer, A. H., & van der Schalk, J. (2013). 
Social identity salience shapes group-based emotions through group-based 
appraisals. Cognition & Emotion, 27(8), 1359-1377, 
doi:10.1080/02699931.2013.785387. 
Lazare, A. (2004) On apology. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Leach, C. W., & Cidam, A. (2015). When is shame linked to constructive approach 
orientation? A meta-analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
109(6), 983-1002, doi: 10.1037/pspa0000037. 
 
References 
228 
 
 
Leach, C. W., Iyer, A., & Pedersen, A. (2007). Angry opposition to government 
redress: When the structurally advantaged perceive themselves as relatively 
deprived. British Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 191-204, 
doi:10.1348/014466606X99360. 
Leonard, D. J., Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (2011). Emotional responses to 
intergroup apology mediate intergroup forgiveness and retribution. Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(6), 1198-1206, 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2011.05.002. 
Lerner, J. S., Gonzalez, R. M., Small, D. A., & Fischhoff, B. (2003). Effects of fear and 
anger on perceived risks of terrorism: A national field experiment. 
Psychological Science, 14(2), 144-150, doi:10.1111/1467-9280.01433. 
Liberman, V., Samuels, S. M., & Ross, L. (2004). The name of the game: Predictive 
power of reputations versus situational labels in determining Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game moves. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(9), 
1175-1185, doi:10.1177/0146167204264004. 
Lickel, B., Schmader, T., Curtis, M., Scarnier, M., & Ames, D. R. (2005). Vicarious 
shame and guilt. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 8(2), 145-157, 
doi:10.1177/1368430205051064. 
Liebkind, K., Nyström, S., Honkanummi, E., & Lange, A. (2004). Group size, group 
status and dimensions of contact as predictors of intergroup attitudes. 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 7(2), 145-159, 
doi:10.1177/1368430204041398. 
  References 
229 
 
Livingstone, A. G., Spears, R., Manstead, A. S. R., Bruder, M., & Shepherd, L. (2011). 
We feel, therefore we are: Emotion as a basis for self-categorization and 
social action. Emotion, 11(4), 754-767, doi:10.1037/a0023223. 
Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: Explaining 
offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 79(4), 602-616, doi:10.1037//0022-3514.79.4.602. 
Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (2002). Intergroup emotions and the social self: 
Prejudice reconceptualized as differentiated reactions to out-groups. In J. P. 
Forgas & K. D. Williams (Eds.), The social self: Cognitive, interpersonal, and 
intergroup perspectives (pp.309–326). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. 
MacLin, M. K., Downs, C., MacLin, O. H., & Caspers, H. M. (2009). The effect of 
defendant facial expression on mock juror decision-making: The power of 
remorse. North American Journal of Psychology, 11(2), 323-332. 
Maitner, A. T., Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (2006). Evidence for the regulatory 
function of intergroup emotion: Emotional consequences of implemented or 
impeded intergroup action tendencies. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 42(6), 720-728, doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.08.001. 
Manstead, A. S. R., & Fischer, A. H. (2001). Social appraisal: The social world as 
object of and inﬂuence on appraisal processes. In K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & 
T. Johnstone (Eds.), Appraisal processes in emotion: Theory, methods, 
research (pp. 221 – 232). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mao, F. (2018, February 13). Australia’s apology to Stolen Generations: ‘It gave me 
peace’. BBC News, Sydney.   
References 
230 
 
 
McCullough, M. E., Root, L. M., & Cohen, A. D. (2006). Writing about the benefits of 
an interpersonal transgression facilitates forgiveness. Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 74(5), 887-897, doi:10.1037/0022-006X.74.5.887. 
McCullough, M. E., Worthington, E. L., & Rachal, K. C. (1997). Interpersonal forgiving 
in close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(2), 
321-336, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.73.2.321. 
McGillivray, F., & Smith, A. (2005).  The Impact of Leadership Turnover and 
Domestic Institutions on International Cooperation. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 49(5), 639-660, doi:10.1177/0022002705279478. 
McKenny, L. (2008, February 13). Speech gets standing ovation in Redfern. The 
Sydney Morning Herald.  
McLernon, F., Cairns, E., & Hewstone, M. (2002). Views on forgiveness in Northern 
Ireland. Peace Review, 14(3), 285-290, doi:10.1080/1367886022000016839. 
Minow, M. (1998). Between vengeance and forgiveness: Facing history after 
genocide and mass violence. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. 
Nadler, A. (2012). Intergroup reconciliation: Definitions, processes, and future 
directions. In L. Tropp (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of intergroup conflict (pp. 
291-308). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Nadler, A. & Schnabel, N. (2008). Instrumental and socioemotional paths to 
intergroup reconciliation and the needs-based model of socioemotional 
reconciliation. In A. Nadler, T. E. Malloy, & J. D. Fisher (Eds.), The Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Reconciliation (pp. 93-125). Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
  References 
231 
 
Nadler, A., & Shnabel, N. (2015). Intergroup reconciliation: Instrumental and 
socioemotional processes and the needs-based model. European Review of 
Social Psychology, 26(1), 93-125, doi:10.1080/10463283.2015.1106712. 
Nelissen, R. M., & Zeelenberg, M. (2009). When guilt evokes self-punishment: 
Evidence for the existence of a Dobby Effect. Emotion, 9(1), 118-122, 
doi:10.1037/a0014540. 
Okimoto, T. G., Wenzel, M., & Hornsey, M. J. (2015). Apologies demanded yet 
devalued: Normative dilution in the age of apology. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 60, 133-136, doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2015.05.008. 
Parkinson, B., Fischer, A. H., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2005). Emotion in social relations: 
Cultural, group, and interpersonal processes. New York: Psychology Press. 
Pescosolido, A. T. (2002). Emergent leaders as managers of group emotion. The 
Leadership Quarterly, 13(5), 583-599, doi:10.1016/S1048-9843(02)00145-5. 
Petrucci, C. J. (2002).  Apology in the criminal justice setting: Evidence for including 
apology as an additional component in the legal system. Behavioral Sciences 
& the Law, 20(4), 337-362, doi:10.1002/bsl.495. 
Philpot, C. R., & Hornsey, M. J. (2008). What happens when groups say sorry: The 
effect of intergroup apologies on their recipients. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 34(4), 474-487, doi:10.1177/0146167207311283. 
Pillutla, M. M., & Murnighan, J. K. (1996). Unfairness, anger, and spite: Emotional 
rejections of ultimatum offers. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 68(3), 208-224, doi:10.1006/obhd.1996.0100.  
References 
232 
 
 
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008).  Asymptotic and resampling strategies for 
assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. 
Behavior Research Methods, 40, 879-891, doi:10.3758/BRM.40.3.879. 
Riek, B. M. (2010). Transgressions, guilt, and forgiveness: A model of seeking 
forgiveness. Journal of Psychology and Theology, 38(4), 246-254, 
doi:10.1177/009164711003800402. 
Riek, B. M., & Mania, E. W. (2011). The antecedents and consequences of 
interpersonal forgiveness: A meta-analytic review. Personal Relationships, 
19(2), 304-325, doi:10.1111/j.1475-6811.2011.01363.x. 
Roe, M. D., Pegg, W., Hodges, K., & Trimm, R. A. (1999). Forgiving the other side: 
Social identity and ethnic memories in Northern Ireland. In J. P. Harrington 
& E. Mitchell (Eds.), Politics and performance in contemporary Northern 
Ireland (pp. 122–156). Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press. 
Rosenthal, R. W. (1981). Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and chain 
store paradox. Journal of Economic Theory, 25(1), 92-100, 
doi:10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1. 
Rouhana, N. N. (2004). Group identity and power asymmetry in reconciliation 
processes: The Israeli-Palestinian case. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace 
Psychology, 10(1), 33-52, doiL:10.1207/s15327949pac1001_3. 
Rychlowska, M., van der Schalk, J., Gratch, J., Breitinger, E. & Manstead, A. S. R. 
(2019). Beyond actions: Reparatory effects of regret in intergroup trust 
games.  Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 82, 74-84, 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2019.01.006. 
  References 
233 
 
Schlueter, E., & Scheepers, P. (2010). The relationship between outgroup size and 
anti-outgroup attitudes: A theoretical synthesis and empirical test of group 
threat-and intergroup contact theory. Social Science Research, 39(2), 285-
295, doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2009.07.006. 
Schniter, E., Sheremeta, R. M., & Sznycer, D. (2013). Building and rebuilding trust 
with promises and apologies. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 94, 242-256, doi:10.2139/ssrn.2144021. 
Schmader, T., & Lickel, B. (2006). The approach and avoidance function of guilt and 
shame emotions: Comparing reactions to self-caused and other-caused 
wrongdoing. Motivation and Emotion, 30(1), 43-56, doi:10.1007/s11031-
006-9006-0. 
Shepherd, L., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. (2013). The self-regulatory role of 
anticipated group-based shame and guilt in inhibiting in-group favoritism. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 43(6), 493-504, 
doi:10.1002/ejsp.1971.  
Shnabel, N. & Nadler, A. (2008). A needs-based model of reconciliation: Satisfying 
the differential emotional needs of victim and perpetrator as a key to 
promoting reconciliation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
94(1), 116-132, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.1.116. 
Shnabel, N., & Nadler, A. (2015). The role of agency and morality in reconciliation 
processes: The perspective of the Needs-Based Model. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science, 24(6), 477-483, doi:10.1177/0963721415601625. 
Shnabel, N., Nadler, A., Canetti-Nisim, D., & Ullrich, J. (2008). The role of acceptance 
and empowerment in promoting reconciliation from the perspective of the 
References 
234 
 
 
Needs-Based Model. Social Issues and Policy Review, 2(1), 159-186, 
doi:10.1111/j.1751-2409.2008.00014.x. 
Shnabel, N., Nadler, A., Ullrich, J., Dovidio, J. F., & Carmi, D. (2009). Promoting 
reconciliation through the satisfaction of the emotional needs of victimized 
and perpetrating group members: The Needs-Based Model of reconciliation. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 35(8), 1021-1030, 
doi:10.1177/0146167209336610. 
Shore, D. M., Rychlowska, M., van der Schalk, J., Parkinson, B., & Manstead, A. S. R. 
(2019). Intergroup emotional exchange: Intergroup guilt and outgroup anger 
increase resource allocation in trust games. Emotion, 19(4), 605-616, 
doi:10.1037/emo0000463.  
SimonTov-Nachlieli, I., & Shnabel, N. (2014). Feeling both victim and perpetrator: 
Investigating duality within the Needs-Based Model. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 40(3), 301-314, doi:10.1177/0146167213510746. 
Smith, E.R. (1993). Social identity and social emotions: Toward new 
conceptualizations of prejudice. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), 
Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception 
(pp. 297-315). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Smith, E. R. (1999). Affective and cognitive implications of a group becoming part of 
the self: New models of prejudice and of the self-concept. In D. Abrams & 
M. A. Hogg (Eds.), Social identity and social cognition (pp. 183-196). Oxford, 
England: Blackwell. 
  References 
235 
 
Smith, E. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2015). Dynamics of group-based emotions: Insights 
from Intergroup Emotions Theory. Emotion Review, 7(4), 349-354, 
doi:10.1177/1754073915590614 
Smith, E. R, Seger, C. R., and Mackie, D. A. (2007). Can emotions be truly group 
level? Evidence regarding four conceptual criteria. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 93(3), 431-446, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.3.431. 
Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. 
In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds), (1986). Psychology of intergroup 
relations (pp. 7-24). Chicago: Nelson Hall. 
Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Tausch, N., Maio, G., & Kenworthy, J. (2007). The 
impact of intergroup emotions on forgiveness in Northern Ireland. Group 
Processes and Intergroup Relations, 10(1), 119-135, 
doi:10.1177/1368430207071345. 
Tangney, J. P., Wagner, P., Fletcher, C., & Gramzow, R. (1992). Shamed into anger: 
The relation of shame and guilt to anger and self-reported aggression. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62(4), 669-675, 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.4.669. 
Tavuchis, N. (1991). Mea Culpa: A society of apology and reconciliation. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Tiedens, L. Z., & Linton, S. (2001). Judgment under emotional certainty and 
uncertainty: The effects of specific emotions on information processing. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(6), 973-988, 
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.6.973. 
References 
236 
 
 
Toft, M. D. (2010). Ending civil wars: A case for rebel victory? International Security, 
34 (4), 7-36, doi:10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.7. 
Tolstoy, L. (1887). What to Do?: Thoughts Evoked by the census of Moscow. (I. F. 
Hapgood Trans). Harvard, MA: T.Y. Crowell & Company. (Original work 
published 1886). 
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2006). Appraisal antecedents of shame and guilt: 
Support for a theoretical model. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 
32(10), 1339-1351, doi:10.1177/0146167206290212. 
Triandis, H. C., McCusker, C., & Hui, C. H., (1990). Multimethod probes of 
individualism and collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
59(5), 1006-1020, doi:10.1037/0022-3514.59.5.1006. 
Turner, J. C. (1991). Social influence. Buckingham, England: Open University Press. 
Tyber, J. M., Lieberman, D., & Griskevicius, V. (2009). Microbes, mating, and 
morality: Individual differences in three functional domains of disgust. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97(1), 103-122, 
doi:10.1037/a0015474. 
Vaish, A., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2011). Young children’s responses to 
guilt displays. Developmental Psychology, 47(5), 1248-1262, 
doi:10.1037/a0024462. 
van der Schalk, J., Bruder, M., & Manstead, A. (2012). Regulating emotion in the 
context of interpersonal decisions: The role of anticipated pride and regret. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 3(1), 513, doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00513. 
  References 
237 
 
van der Schalk, J., Kuppens, T., Bruder, M., & Manstead, A. S. R. (2015). The social 
power of regret: The effect of social appraisal and anticipated emotions on 
fair and unfair allocations in resource dilemmas. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. General, 144(1), 151-157, doi:10.1037/xge0000036. 
van Dijke, M., & De Cremer, D. (2011). When social accounts promote acceptance 
of unfair ultimatum offers: The role of the victim’s stress response to 
uncertainty and power position. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(3), 468-
479, doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.03.014. 
Van Kleef G. A. (2009). How emotions regulate social life: The Emotions as Social 
Information (EASI) Model. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18, 
184–188 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01633.x. 
Van Kleef G. A., De Dreu C. K. W., & Manstead A. S. R. (2010). An interpersonal 
approach to emotion in social decision making: The Emotions as Social 
Information model. In Zanna M. P. (Ed.), Advances in experimental social 
psychology (Vol. 42, pp. 45–96). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., & Leach, C. W. (2008). Exploring psychological 
mechanisms of collective action: Does relevance of group identity influence 
how people cope with collective disadvantage? British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 47(2), 353-372, doi:10.1348/014466607X231091 
Verbeke, W., Belschak, F., & Bagozzi, R. P. (2004). The adaptive consequences of 
pride in personal selling. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 
32(4), 386-402, doi:10.1177/0092070304267105. 
References 
238 
 
 
Voci, A. (2006). The link between identification and in-group favouritism: Effects of 
threat to social identity and trust-related emotions. British Journal of Social 
Psychology, 45(2), 265-284, doi:10.1348/014466605X52245. 
Weisbuch, M., & Ambady, N. (2008). Affective divergence: Automatic responses to 
others' emotions depend on group membership. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 95(5), 1063-1079, doi:10.1037/a0011993. 
Wenzel, M., Okimoto, T. G., Hornsey, M. J., Lawrence-Wood, E., & Coughlin, A. M. 
(2017). The mandate of the collective apology: Apology representiveness 
determines perceived sincerity and forgiveness in intergroup contexts. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(6), 758-771, 
doi:10.1177/0146167217697093. 
Wildschut, T., & Insko, C. A. (2007). Explanations of interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity: A review of the evidence. European Review of Social 
Psychology, 18(1), 175-211, doi:10.1080/10463280701676543. 
Wildschut, T., Insko, C. A., and Gaertner, L. (2002). Intragroup social influence and 
intergroup competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82(6), 
975-992, doi:10.1037//0022-3514.82.6.975. 
Wintour, P. & Mulholland, H. (2012, September 20). Nick Clegg apologies for tuition 
fees pledge. The Guardian. 
Wohl, M. J., Hornsey, M. J., & Philpot, C. R. (2011). A critical review of public 
apologies: Aims, pitfalls, and a Staircase Model of effectiveness. Social Issues 
and Policy Review, 5(1), 70-100, doi:10.1111/j.1751-2409.2011.01026.x. 
  References 
239 
 
Wubben, M. J. J., De Cremer, D., & van Dijk, E. (2012). Is pride a prosocial emotion? 
Interpersonal effects of authentic and hubristic pride. Cognition and 
Emotion, 26(6), 1084-1097, doi:10.1080/02699931.2011.646956. 
Zeelenberg, M., van Dijk, W. W., & Manstead, A. S. R. (1998). Reconsidering the 
relation between regret and responsibility. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 74, 254-272, doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2780.
Appendices 
240 
 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Study 1 Manipulation 
 
Apology Desire 
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Apology Not Enough 
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Appendix 2 
Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations Inventory (Trim-18; McCullough, 
Root, & Cohen, 2006). Used in Studies 1, 10, 11, 12. 
(A) = Victim Group 
(B) = Transgressing Group 
All to be marked on a scale of 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). 
1. (A) should make (B) pay 
2. (A) should keep as much distance from (B) as possible 
3. Even though the actions of (B) have hurt, the (A) people should have goodwill for them 
4. (A) should wish something bad would happen to (B) 
5. (A) is best living as if (B) doesn’t or didn’t exist 
6. The hatchet should be buried and (A) should move forward 
7. (A) shouldn’t trust (B) 
8. Despite what happened, (A) should have a positive relationship with (B) 
9. (B) should get what they deserve 
10. (A) should find it difficult to act warmly towards (B) 
11. (A) should avoid (B) 
12. (A) should put any hurt aside so their relationship can resume 
13. (A) will get even one day 
14. (A) should give up its hurt and resentment 
15. (A) should cut off any relationship with (B) 
16. The (A) people should release their anger so they can work on restoring the relationship 
17. (A) should want to see (B) hurt and miserable 
18. (A) should withdraw contact with (B) 
Scoring Instructions: 
Avoidance Motivations: 2, 5, 7, 10, 11, 15, and 18. 
Revenge Motivations: 1, 4, 9, 13, and 17. 
Benevolence Motivations: 3, 6, 8, 12, 14, and 16. 
For a sum of the Trim-18 Forgiveness Scale, answers to all avoidance and revenge 
motivations questions were reverse coded and added to the answers of the benevolence 
motivations. 
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Appendix 3 
Study 2 Statement Reactions. 
Condition: “We’re really sorry about what we did!” 
 “Okay, let’s go to the end” 
 “You’re mean” 
 “Thanks, lets go to the end” 
 “Stop Stealing!” 
 “You’ve mugged us off, lets just cooperate” 
 “No worries” 
 “Okay, let’s go to the end” 
 “Let’s work together” 
 “Why are you stopping?” 
 “Thanks” 
 “Better go to the end next round, bitches!” 
 “Can we trust you” 
 “That’s okay, can we just cooperate now?” 
Condition: “We’re trying to get the best outcome!” 
 “Waiting for an apology…” 
 “Well if we go to the end we both do better.” 
 “Bit harsh” 
 “Do you understand the game?” 
 “Stop being so greedy, this is no fun, you’re mean!” 
 “It’s fairly even anyway” 
 “We feel pretty much the same” 
 “We want to cooperate” 
 “No chocolate biscuit for any of you” 
 “It’s only a game.” 
 “Please can we cooperate.” 
 “Why are you choosing to stop?” 
 “That’s crap, we’re both doing badly now” 
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Appendix 4 
Study 3 Kensington and Chelsea Council Manipulation (Manipulations shown in 
Red) 
 
‘[I/We] are truly sorry’:                       
[New/(blank)] Kensington and 
Chelsea leader makes humble 
apology as probe into Grenfell 
Tower disaster widened 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first public statement since the fire, the 
[new/(blank)] council leader was said to feel "truly 
sorry" and pledged to "heal the wounds" in the 
community. 
"The first thing [I/we] want to do is apologise, this is 
our community and we have failed it when people 
needed us the most. So, no buts, no ifs, no excuses – [I 
am/We are] truly sorry." 
The leader continued: "As the [new/(blank)] leader, I 
can say that things are going to change." 
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Appendix 5 
Study 3. Exploratory analyses of individual ‘positive perceptions’ items, including 
means and SDs (in parentheses). 
Measure 
Condition 
New Leader Control 
Interpersonal Intergroup Interpersonal Intergroup 
Sincerity     
   Council 
Leader 
3.02 
(1.06) 
2.85 
(.91) 
2.70 
(1.15) 
2.60 
(1.04) 
   Council 2.53 
(1.04) 
2.40 
(.93) 
2.63 
(1.11) 
2.37 
(1.02) 
Remorse     
   Council 
Leader 
3.08 
(1.10) 
2.95 
(.89) 
2.98 
(1.11) 
2.82 
(.98) 
   Council 2.67 
(1.09) 
2.59 
(1.00) 
2.73 
(1.09) 
2.65 
(1.08) 
Trust     
   Council 
Leader 
2.99 
(1.06) 
2.66 
(.80) 
2.63 
(1.03) 
2.34 
(.89) 
   Council 2.64 
(1.06) 
2.37 
(.96) 
2.56 
(1.13) 
2.23 
(.97) 
Believability     
   Council 
Leader 
2.97 
(1.11) 
2.71 
(.84) 
2.69 
(1.08) 
2.31 
(.93) 
   Council 2.76 
(1.04) 
2.39 
(.88) 
2.56 
(1.08) 
2.37 
(1.07) 
 
Sincerity: Council Leader.  Significant effect of new leader vs control, F(1,256) = 
4.66, p = .032, ηp2 = .02; non-significant effect of apology type, F(1,256) = 1.11, p = 
.294, ηp2 < .01; non-significant interaction, F(1, 256) = .07, p = .799, ηp2 <.01. 
Sincerity: Council. Non-significant effect of new leader vs control, F(1,256) = .06, p = 
.802, ηp2 <  .01; non-significant effect of apology type, F(1,256) = 2.30, p = .131, ηp2 
= .01; non-significant interaction, F(1, 256) = .24, p = .623, ηp2 <.01. 
Remorse: Council Leader. Non-significant effect of new leader vs control, F(1,256) = 
.82, p = .366, ηp2 < .01; non-significant effect of apology type, F(1,256) = 1.31, p = 
.253, ηp2 = .01; non-significant interaction, F(1, 256) = .03, p = .853, ηp2 <.01. 
Remorse: Council. Non-significant effect of new leader vs control, F(1,256) = .24, p = 
.625, ηp2 < .01; non-significant effect of apology type, F(1,256) = .42, p = .519, ηp2 < 
.01; non-significant interaction, F(1, 256) = .01, p = .981, ηp2 <.01. 
Trust: Council Leader. Significant effect of new leader vs control, F(1,256) = 8.40, p = 
.004, ηp2 = .03; Significant effect of apology type, F(1,256) = 6.69, p = .010, ηp2 = .03; 
non-significant interaction, F(1, 256) = .02, p = .876, ηp2 <.01. 
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Trust: Council. Non-significant effect of new leader vs control, F(1,256) = .69, p = 
.407, ηp2 < .01; significant effect of apology type, F(1,256) = 5.49, p = .020, ηp2 = .02; 
non-significant interaction, F(1, 256) = .06, p = .801, ηp2 <.01. 
Believability: Council Leader. Significant effect of new leader vs control, F(1,256) = 
7.59, p = .006, ηp2 = .03; significant effect of apology type, F(1,256) = 6.72, p = .010, 
ηp2 = .03; non-significant interaction, F(1, 256) = .23, p = .635, ηp2 <.01. 
Believability: Council. Non-significant effect of new leader vs control, F(1,256) = .69, 
p = .406, ηp2 < .01; significant effect of apology type, F(1,256) = 5.01, p = .026, ηp2 = 
.02; non-significant interaction, F(1, 256) = .50, p = .478, ηp2 <.01. 
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Appendix 6 
Study 4 UBER manipulation 
Denial of Responsibility 
Following the decision on by London’s transport authority to not renew Uber’s 
license to operate in the city, newly installed CEO Dara Khosrowshahi has published 
a letter in the Evening Standard stating the company’s confusion as to why this 
course of action has been taken, finishing with: 
“This ruling shows that London is closed to innovative companies”. 
Apology 
Following the decision on by London’s transport authority to not renew Uber’s 
license to operate in the city, newly installed CEO Dara Khosrowshahi has published 
a letter in the Evening Standard apologizing for the company’s myriad of mistakes, 
finishing with:  
“On behalf of everyone at Uber globally, I apologise for the mistakes we’ve made.”  
Both 
Following the decision on by London’s transport authority to not renew Uber’s 
license to operate in the city, newly installed CEO Dara Khosrowshahi has published 
a letter in the Evening Standard stating the company’s confusion as to why this 
course of action has been taken, finishing with: 
“This ruling shows that London is closed to innovative companies”. 
A few days later, Khosrowshahi has published a second letter in the Evening 
Standard, accepting the ruling and apologizing for the company’s myriad of 
mistakes, finishing with:  
“On behalf of everyone at Uber globally, I apologise for the mistakes we’ve made.”  
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Appendix 7 
Study 5 Manipulation (Source vs. Type) 
Main Body [unmanipulated but edited accordingly whether the source was the IRA 
(large group), the INLA (small group), or an individual soldier (interpersonal)]:  
The IRA acknowledges that there have been faults and grievous errors in our 
prosecution of the war. Innocent people have been killed and injured as a result of our 
actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those 
who lost their lives, and we recognise their grief and pain.  
The future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or 
closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes all of 
the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be achieved by 
creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed more or less worthy than 
others. The process of conflict resolution requires the equal acknowledgement of the 
grief and loss of others. 
We are endeavouring to fulfil this responsibility to those we have hurt. The IRA 
is committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice and peace in Ireland. We 
remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the challenges and 
difficulties which this presents. This includes the acceptance of our own past mistakes 
and of the hurt and pain we have caused to others. 
Structural Conclusion: 
To conclude, on the behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are 
deeply sorry. We understand that people have lost the most basic of human rights, 
the right to life, because of our actions. Therefore, we would like to restore and 
compensate the communities and families that have been left disadvantaged as a 
result of our actions. We will seek to promote any initiatives that increase equality 
between everyone. 
Relational Conclusion: 
To conclude, on the behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are 
deeply sorry. We will endeavour to promote contact with between us and any of 
the victims of our actions. We would like to help the communities that have been 
affected. We will seek to promote any initiatives that would help build trust 
between members of all communities in the future. 
Identity Conclusion: 
To conclude, on the behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are 
deeply sorry. We would like all to know that the IRA acknowledges that it owes a 
moral debt and that it is willing to take action to remove all threats (real or 
imagined) to anyone’s identity. As part of this process we will seek to endorse the 
rights of all those living within these islands. 
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Appendix 8 
Adapted Intergroup Forgiveness Scale for Northern Ireland (Hewstone et al., 2004)  
Used in Studies 5, 6 and 7. 
Where (A) is the transgressor. 
1. The political violence should never be retaliated against. 
2. It is important that the wrongs done to us are never forgotten. 
3. (A) must be forgiven, in order to be free of political violence. 
4. (A) should never be forgiven. 
5. The apology has made me want to forgive (A) more. 
6. Britain would be weaker if these wrongdoings were forgiven and forgotten. 
7. (A) are completely at fault for ‘The Troubles’. 
8. It is important that the atrocities are avenged. 
9. Britain and Northern Ireland will never move on until the events are 
forgotten. 
10. Britain and Northern Ireland will never move on until the events are 
forgiven. 
Questions 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8 need to be reverse coded
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Appendix 9 
Study 5. Exploratory analyses of ‘positive perceptions’ items, including means and SDs (in parentheses). 
 Large Group Small Group Individual 
 Structural Relational Identity Structural Relational Identity Structural Relational Identity 
Sincerity 3.41 
(.87) 
2.62 
(1.12) 
3.07 
(.75) 
3.17 
(1.00) 
3.52 
(.87) 
3.50 
(.84) 
4.00 
(.90) 
4.10 
(.77) 
4.03 
(.62) 
Remorse 3.59 
(.87) 
2.79 
(1.08) 
3.41 
(1.05) 
3.38 
(.82) 
3.48 
(1.02) 
3.64 
(1.03) 
4.04 
(.58) 
4.03 
(.78) 
4.00 
(.64) 
Trust 3.24 
(1.09) 
2.34 
(1.05) 
3.00 
(.80) 
3.10 
(.94) 
3.10 
(.77) 
2.93 
(1.18) 
3.82 
(.86) 
3.83 
(1.00) 
3.80 
(.61) 
Believability 3.21 
(1.01) 
2.76 
(.87) 
3.17 
(.76) 
3.14 
(.79) 
3.21 
(.77) 
3.07 
(.94) 
3.61 
(.88) 
3.52 
(.83) 
3.70 
(.65) 
 
Sincerity: Significant effect of apology source, F(2,251) = 30.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .19; non-significant effect of apology type, F(2, 251) = .53, p = .589, ηp2 < .01; 
significant interaction, F(4, 251) = 3.54, p = .008, ηp2 = .05 [driven by Large Group condition, where structural apology differs significantly from relational] 
Remorse: Significant effect of apology source, F(2,251) = 16.51, p < .001, ηp2 = .12; non-significant effect of apology type, F(2, 251) = 2.10, p = .124, ηp2 = 
.02; significant interaction, F(4, 251) = 2.46, p = .046, ηp2 = .04 [driven by Large Group condition, where relational apology differs significantly from 
structural and identity apologies] 
Trust: Significant effect of apology source, F(2,251) = 25.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .17; non-significant effect of apology type, F(2, 251) = 2.17, p = .116, ηp2 = .02; 
significant interaction, F(4, 251) = 2.63, p = .035, ηp2 = .04 [driven by Large Group condition, where structural apology differs significantly from relational] 
Believability: Significant effect of apology source, F(2,251) = 11.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .08; non-significant effect of apology type, F(2, 251) = .99, p = .373, ηp2 = 
.01; non-significant interaction, F(4, 251) = 1.05, p = .383, ηp2 = .02 
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Appendix 10 
Study 6 Manipulation (Combined vs. Remorse) 
Control Main Body: 
The IRA acknowledges that there have been faults and grievous errors in our 
prosecution of the war. Innocent people have been killed and injured as a result of 
our actions. We offer our apologies and condolences to the families of all those 
who lost their lives, and we recognise their grief and pain.  
Despite our regrets, the future will not be found in denying collective 
failures and mistakes or closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have 
been hurt. That includes all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-
combatants. It will not be achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some 
are deemed more or less worthy than others. The process of conflict resolution 
requires the equal acknowledgement of the grief and loss of others. 
We are endeavouring to fulfil this responsibility to those we have hurt. The 
IRA is committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice and peace in 
Ireland. We remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the 
challenges and difficulties which this presents. This includes the acceptance of our 
own past mistakes and of the hurt and pain we have caused to others. 
High Remorse Main Body: 
The IRA acknowledges that there have been faults and grievous errors in our 
prosecution of the war. Innocent people have been killed and injured as a result of 
our actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all 
those who lost their lives. We are deeply ashamed about the suffering that our 
actions have caused. 
Despite our immense feelings of guilt and regret, the future will not be 
found in denying collective failures and mistakes or closing minds and hearts to the 
plight of those who have been hurt. That includes all of the victims of the conflict, 
combatants and non-combatants. It will not be achieved by creating a hierarchy of 
victims in which some are deemed more or less worthy than others. The process of 
conflict resolution requires the equal acknowledgement of the grief and loss of 
others. 
We are endeavouring to fulfil this serious responsibility to those we have 
hurt. The IRA is committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice and 
peace in Ireland. We remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing 
with the challenges and difficulties which this presents. This includes the 
acceptance of our own past mistakes and of the hurt and pain we have caused to 
others.  
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Control Conclusion: 
To conclude, on behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are sorry. 
We feel remorse about the fact that people have lost the most basic of human 
rights, the right to life, because of our actions. Because of this we will endeavour to 
promote contact between us and any of the victims of our actions. We would 
therefore like to help the affected communities, through restoration and 
compensation. We acknowledge our debt and we will also take action to remove all 
threats to anyone’s identity. We will seek to promote any initiative that increase 
equality and trust between members of all communities in the future and as a part 
of this process we endorse the rights of all those living within these islands. 
High Remorse Conclusion: 
To conclude, on behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are deeply sorry. 
We feel sincere remorse about the fact that people have lost the most basic of 
human rights, the right to life, because of our actions. Because of this we will 
endeavour to promote contact between us and any of the victims of our actions. 
We would therefore like to help the affected communities, through restoration and 
compensation. We acknowledge our moral debt and we will also take action to 
remove all threats to anyone’s identity. We will seek to promote any initiative that 
increase equality and trust between members of all communities in the future and 
as a part of this process we endorse the rights of all those living within these 
islands. 
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Appendix 11 
Study 6. Exploratory analyses of ‘positive perceptions’ items, including means and 
SDs (in parentheses). 
 Apology Factors  
Included 
Apology Factors  
Not Included 
 High Remorse Control  High Remorse Control  
Sincerity 
 
3.16 
(1.09) 
3.41 
(.83) 
3.29 
(.87) 
2.61 
(.99) 
Remorse 
 
3.36 
(1.09) 
3.46 
(.89) 
3.40 
(.89) 
2.80 
(1.05) 
Trust 3.00 
(1.15) 
3.26 
(.98) 
3.11 
(.91) 
2.55 
(.90) 
Believability 3.07 
(.99) 
3.24 
(.90) 
3.20 
(.69) 
2.73 
(.76) 
 
Sincerity: Significant effect of apology factors, F(1,176) = 5.32, p = .020, ηp2 = .03; 
non-significant effect of remorse, F(1, 176) = 2.18, p = .142, ηp2 = .01; significant 
interaction, F(1, 176) = 10.85, p = .001, ηp2 = .06 [driven by the apology factors not 
included condition, where controlled remorse is significantly lower than high 
remorse]. 
Remorse: Significant effect of apology factors, F(1,176) = 4.44, p = .037, ηp2 = .03; 
non-significant effect of remorse, F(1, 176) = 2.96, p = .087, ηp2 = .02; significant 
interaction, F(1, 176) = 5.81, p = .017, ηp2 = .03 [driven by the apology factors not 
included condition, where controlled remorse is significantly lower than high 
remorse]. 
Trust: Significant effect of apology factors, F(1,176) = 4.20, p = .042, ηp2 = .02; non-
significant effect of remorse, F(1, 176) = 1.07, p = .303, ηp2 = .01; significant 
interaction, F(1, 176) = 7.85, p = .006, ηp2 = .04 [driven by the apology factors not 
included condition, where controlled remorse is significantly lower than high 
remorse]. 
Believability: Non-significant effect of apology factors, F(1,176) = 2.27, p = .134, ηp2 
= .01; non-significant effect of remorse, F(1, 176) = 1.43, p = .234, ηp2 = .01; 
significant interaction, F(1, 176) = 6.59, p = .011, ηp2 = .04 [driven by the apology 
factors not included condition, where controlled remorse is significantly lower than 
high remorse]. 
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Appendix 12 
Study 7 Manipulation (Combined vs. Emotion) 
Control Main Body: 
The IRA acknowledges that there were faults in the prosecution of the war. 
Innocent people were killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our 
sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives. 
We regret the suffering that our actions caused.   
 The future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or 
closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes 
all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be 
achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed more or less 
worthy than others. The process of conflict resolution requires the equal 
acknowledgement of the damage caused by everyone that has been involved. 
Guilt Main Body: 
The IRA acknowledges that there were faults in the prosecution of the war. 
Innocent people were killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our 
sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives. 
We regret the suffering that our actions caused. There is an immense feeling of 
guilt over the fact that we as a group were able to commit the acts that we did 
 The future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or 
closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes 
all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be 
achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed more or less 
worthy than others. The process of conflict resolution requires the equal 
acknowledgement of the damage caused by everyone that has been involved. 
Shame Main Body: 
The IRA acknowledges that there were faults in the prosecution of the war. 
Innocent people were killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our 
sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives. 
We regret the suffering that our actions caused. There is an immense feeling of 
shame over the fact that we as a group were able to commit the acts that we did 
 The future will not be found in denying collective failures and mistakes or 
closing minds and hearts to the plight of those who have been hurt. That includes 
all of the victims of the conflict, combatants and non-combatants. It will not be 
achieved by creating a hierarchy of victims in which some are deemed more or less 
worthy than others. The process of conflict resolution requires the equal 
acknowledgement of the damage caused by everyone that has been involved. 
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Control Conclusion: 
To conclude, on behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are sorry. 
We are trying to fulfil this responsibility to those that have been hurt, directly or 
indirectly. The IRA is committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice 
and peace in Ireland. We remain committed to the peace process and to dealing 
with the challenges and difficulties which this presents. This includes both the 
honest recognition of our own past mistakes, as well as the acceptance of the 
mistakes caused by others. All deaths during the troubles are regretted and should 
not have happened, and we underline the now important need to implement 
agreement in full to ensure that there are no future deaths from violence in 
Northern Ireland. 
Apology Factors Conclusion: 
To conclude, on behalf of everyone connected with the IRA, we are sorry. 
We regret the fact that people lost the most basic of human rights, the right to life, 
because of our actions during the conflict. Because of this we will endeavour to 
promote contact between us and any of the victims. We would like therefore like to 
help the affected communities, through restoration and compensation. We 
acknowledge our moral debt and we will also take action to remove all threats to 
anyone’s identity. We will seek to promote any initiative that increase equality and 
trust between members of all communities in the future and as a part of this 
process we endorse the rights of all those living within these islands. 
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Appendix 13 
Study 7. Exploratory analyses of ‘positive perceptions’ items, including means and 
SDs (in parentheses). 
 Apology Factors Included Apology Factors Not Included 
 Expressed 
Guilt 
Expressed 
Shame 
Control 
Expressed 
Guilt 
Expressed 
Shame 
Control 
Sincerity 
 
3.16 
(.87) 
3.16 
(.69) 
2.97 
(.89) 
2.87 
(.95) 
3.29 
(1.06) 
2.56 
(.91) 
Remorse 
 
3.35 
(.82) 
3.54 
(.84) 
2.97 
(.89) 
2.92 
(.98) 
3.37 
(1.08) 
2.59 
(.94) 
Trust 
 
2.92 
(.92) 
3.03 
(.83) 
3.03 
(.89) 
2.67 
(.90) 
2.95 
(.96) 
2.59 
(.91) 
Believability 3.00 
(.94) 
3.16 
(.69) 
2.95 
(.87) 
2.72 
(.86) 
3.18 
(1.01) 
2.56 
(.94) 
 
Sincerity: Non-significant effect of apology factors, F(1,222) = 2.55, p = .112, ηp2 = 
.01; significant effect of emotion, F(2, 222) = 4.89, p = .008, ηp2 = .04, [shame 
significantly larger than control]; non-significant interaction, F(2, 222) = 1.50, p = 
.160, ηp2 = .02. 
Remorse: Significant effect of apology factors, F(1,222) = 7.11, p = .008, ηp2 = .03, 
[factors included significantly larger than not included]; significant effect of 
emotion, F(2, 222) = 9.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, [shame and guilt significantly larger 
than control]; non-significant interaction, F(2, 222) = .41, p = .665, ηp2 < .01. 
Trust: Significant effect of apology factors, F(1,222) = 4.59, p = .033, ηp2 = .02, 
[factors included significantly larger than not included]; non-significant effect of 
emotion, F(2, 222) = 1.08, p = .340, ηp2 = .01; non-significant interaction, F(2, 222) = 
.74, p = .477, ηp2 = .01. 
Believability: Non-significant effect of apology factors, F(1,222) = 3.30, p = .071, ηp2 
= .02; significant effect of emotion, F(2, 222) = 4.51, p = .012, ηp2 = .04, [shame 
significantly larger than control]; non-significant interaction, F(2, 222) = 1.06, p = 
.348, ηp2 = .01. 
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Appendix 14 
Study 8 Game Behaviour Raw Data.  
“S” denotes that the group stole, and the accompanying number denotes the round 
number on which they exited. “C” denotes a fully completed round. 
 
 
Phase Game Group 1 Group 2 Phase Game Group 3 Group 4
1 b S3 a 1 b C5 C5 a
2 a S1 b 2 a S4 b
3 b S1 a 3 b S1 a
4 a S2 b 4 a S2 b
5 b S1 a 5 b S1 a
6 a S1 b 6 a S2 b
Pride 3 2 Pride 2 4
Guilt 5 5 Guilt 1 6
Shame 4 6 Shame 1 5
7 b C5 C5 a 7 b C5 C5 a
8 a S4 b 8 a S4 b
9 b C5 C5 a 9 b S3 a
10 a S4 b 10 a S4 b
11 b S2 a 11 a S2 b
12 a S2 b 12 b S1 a
Session 1 Session 2
1
Expression
2
1
2
Expression
Phase Game Group 5 Group 6 Phase Game Group 7 Group 8
1 b S4 a 1 a S3 b
2 a S3 b 2 b C5 C5 a
3 b S4 a 3 a S4 b
4 a C5 C5 b 4 b C5 C5 a
5 b S4 a 5 a S4 b
6 a C5 C5 b 6 b C5 C5 a
Pride 5 4 Pride 4 5
Guilt 2 1 Guilt 2 1
Shame 2 1 Shame 2 1
7 b S4 a 7 b S2 a
8 a C5 C5 b 8 a S2 b
9 b S4 a 9 b S2 a
10 a S3 b 10 a S1 b
11 b S1 a 11 b S2 a
12 a S2 b 12 a S1 b
Session 4
1
Expression
2
Session 3
1
Expression
2
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Phase Game Group 9 Group 10 Phase Game Group 11 Group 12
1 b S3 a 1 b C5 C5 a
2 a S3 b 2 a S3 b
3 b S3 a 3 b C5 C5 a
4 a S3 b 4 a S2 b
5 b S3 a 5 b S1 a
6 a S1 b 6 a S1 b
Pride 4 1 Pride 4 5
Guilt 1 1 Guilt 1 2
Shame 1 1 Shame 1 2
7 b S4 a 7 a S4 b
8 a S3 b 8 b S2 a
9 b S1 a 9 a S2 b
10 a S2 b 10 b S1 a
11 b S2 a 11 a S1 b
12 a S2 b 12 b S1 a
Session 6
1
Expression
2
Session 5
1
Expression
2
Phase Game Group 13 Group 14 Phase Game Group 15 Group 16
1 a C5 C5 b 1 a S4 b
2 b S4 a 2 b C5 C5 a
3 a S3 b 3 a S4 b
4 b S3 a 4 b C5 C5 a
5 a S1 b 5 a S4 b
6 b S1 a 6 b S2 a
Pride 3 3 Pride 5 6
Guilt 5 5 Guilt 2 1
Shame 6 5 Shame 1 1
7 a C5 C5 b 7 a S1 b
8 b C5 C5 a 8 b S1 a
9 a C5 C5 b 9 a S3 b
10 b C5 C5 a 10 b S1 a
11 a C5 C5 b 11 a S1 b
12 b S4 a 12 b S1 a
Session 8
1
Expression
2
Session 7
1
Expression
2
Phase Game Group 17 Group 18 Phase Game Group 19 Group 20
1 b S2 a 1 b S2 a
2 a S1 b 2 a C5 C5 b
3 b S1 a 3 b S4 a
4 a S1 b 4 a S3 b
5 b S1 a 5 b C5 C5 a
6 a S1 b 6 a S2 b
Pride 4 2 Pride 6 3
Guilt 4 2 Guilt 2 4
Shame 3 2 Shame 1 3
7 b S1 a 7 b S2 a
8 a S1 b 8 a S4 b
9 b S2 a 9 b S2 a
10 a S2 b 10 a S4 b
11 b S2 a 11 b S1 a
12 a S2 b 12 a S2 b
Session 10
1
Expression
2
Session 9
1
Expression
2
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Phase Game Group 21 Group 22 Phase Game Group 23 Group 24
1 a C5 C5 b 1 a C5 C5 b
2 b C5 C5 a 2 b C5 C5 a
3 a C5 C5 b 3 a C5 C5 b
4 b S4 a 4 b C5 C5 a
5 a C5 C5 b 5 a S2 b
6 b S4 a 6 b S1 a
Pride 5 1 Pride 5 5
Guilt 3 1 Guilt 1 5
Shame 1 1 Shame 2 2
7 a C5 C5 b 7 b C5 C5 a
8 b S4 a 8 a C5 C5 b
9 a C5 C5 b 9 b S3 a
10 b S4 a 10 a S1 b
11 a C5 C5 b 11 b S2 a
12 b S1 a 12 a S1 b
Session 12
1
Expression
2
Session 11
1
Expression
2
Phase Game Group 25 Group 26 Phase Game Group 27 Group 28
1 b C5 C5 a 1 a S4 b
2 a S4 b 2 b S2 a
3 b S4 a 3 a S2 b
4 a S4 b 4 b S2 a
5 b S2 a 5 a S2 b
6 a S1 b 6 b S2 a
Pride 2 3 Pride
Guilt 6 4 Guilt
Shame 6 5 Shame
7 b C5 C5 a 7 b S1 a
8 a C5 C5 b 8 a S1 b
9 b C5 C5 a 9 b S2 a
10 a C5 C5 b 10 a S1 b
11 b S2 a 11 b S1 a
12 a S1 b 12 a S1 b
Session 14
1
Expression
2
Session 13
1
Expression
2
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Appendix 15 
Study 10 Staircase Model Manipulation 
Step 0: Control Condition 
To present day, there has been no contact between the Thai and Cambodian 
Governments concerning the events at Preah Vihear. 
 
Step 1: Accepting Collective Guilt 
In early 2014, Thailand made contact with Cambodia and admitted their 
fault for crossing into the district whilst armed. The Thai government issued a 
statement in which they recognised their wrongdoing and accepted collective guilt 
for the dispute. Specifically, they disclosed that the blame for the conflict “lay with 
them” and that the deaths of soldiers and civilians from both countries was both 
“regrettable and a direct consequence of Thai actions” 
 
Step 2: Settings History Records Straight 
In addition to accepting guilt, Thai officials signed a copy of the ICJ’s official 
document stating the events that occurred at Preah Vihear and that they 
recognised that the Temple belonged to Cambodia and that they would make no 
further claim on it. Representatives of both the Thai and Cambodian worked 
together to ensure what was drawn up in the ICJ’s document was factual and 
accurate. 
 
Step 3: Discussing Reparations 
In May 2014, the Thai government offered to pay for all reparations needed 
for the Preah Vihear Temple by a way of reconciliation, and to offer a significant 
amount of money to each Cambodian family who had lost a family member in the 
conflict. In addition to this, they stated that they will soon remove any military 
camps that were located near the Cambodian border, ensuring the safety of the 
Cambodian people.   
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Step 4: Intergroup Apology 
The Prime Minister of Thailand used the following public statement to 
apologise to Cambodia for the conflict:  
  “I, as well as the rest of the Thai Government acknowledge that there have 
been faults and grievous errors in the effort to seize land. Innocent people have 
been killed and injured as a result of our actions. We offer our sincere apologies 
and condolences to the families of all those who lost their lives. We are ashamed 
about the suffering that our actions have caused.  
We are trying to fulfil this responsibility to those we have hurt. The Thai 
Government is committed unequivocally to rebuilding our relationship with 
Cambodia. We remain totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with 
the challenges and difficulties which this presents. This includes the recognition of 
our own past mistakes and the hurt and pain we have caused.” 
 
Step 5: Post-Apology Engagement 
A year after Thailand’s offer of reparations, all families that had lost a family 
member in the conflict that sought financial compensation had received it as 
promised. Later that year, the Preah Vihear Temple had been given World Heritage 
status, with Thailand paying when any repairs were necessary. As a form of 
acknowledgement of their role, the Thai Government send flowers and 
representatives to attend any memorial services regarding those who had died as a 
result of the events at Preah Vihear, so that the relationship between them and 
Cambodia could become harmonious and avoid any further conflict. 
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Appendix 16 
 Study 11 Staircase Model Manipulation  
Step 0: Control Condition 
To present day, there has been no contact between the remaining IRA group 
and the British government or people. 
 
Step 1: Accepting Collective Guilt 
In late 2005, the IRA made contact with the British Government and 
admitted their fault for the atrocities they caused in Britain. The IRA issued a 
statement in which they recognised their wrongdoing and accepted collective guilt 
for the actions. Specifically, they disclosed that the blame for the acts that occurred 
in Britain “lay with them” and that the deaths were “regrettable and a direct 
consequence of IRA actions”. 
 
Step 2: Settings History Records Straight 
In addition to accepting guilt, IRA officials signed a copy of Britain’s official 
document stating that they recognised that they were at fault for the attacks and 
bombings that they conducted. Representatives of both the IRA and the British 
government worked together to ensure what was drawn up in the document was 
factual and accurate. 
 
Step 3: Discussing Reparations 
In early 2006, the IRA offered to pay for all reparations for their attacks in 
Britain by a way of reconciliation, and to offer a significant amount of money to 
each British family who had lost a family member in the conflict. In addition to this, 
they stated that they will soon complete the disarmament of all of their weapons, 
ensuring the safety of the British people and their identity.  
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Step 4: Intergroup Apology 
An IRA spokesperson used the following public statement to apologise to 
the British people for the conflict: 
“The IRA acknowledges that there have been faults and grievous errors in 
the prosecution of war. Innocent people have been killed and injured as a result of 
our actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all 
those who lost their lives. We are ashamed about the suffering that our actions 
have caused. 
We are trying to fulfil this responsibility to those we have hurt. The IRA is 
committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice, and peace. We remain 
totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the challenges and 
difficulties which this presents. This includes the recognition of our own past 
mistakes and the hurt and pain we have caused.” 
 
Step 5: Post-Apology Engagement 
A year after the IRA’s offer of reparations, all families that had lost a family 
member in the conflict that sought financial compensation had received it as 
promised. Later that year, the international weapons inspectors confirmed the 
groups ‘full disarmament’ status. As a form of acknowledgment of their role, the 
remaining IRA group send flowers and representatives to attend any remembrance 
services of the British people who had died as a result of their actions, so that the 
relationship between them and the British could become harmonious and avoid any 
further conflict.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendices 
264 
 
 
 Appendix 17 
 Study 12 Staircase Model Manipulation 
Apology 
An IRA spokesperson used the following public statement to apologise to all 
of the victims of conflict: 
“The IRA acknowledges that there have been faults and grievous errors in 
the prosecution of war. Innocent people have been killed and injured as a result of 
our actions. We offer our sincere apologies and condolences to the families of all 
those who lost their lives. We are ashamed about the suffering that our actions 
have caused. 
We are trying to fulfil this responsibility to those we have hurt. The IRA is 
committed unequivocally to the search for freedom, justice, and peace. We remain 
totally committed to the peace process and to dealing with the challenges and 
difficulties which this presents. This includes the recognition of our own past 
mistakes and the hurt and pain we have caused.” 
 
Accepting Guilt 
In late 2005, the IRA made contact with the British Government and 
admitted their fault the atrocities that they caused. Following this, both the IRA and 
the British Government issued statements in which they recognised their 
wrongdoing and accepted collective guilt for particular actions during ‘The 
Troubles’. Specifically, both disclosed that the blame for particular acts “lay with 
them” and that the deaths were “regrettable and a direct consequence of our 
actions”. 
 
Setting History Records 
In addition to accepting guilt, officials of both the IRA and the British 
government met to discuss the official documentation of events during ‘The 
Troubles’. The representatives worked together to ensure that what was drawn up 
into the document was factual and accurate. After these discussions, both parties 
signed a copy of the official document. 
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Discussing Reparations 
In early 2006, representatives of the IRA and the British Government again 
met, this time to discuss reparations. The negotiations allowed both parties to 
suggest what was needed of one another to continue the reconciliation process. 
These discussions ended in a positive manner, with certain promises made, the 
British Government offering a more devolved government in Northern Ireland, and 
the IRA offering a complete disarmament to the ensure the safety of civilians in 
Northern Ireland and mainland Britain. 
 
Control 
Following ‘The Good Friday Agreement (1998)’ to present day, there has 
been little public contact from the remaining IRA group. 
 
Conditions 
 
Condition 0: Control. 
Condition 1: Apology. 
Condition 2: Accepting Guilt, Apology. 
Condition 3: Accepting Guilt, Setting History Records, Apology. 
Condition 4: Accepting Guilt, Setting History Records, Discussing Reparations, 
Apology. 
Condition 5: Discussing Reparations, Setting History Records, Accepting Guilt, 
Apology. 
 
 
 
 
